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Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean:  
Past Problems Counsel Precaution 
Michael LeVine, Peter Van Tuyn, Layla Hughes* 
“Although it can be a forbidding moonscape, the Arctic is also var-
ied, majestic, serene, memorably beautiful and occasionally gentle. 
The far north is not only a prowling bear, a battering storm and vi-
cious cold, but also a fat bumblebee buzzing among delicately yel-
low arctic poppies.”1 
“I believe there will not be an oil spill.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For most of history, the U.S. Arctic Ocean was protected from 
large-scale industrial activities by sea ice, remoteness, and plentiful re-
sources in other, more accessible regions. That reality is rapidly changing 
as receding sea ice and the growing world demand for resources have led 
to increased corporate interest in the Arctic Ocean. This industrial pres-
sure occurs against the backdrop of a swiftly changing climate, an ab-
sence of holistic planning for the future of the region, missing scientific 
information, and a lack of proven technologies. 
The potential for industrial development in the America’s Arctic 
Ocean has generated substantial controversy. At the center of this con-
troversy are a series of decisions made by the federal government to al-
low offshore oil and gas activities in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas. 
                                                            
* Michael LeVine is Pacific Senior Counsel for Oceana, an international nonprofit organization 
dedicated to maintaining and restoring ocean ecosystems. He is based in Juneau, AK. Peter Van 
Tuyn is an environmental attorney with the law firm Bessenyey & Van Tuyn, L.L.C., located in 
Anchorage, AK. Layla Hughes is an attorney and founder of Arctic Policy Consulting. The authors 
owe a debt of gratitude to Karen Schmidt, Lisa Marrioti, Erik Grafe, Susan Murray, Chris Krenz, 
Leah Donahey, Kristen Miller, Brian McLane, and Cindy Shogan for their contributions to, and 
support for, this article. 
 1. Dr. William E. Taylor, Foreword to FRED BRUEMMER, THE ARCTIC WORLD 1 (1985). 
 2. John M. Broder, Shell Is Likely to Receive Permits for Oil Drilling Off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/interior-department-will-likely-
allow-shell-to-drill-in-arctic.html?_r=0 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar). 
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These approvals have greatly expanded the presence of multinational oil 
companies in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. Prior to 2003, companies held al-
most no leases in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas, and no exploration drill-
ing had been conducted since the early 1990s. Over the last decade, more 
than three million acres of leases have been sold, and subsidiaries of 
Royal Dutch Shell have been awarded permits to conduct exploration 
drilling. The leasing and exploration-related approvals have generated 
opposition and litigation, and activities undertaken pursuant to those ap-
provals have created direct risk to the marine environment. 
In this Article, we provide context for the controversy facing gov-
ernment agencies charged with making decisions about the future of 
America’s Arctic Ocean. We then distill themes that, if addressed, could 
help further a lasting solution for this region that respects its natural and 
human values while crafting a reasonable path forward for decisions 
about development. First, this Article offers background about the re-
gion, the threats facing it, and some of the challenges in managing the 
natural resources there. Second, it provides an overview of the legal 
framework through which the United States government makes decisions 
about whether and under what conditions offshore oil and gas activities 
should occur. Third, this Article highlights decisions about Arctic Ocean 
resources that have been made pursuant to that legal framework and dis-
cusses the resulting court challenges. 
Based on that review, we conclude that the controversy has resulted 
in large part from: (1) the failure to ensure necessary preparedness; (2) 
the lack of community involvement; and (3) the need for more specific 
mandates to ensure that management decisions about resources in im-
portant and unique places, like the Arctic, are based on sufficient science, 
precaution, and an equitable balancing of costs and benefits. This Article 
identifies specific problems with the existing law that Congress could 
address to improve decision making, and finally, it highlights steps that 
federal agencies could take without congressional action to improve pre-
paredness, community involvement, and the rules governing decisions 
about Arctic Ocean resources. 
II. AMERICA’S ARCTIC OCEAN 
The U.S. Arctic Ocean, as defined by the Arctic Research and Poli-
cy Act, includes the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi seas, extending as far 
south as the Aleutian Islands and north to the end of the U.S. Exclusive 
Economic Zone, 200 nautical miles from the northern coast of Alaska.3 
                                                            
 3. Arctic Research and Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4111 (2012). 
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This vast and diverse region of the world’s ocean provides vital habitat 
for countless mammals, birds, and fish, and it supports vibrant communi-
ties and opportunities for subsistence. It is also changing as a result of 
climate warming and ocean acidification. The southern region—the Ber-
ing Sea—supports some of the world’s largest fisheries and is part of a 
major industrial shipping route.4 By contrast, the northern region—the 
Chukchi and Beaufort seas—have been largely insulated from large-scale 
industrial activity until relatively recently. 
This Article focuses on the federal waters of the U.S. Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas—which extend from three to 200 miles offshore—because 
these areas are at the heart of the debate about whether and how to move 
forward with oil and gas activities in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. In this Part, 
we discuss the unique nature of northern Arctic seas and their importance 
to wildlife and coastal communities; the state of scientific information 
about the U.S. Arctic Ocean; and the dual challenges posed by changing 
climate and growing industrial pressure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 4. See infra Part II.C.3.b–c (discussing shipping and commercial fishing). 
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A. The Arctic Ocean Is Unique and Important 
The coasts along the Beaufort and Chukchi seas are sparsely popu-
lated, with eight villages whose residents are predominately Iñupiat Es-
kimo.5 The Iñupiat people have lived in the region and depended on the 
Arctic ecosystems to provide fish, whales, walrus, seals, seabirds, and 
other resources for thousands of years.6 For the local people, subsistence 
foods provide a substantial amount of everyday nutrition, comprising up 
to 50% of total calories consumed in U.S. Arctic communities. These 
foods also provide health benefits; the proportion of daily intake is in-
versely related to the risk of developing metabolic disorders.7 Arctic 
communities have been experiencing a rise in chronic diseases such as 
diabetes and cancer, making the availability of subsistence foods all the 
more important.8 In addition to food, subsistence resources provide mate-
rials for clothing, boat-building, and other fundamental needs.9 
Subsistence practices also form the basis of cultural, social, and 
spiritual values in the region.10 “Subsistence activities are assigned the 
highest cultural value by the Iñupiat and provide a sense of identity in 
addition to the substantial economic and nutritional contributions.”11 The 
sharing and trading of subsistence foods reinforces the strong relation-
ships within and among families and communities.12 Because the most 
important subsistence resources—whales, for example—are migratory, 
subsistence activities can be concentrated in time and space. 
                                                            
 5. Harry Brower Jr. & Taqulik Hepa, Subsistence Hunting Activities and the Inupiat Eskimo, 
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. (Fall 1998), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-
quarterly/united-states/subsistence-hunting-activities-and-inupiat-es. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Aaron Wernham, Iñupiat Health and Proposed Alaskan Oil Development: Results of the 
First Integrated Health Impact Assessment/Environmental Impact Statement for Proposed Oil De-
velopment on Alaska’s North Slope, 4 ECOHEALTH 500, 506–07 (2007). 
 8. Id. at 500, 504. 
 9. Brower & Hepa, supra note 5. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. ET AL., EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS 
ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
VOLUME I, AT 3-59, 2-60, 3-157 (2013) [hereinafter NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS], available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/permits/eis/arctic_sdeis_vol1.pdf. 
 12. Brower & Hepa, supra note 5. 
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In addition to subsistence, Arctic waters are also of vital importance 
to some of the world’s most iconic wildlife species, including ice-
dependent polar bears, walruses, and ice seals. Bowhead, beluga, and 
gray whales spend some or all of their time in these waters.13 Millions of 
birds, representing more than 100 species, migrate from nearly every 
corner of the world to nest and feed in the Arctic each summer.14 These 
bird species include some that are protected under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA), such as the Steller’s and spectacled eiders; candidate 
species under the ESA, such as the yellow-billed loon and Kittlitz’s 
murrelet; and other species of conservation concern, including Pacific 
black brant.15 More than 100 fish species live in the Chukchi and Beau-
fort seas, including Arctic grayling, Arctic char, all five species of Pacif-
ic salmon, capelin, herring, and various species of cod and sculpin.16 
The “Arctic environment is highly variable both physically and bio-
logically.”17 Thus, what could appear at quick glance to be a homoge-
nous landscape of snow and ice is actually a vibrant web of important 
places that change dramatically with the seasons. Phytoplankton and ice 
algae form the basis of the food web, which is characterized by short 
food chains, seasonal periods of high productivity, and migration.18 
Habitats in the Beaufort Sea differ from those in the Chukchi, and within 
each sea there is significant variance among areas. At the same time, 
there are commonalities. Consistent ice leads and polynas—openings in 
the ice—and the ice edge, which grows and contracts over great distanc-
es seasonally, are among the most important areas to many species.19 
Migration corridors and certain high-productivity habitats along the sea-
floor are also among the most important areas. The concentrated seasonal 
and spatial nature of biological resources in the Arctic and the simple 
food chain may make the ocean ecosystem particularly sensitive to im-
                                                            
 13. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3–92. 
 14. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ARCTIC LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE (2010), 
available at http://library.fws.gov/LCC/Arctic.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
 16. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-59; N. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC MANAGEMENT AREA 56 (2009) 
[hereinafter FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN], http://www.npfmc.org/wp-content/PDFdocuments/ 
fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf. 
 17. Leslie Holland-Bartels & Jonathan J. Kolak, Oil-Spill Risk, Response, and Impact, in AN 
EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE NEEDS TO INFORM DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHUKCHI AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA 109, 151 (Leslie Holland-
Bartels & Brenda Pierce eds., 2011) [hereinafter USGS REPORT], available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370/pdf/circ1370.pdf 
 18. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16, at 43, 53–54. 
 19. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-7. 
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pacts from climate change and activities such as oil and gas exploration 
and development. 
In addition, the Arctic region plays a critical role in regulating the 
global climate system,20 including weather patterns in the northern hemi-
sphere.21 The colder Arctic is a sink for heat from the rest of the world, 
and the movement of heat from the tropics to the poles affects weather 
patterns. Storm tracks depend on the position, strength, and orientation of 
the jet stream,22 and fluctuations in the polar regions affect the location 
and speed of the jet stream, which affects weather patterns, especially at 
mid-latitudes.23 
B. Lack of Scientific Information About the Arctic Ocean 
Though scientists know that the Arctic Ocean is important to the 
people and wildlife of the region and as part of the climate system, there 
is a widely acknowledged lack of basic scientific information about the 
region. In 2005, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) noted 
that the Arctic is “the least studied and most poorly understood area on 
Earth” and that, in particular, “[t]he Arctic Ocean is the least well known 
ocean on the planet. We know more about the topography of the planets 
Venus and Mars than we do about the bathymetry of the Arctic Ocean.”24 
Since the USARC made that statement, scientific efforts have increased 
in the Arctic, and more is known now than a decade ago. Still, there are 
substantial information gaps, and, as explained below, the government 
continues to rely on decisions that were made under conditions of con-
siderable uncertainty. This lack of basic scientific information creates 
significant hurdles to effective management of human activities. 
Scientists recognize that the recent loss of sea ice during the sum-
mer months is fundamentally changing Arctic Ocean ecosystems, yet 
relatively little is known about the abundance and distribution of com-
                                                            
 20. Gordon McBean et al., Arctic Climate: Past and Present, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 21, 32–34 (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/ 
pages/scientific.html. 
 21. Mark C. Serreze et al., Perspectives on the Arctic’s Shrinking Sea-Ice Cover, 315 SCIENCE 
1533, 1536 (2007). 
 22. Cristina L. Archer & Ken Caldeira, Historical Trends in the Jet Streams, 35 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS 1, 5 (2008). 
 23. See OCEANA ET AL., AS GOES THE ARCTIC, SO GOES THE PLANET 15–16 (2008), available 
at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/o/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/pacific/ArcticPetition-FINAL-
lowres.pdf. 
 24. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC 
RESEARCH 2005, at 1, 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/goals/usarc_goals 
_2005.pdf. 
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mon species, much less how the food webs work in this region.25 As the 
USARC noted, “Fundamental baseline scientific information is lacking 
for living resources in much of the region, and basic biological aspects, 
such as the ecology of the area, and the spatial habitat of flora and fauna 
that might be at risk from spills are poorly known.”26 In fact, in the 2008 
environmental impact statement (EIS) analyzing the potential impacts 
from Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea, the Department of 
the Interior explicitly recognized that there is significant missing infor-
mation about even the most basic parameters for every one of the largest 
and most conspicuous animals in the ecosystem—all fish, marine mam-
mals, and birds—which, in other regions, are typically the most studied 
animals.27 The missing information for these species included abun-
dance, distribution, and life history. As a result of this missing infor-
mation, the government concluded, among other things, that it could not 
determine the potential level of effects oil and gas development could 
have on marine mammals.28 Accordingly, a court-ordered supplemental 
EIS for the lease sale included a lengthy appendix chronicling the in-
stances in which the agency acknowledged that it did not have data po-
tentially relevant to the effects of oil and gas activity in the Chukchi 
                                                            
 25. See SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 8, 10, 14–15, 24, 58–61 (2004), 
available at http://www.amap.no/arctic-climate-impact-assessment-acia; see also NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV. ALASKA REGION, FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR THE ARCTIC 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND AMENDMENT 29 TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND TANNER CRABS 79–90, 99–105, 192 (2009) [hereinafter 
ARCTIC FMP EA], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NOAA-NMFS-
2009-0042-0403. 
 26. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION RECOMMENDS 
STEPS TO EXPANDED U.S. FUNDING FOR ARCTIC/SUBARCTIC OIL SPILL RESEARCH 2 (2010), availa-
ble at http://issuu.com/wickcommunications/docs/2010.5.26_usarc_oilspill_white_paper_finalcrmt/ 
2. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 297–302 (discussing litigation challenging the decision 
to hold Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea). 
 28. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 
193 AND SEISMIC SURVEYING ACTIVITIES IN THE CHUKCHI SEA I, at II-42, II-45, IV-269, IV-274 
(2007), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/ 
Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-026-Vol%20I.pdf (“[B]ecause of the 
lack of data on marine mammal distributions and habitat use in offshore areas of the Chukchi Sea, it 
is uncertain what the level of effects would be in offshore area.”). 
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Sea.29 The agency has made similar acknowledgments for data gaps in 
the Beaufort Sea.30 
The lack of baseline science has also been highlighted by several 
other prominent local and federal agencies as well as by international 
bodies. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has identified in-
formation gaps for nearly every species in the Arctic Ocean.31 In its 
comments on the Draft Proposed 2010–15 Five-Year Leasing Program, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recom-
mended using a precautionary approach, delaying oil and gas activities in 
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas until more information is available to 
support sustainable management.32 The final report of the National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing (National Commission) echoed this sentiment, observing that the 
“[s]cientific understanding of environmental conditions . . . in areas pro-
posed for more drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate.”33 “The same is 
                                                            
 29. See CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA, OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 193 IN THE CHUKCHI SEA, 
ALASKA: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, APPENDIX A (2011) 
[hereinafter CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS], available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Enviro
nment/Environmental_Analysis/2011-041v1.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., PROPOSED OCS LEASE SALE 202, BEAUFORT SEA 
PLANNING AREA 109 (2006), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_ 
Newsroom/Library/Publications/2006/2006_EA_202.pdf (noting lack of data on cumulative impacts 
of development on polar bears); id. at 55–56 (noting that the impacts of an oil spill are uncertain). 
 31. See, e.g., Anthony R. DeGrange & Lyman Thorsteinson, Ecological and Subsistence Con-
text, in USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 41, 59 (For marine mammals generally, “seasonal, annual, 
and geographic variability in diet are poorly quantified and foraging areas are poorly de-
scribed . . . . Population enumeration is poor, even non-existent, for many [marine mammal] species, 
and relatively good for a few. Without information on stock structure, however, which is poorly 
known for many species but fundamental to management, data are difficult to interpret even for 
species where abundance estimates exist.”); Deborah R. Hutchinson & Richard C. Ferrero, Marine 
Mammals and Anthropogenic Noise, in USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 165, 187 (“There is a basic 
lack of information about ice seals. Key information about the abundance, distribution, and vital 
aspects of ice seals is incomplete.”); DeGrange & Thorsteinson, supra, at 69 (regarding fish, 
“[i]nformation about status and trends, habitat requirements, relative distribution and abundance, and 
knowledge of life history stages . . . is incomplete and unavailable for large expanses of Arctic 
nearshore and shelf waters . . . .”). 
 32. See Letter from Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Sec’y of Commerce for Oceans and Atmos-
phere, to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Dir., Minerals Mgmt. Serv. 5 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/noaa/09_12_10_NOAA_Comments_on_MMS_5_Year_Plan.pdf. 
 33. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING vii (2011) [here-
inafter DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. In the wake of the explosion of the 
Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, President Obama created the National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. The Commission was “an independent, 
nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. The President 
charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability 
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true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills,” as well as the im-
pacts of routine oil and gas operations.34 The Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment, an international project of the Arctic Council and the Interna-
tional Arctic Science Committee, highlighted basic surveys and monitor-
ing as well as ecosystem-based research as some of the highest priority 
research actions needed for Arctic marine waters.35 Further, both the 
North Slope Borough and Northwest Arctic Borough (the local govern-
ments in the U.S. Arctic, approximately equivalent to counties) have 
called for better baseline science to guide decisions, and Senator Mark 
Begich (D-AK) has introduced legislation calling for additional Arctic 
research and coordination.36 
Where basic information about the marine ecosystem exists, much 
of it is old, spotty, and sparse. For example, the 2008 Environmental As-
sessment for the Arctic Fishery Management Plan states that “data [is] 
scarce for estimating the abundance and biomass of fishes in the Alaskan 
Arctic.”37 The review of potential data sources indicated that surveys for 
fish have occurred about every fifteen to twenty years but typically over 
different regions. Even if those surveys over the past sixty years were 
combined, which would be inappropriate due to different sampling 
methodologies and other reasons, there are still major areas of the U.S. 
Arctic Ocean shelf region that have yet to be surveyed. 
Despite harsh and changing conditions, progress is being made. 
Various private and public entities have recently started scientific re-
search programs in the Arctic Ocean to fill some of the data gaps.  For 
example, the Chukchi Sea Environmental Studies Program (CSESP), 
funded by ConocoPhilips, Shell, and Statoil, is a multi-year, multi-
                                                                                                                                     
to respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer.” Id. at vi. 
The Commission held hearings, produced working papers, and ultimately concluded its work with 
the publication of the Deepwater Horizon Report. 
 34. Id. at vii; see also Letter from Jane Lubchenco, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that “[t]here are 
also gaps in our understanding of how some species utilize habitat in the Arctic and how behavioral 
responses to seismic airguns may or may not exclude marine mammal from these habitats, particu-
larly in the face of potentially increasing levels of exploration and development.”). 
 35. See Harald Loeng et al., Marine Systems, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 20, at 453, 522. The International Arctic Science Committee is “a non-governmental 
organisation [sic] that aims to encourage, facilitate and promote cooperation in all aspects of Arctic 
research in all countries engaged in Arctic research and in all areas of the Arctic region.” INT’L 
ARCTIC SCI. COMM., http://www.iasc.info/ (last visited May 29, 2014). 
 36. See, e.g., Letter from Reggie Joule, Mayor, Nw. Arctic Borough, to Michael S. Rolland, 
Chief, Leasing Section, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (Nov. 18, 2013); Arctic Ocean Research 
and Science Policy Review Act of 2009, S. 1562, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s1562rs/pdf/BILLS-111s1562rs.pdf; Arctic Research, 
Monitoring, and Observing Act of 2013, S. 1344, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 37. ARCTIC FMP EA, supra note 25, at 99. 
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discipline marine science research program collecting information on 
physical oceanography, ocean acidification, atmospheric conditions, sed-
iments, benthic communities, plankton ecology, fish, seabirds, marine 
mammals, and underwater acoustics.38 The purpose of the study is to 
provide baseline information that can be used by the government in its 
analysis and management of industrial activities.39 In addition, Shell and 
the North Slope Borough are working together under a five-year collabo-
rative science agreement in order to expand the baseline knowledge of 
the Arctic ecosystem, including human health, social, and cultural condi-
tions.40 
Other entities are working to synthesize existing information. For 
example, the North Pacific Research Board (NPRB), the National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF) Office of Polar Programs, and the North Pacific 
Marine Research Institute (NPMRI) are synthesizing arctic science in a 
project called the “Pacific Marine Arctic Regional Synthesis of the 
Northern Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas” (PacMARS), and BOEM 
and NOAA scientists are leading a somewhat different synthesis project 
known as the “Synthesis of Arctic Research” (SOAR).41 Several non-
governmental organizations have worked collaboratively to collect avail-
able scientific information, use it to identify important areas in the U.S. 
Arctic Ocean, and provide that information to government decision mak-
ers.42 
                                                            
 38. CHUKCHI SEA ENVTL. STUDIES PROGRAM, http://www.chukchiscience.com/ (last visited 
May 29, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Press Release, Shell, North Slope Borough, Shell to Collaborate on Science (Oct. 28, 
2010), available at http://www.shell.us/aboutshell/projects-locations/alaska/events-news/10282010-
science.html. 
 41. See, e.g., PAC. MARINE ARCTIC REG’L SYNTHESIS, http://pacmars.cbl.umces.edu/ (last 
visited May 29, 2014); SYNTHESIS OF ARCTIC RESEARCH (SOAR), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/soar/ 
(last visited May 29, 2014). 
 42. See generally Letter from Nat’l Audubon Soc’y et al., to Tommy Beaudreau, Dir., Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (Dec. 3, 2013) available at http://ak.audubon.org/sites/default/files/ 
documents/chukchi_call_comments_and_appendices_3dec2013.pdf (“While we recommend against 
proceeding with the lease sale at this time, our comments focus on providing BOEM with infor-
mation and analysis necessary to follow through with a reasonable approach to targeted leasing 
separate and apart from the valid reasons not to hold the lease sale.”); Melanie A. Smith, Arctic 
Marine Synthesis: Atlas of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, AUDUBON ALASKA, 
http://ak.audubon.org/arctic-marine-synthesis-atlas-chukchi-and-beaufort-seas (last visited May 29, 
2014). 
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C. The Triple Threat: Climate Change, Acidification, and                        
Industrialization 
The Arctic region is changing. Climate change is resulting in sub-
stantial warming, and marine absorption of carbon dioxide is causing 
oceans to become more acidic. At the same time, industrial activity is 
increasing in the Arctic Ocean. Together, these changes may have sub-
stantial effects on the people and ecosystems in the region. As the inter-
agency working group created by President Obama to address Arctic is-
sues explained, 
The U.S. Arctic is experiencing rapid, sustained change, and those 
changes are expected to continue into the coming decades due to 
climate change, resource extraction, and increasing human activi-
ties. Terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems as well as 
broader environmental, cultural, and economic trends in the Arctic 
will be affected.43 
This section summarizes the changes that are occurring in the U.S. Arctic 
and the risks that are created by those changes. 
1. Climate Change 
The Arctic is warming roughly twice as fast as the rest of the 
world.44 The more rapid temperature increase, known as “Arctic amplifi-
cation,” is due in part to a number of processes known as feedbacks.45 
Most importantly, warming is causing snow and sea ice to melt. Snow 
and sea ice reflect solar energy, and as it melts, new areas of ocean and 
land open; these darker areas absorb substantially more energy than the 
ice-covered areas. Once it is absorbed, this energy is converted to heat, 
which warms the Arctic.46 
                                                            
 43. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEV. & 
PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC 8 (2013) 
[hereinafter INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/upload/ 
ArcticReport-03April2013PMsm.pdf.  
 44. See Henry Huntington et al., Introduction, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 20, at 1, 3–23. In addition, the shape of the troposphere—the atmospheric layer over the 
Earth’s surface—causes the Arctic to warm faster than other parts of the planet. Because the tropo-
sphere is thinner in the Arctic, less energy is necessary to warm it there than would be required to 
warm the much thicker atmospheric layer in the tropics. See Vladimir M. Kattsov et al., Future 
Climate Change: Modeling and Scenarios for the Arctic, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 20, at 99, 106. Finally, lower evaporation rates leave more energy available to warm the 
atmosphere in the Arctic. Since a smaller fraction of energy goes to evaporation at the poles, more 
energy goes directly to heating the atmosphere. See id. at 126. 
 45. Huntington et al., supra note 44, at 12. 
 46. See generally All About Sea Ice, Thermodynamics: Albedo, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA 
CTR., http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/processes/albedo.html (last visited May 29, 2014). 
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In 2012, the seasonal minimum sea ice extent in the Arctic reached 
a record low.47 The years 2007 through 2012 represent the six smallest 
sea ice extents on record.48 The rate of sea ice disappearance exceeds 
even the most dramatic predictions from only a few years ago; if it con-
tinues at its current pace, the Arctic Ocean will be ice free in the summer 
by 2017.49 Climate change in the Arctic is also contributing to increased 
storms, sea level rise, melting permafrost, and coastal erosion.50 
The changes in the Arctic have implications for the rest of the 
world. For example, the Arctic plays an important role in driving cur-
rents across all oceans, and as the Arctic warms, currents could change.51 
Rapid Arctic warming also may be tied to high-impact, extreme weather 
events in the United States and Europe.52 In addition, melting glacial ice 
caused by warming contributes to global sea-level rise, and the feedbacks 
tied to melting sea ice contribute to increased warming throughout the 
world.53 
The changes in the Arctic also have significant effects locally. The 
loss of sea ice affects Arctic species by altering the food web and reduc-
ing habitat for ice-dependent species such as polar bears, walruses, and 
ice seals that depend on sea ice for feeding, breeding, and giving birth.54 
Ringed seals, for example, depend on sea ice for resting, pupping, mat-
ing, molting, and feeding. Increased temperatures and loss of protective 
                                                            
 47. Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. 
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-
seasonal-minimum/. The record minimum is compared to years since 1979, which is when satellite 
data became available. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Wieslaw Maslowski, Jaclyn Clement Kinney, Matthew Higgins & Andrew Rob-
erts, The Future of Arctic Sea Ice, 40 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 625 (2012); James E. 
Overland & Muyin Wang, When Will the Summer Arctic Be Nearly Sea Ice Free?, 40 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS 2097 (2013); Quirin Schiermeier, Ice Loss Shifts Arctic Cycles, NATURE (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.nature.com/news/ice-loss-shifts-arctic-cycles-1.11387. 
 50. See generally Huntington et al., supra note 44. 
 51. See generally id.; see also McBean et al., supra note 20, at 22–33. 
 52. Andrew Freedman, Arctic Warming Is Altering Weather Patterns, Study Shows, CLIMATE 
CENT. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/arctic-warming-is-altering-weather-
patterns-study-shows; see also Jennifer A. Francis & Stephen J. Vavrus, Evidence Linking Arctic 
Amplification to Extreme Weather in Mid-Latitudes, 39 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1 (2012). 
 53. Holli Riebeek, Arctic Melt Raises Sea Levels and Reinforces Global Warming, EARTH 
OBSERVATORY (June 14, 2011), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/blogs/earthmatters/2011/06/14/ 
arctic-melt-raises-sea-levels-and-reinforces-global-warming/ (citing ARCTIC MONITORING & 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC CLIMATE ISSUES 2011: CHANGES IN ARCTIC SNOW, WATER, ICE 
AND PERMAFROST (2012), available at http://amap.no/swipa/). 
 54. See generally Kristin L. Laidre et al., Quantifying the Sensitivity of Arctic Marine Mam-
mals to Climate-Induced Habitat Change, 18 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S97, S98–S99 (2008); 
Loeng et al., supra note 35, at 456, 496–97; NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-132 to 3-
133. 
2014] Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean 1283 
snow covering will make ringed seals more vulnerable to predation.55 
Loss of sea ice also may affect seals’ prey species, such as Arctic cod.56 
In addition to reducing habitat for marine mammals, the rapid decline of 
sea ice to a seasonally ice-free Arctic is likely to fundamentally alter ma-
rine productivity in the region, which would have dramatic effects on the 
ecosystem.57 
Along with ocean systems and marine life, warming in the Arctic 
also affects subsistence. For example, climate change makes subsistence 
whale hunting more difficult and dangerous by increasing waves that 
affect fall whaling and by decreasing the stability of ice platforms needed 
for spring hunting.58 Changes in the timing and location of ice-dependent 
prey, such as ice seals and walruses, are making hunting more difficult, 
and declines in those and other important subsistence species are ex-
pected.59 These changes threaten not only the health of individual resi-
dents but also the continuity of their cultural identify.60 
2. Acidification 
Carbon dioxide emissions are also resulting in ocean acidification. 
Approximately one-third of the carbon dioxide that is added to the at-
mosphere is absorbed by the oceans.61 The absorption of carbon dioxide 
alters the chemistry of the seawater, making it more acidic, which can 
have substantial negative impacts on the marine environment. The Arctic 
is at particular risk from the effects of acidification due to its cold, low-
salinity waters, in which carbon dioxide is more soluble.62 In addition, 
changes caused by the warming environment accelerate ocean acidifica-
                                                            
 55. Brendan P. Kelly, Climate Change and Ice Breeding Pinnipeds, in “FINGERPRINTS” OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 43, 43 (G.-R.Walther et al. eds., 2001). 
 56. Cynthia T. Tynan & Douglas P. DeMaster, Observations and Predictions of Arctic Climate 
Change: Potential Effects on Marine Mammals, 50 ARCTIC 308, 308 (1997); Bodil A. Bluhm & 
Rolf Gradinger, Regional Variability in Food Availability for Arctic Marine Mammals, 18 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S77, S89 (2008). 
 57. See Bluhm & Gradinger, supra note 56, at S77, S83–S87. 
 58. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 3-195 to 3-196. 
 59. See, e.g., Igor Krupnik & G. Carleton Ray, Pacific Walruses, Indigenous Hunters, and 
Climate Change: Bridging Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge, 54 DEEP-SEA RESEARCH PART II 
2946, 2954 (2007). 
 60. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007). 
 61. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., BLUE CARBON: A RAPID RESPONSE 
ASSESSMENT 27 (Christian Nellemann et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.grida.no/publications/rr/blue-carbon/. http://www.grida.no/publications/rr/blue-carbon/. 
 62. ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2013), available at http://www.amap.no/ 
documents/doc/amap-arctic-ocean-acidification-assessment-summary-for-policy-makers/808. 
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tion in the Arctic. Warming promotes acidification in the Arctic in three 
main ways: (1) declining sea ice promotes gas exchange with the atmos-
phere, which leads to more carbon dioxide being absorbed in Arctic wa-
ters; (2) increased light penetration promotes plant growth in the ocean, 
and these plants initially use absorbed carbon dioxide to grow but then 
release it when they decay; and (3) increased glacial ice melt and river 
discharges lower the salinity of Arctic marine waters and thereby reduce 
their capacity to buffer the ocean against acidification.63 
Research confirms that ocean acidification is occurring in the Arc-
tic. Direct measurements demonstrate a clear trend of declining alkalinity 
(i.e., acidification) in the Bering and Chukchi seas.64 In addition, there is 
proof that parts of the Arctic Ocean have become undersaturated with 
respect to aragonite, a relatively unstable form of calcium carbonate used 
by many Arctic species to form protective shells.65 This undersaturation 
hinders formation of shells and skeletons in important components of the 
marine food webs, such as pteropods and some benthic organisms.66 
Such impacts to these species could reverberate through the marine eco-
system and ultimately affect food for larger Arctic animals, like walrus-
es, seals, and sea birds. 
Acidity also affects growth rates and reproduction in a variety of 
marine organisms.67 Increasing acidity may also decrease the ability of 
                                                            
 63. Marco Steinacher et al., Imminent Ocean Acidification in the Arctic Projected with the 
NCAR Global Coupled Carbon Cycle-Climate Model, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES 515, 525–28 (2009); see 
also Nicholas R. Bates et al., Ocean Acidification and Biologically Induced Seasonality of Car-
bonate Mineral Saturation States in the Western Arctic Ocean, 114 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. C11, C17–
C18 (2009); Nicholas R. Bates & Jeremy T. Mathis, The Arctic Ocean Marine Carbon Cycle: 
Evaluation of Air-Sea CO2 Exchanges, Ocean Acidification Impacts and Potential Feedbacks, 6 
BIOGEOSCIENCES 2433, 2451 (2009). 
 64. See generally A. G. Andreev et al., Calculation Methods and the Distribution of Anthropo-
genic Variations of pH Values in the Pacific Subarctic, 49 OCEANOLOGY 418 (2009) [hereinafter 
Calculation Methods]; A. G. Andreev et al., The Distribution of the Carbonate Parameters in the 
Waters of Anadyr Bay of the Bering Sea and in the Western Part of the Chukchi Sea, 50 
OCEANOLOGY 39, 49 (2010). 
 65. See Bates et al., supra note 63, at 17–18; Victoria J. Fabry et al., Ocean Acidification at 
High Latitudes: The Bellwether, 22 Oceanography 160, 161–62 (2009); Michiyo Yamamoto-Kawai 
et al., Aragonite Undersaturation in the Arctic Ocean: Effects of Ocean Acidification and Sea Ice 
Melt, 326 SCIENCE 1098, 1098 (2009); Steinacher et al., supra note 63, at 530; Melissa Chierici & 
Agneta Fransson, Calcium Carbonate Saturation in the Surface Water of the Arctic Ocean: 
Undersaturation in Freshwater Influenced Shelves, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES  DISCUSSIONS 4963, 4965–
66, 4974 (2009). 
 66. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: STARTING 
WITH THE SCIENCE 7 (2013), available at http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-
on-reports/booklets/OA1.pdf.; Steeve Comeau et al., Key Arctic Pelagic Mollusc (Limacina 
Helicina) Threatened by Ocean Acidification, 6 BIOGEOSCIENCES DISCUSSIONS 2523, 2529–30 
(2009); Yamamoto-Kawai et al., supra note 65, at 1098. 
 67. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 10. 
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seawater to absorb sound,68 increase the size of otoliths in fish,69 and re-
duce the availability of iron, an essential nutrient for phytoplankton 
growth.70 These changes can affect communication, feeding, and balance 
in fish. 
3. Industrial Activities 
As the Arctic environment changes due to climate change and 
ocean acidification, the region is becoming increasingly available for 
industrial activities. These activities would bring substantial risks to a 
part of the world that has remained relatively free from large-scale indus-
trialization. Risks arise from both accidents and routine activities inher-
ent in oil and gas exploration and development, shipping, and commer-
cial fishing. 
a. Oil and Gas 
Though there is no oil and gas development from offshore rigs in 
the Arctic Ocean, substantial activities related to the oil and gas industry 
are taking place. Exploration drilling has been proposed and approved, 
and significant seismic and other testing has occurred. These activities 
require drilling rigs, fleets of large and small vessels, aircraft, and other 
industrial infrastructure, and they can result in substantial risk to the ma-
rine environment and those dependent on it. 
The most obvious risk from these activities is a large oil spill, like 
the one that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon rig exploding and 
sinking in the Gulf of Mexico. That “human, economic, and environmen-
tal disaster” caused the death of eleven crewmembers and resulted in 
“more than four million barrels of oil . . . gushing uncontrolled into the 
Gulf. . . .”71 The debate about the ecological and economic impacts from 
the spill and BP’s liability for it still continues more than four years after 
the accident, “but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natu-
ral systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total 
tens of billions of dollars.”72 
                                                            
 68. Kieth C. Hester et al., Unanticipated Consequences of Ocean Acidification: A Noisier 
Ocean at Lower pH, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L19601, L19601 (2008). 
 69. See David M. Checkley, Jr. et al., Elevated CO2 Enhances Otolith Growth in Young Fish, 
324 SCIENCE 1683, 1683 (2009). 
 70. See Andreev et al., Calculation Methods, supra note 64, at 425; Dalin Shi et al., Effect of 
Ocean Acidification on Iron Availability to Marine Phytoplankton, 327 SCIENCE 676, 676–78 
(2010). 
 71. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at vi. 
 72. Id. 
1286 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
A similar spill in the Arctic Ocean would have dramatic impacts on 
the people and wildlife in the region.73 While acknowledging the “limited 
information” available upon which to make an assessment, the United 
States estimates that “[f]or a catastrophic oil spill, it is assumed that two 
entire years of Arctic marine mammal subsistence harvests and one and 
one-half years of Bowhead whale harvests would be lost.”74 Given what 
is known about the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez 
spills on fish and wildlife, this estimate appears to be optimistic estimate. 
Even this disruption, however, would ripple through the communities 
that depend on bowhead whales as the center of their subsistence way of 
life.75 
The impacts of a catastrophic spill would be exacerbated by the 
lack of effective response capabilities and the sensitivity of the environ-
ment. Moreover, the lack of baseline information would make it difficult 
to prioritize response and measure impacts.76 Of course, a catastrophic 
spill is not certain to occur, but the Deepwater Horizon tragedy made it 
all too clear that such an event is not impossible.77 In addition,  numerous 
                                                            
 73. See, e.g., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 
VOL. IV 13–15, 30–34, 37–40, 47–49, 73–78, 91–98, 103–108, 118–122, 131–133, 137–139 (2003), 
available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Alaska-
Region/Alaska-Lease-Sales/Sale-186/Index.aspx; CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL EIS, supra note 
29, at 132–294. 
 74. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR THE FIVE-
YEAR OCS OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM FOR 2012–2017 67, 69 (2012), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%20EconMethodology.pdf. 
 75. See, e.g., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA, supra note 73; CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 
FINAL SEIS, supra note 29.  
 76. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Assessing Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, SCI. DAILY (July 10, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/07/13071012 
2004.htm. Moreover, oil spill response activities themselves can have impacts on subsistence and 
wildlife resources. See, e.g., CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at 32 (describing 
“significant” effects on subsistence hunters); see also id. at 25 (“Impacts from the oil spill itself 
could be exacerbated during spill response and cleanup activities such as vessel discharge, in-situ 
burning, dispersants, drilling a relief well, and shoreline cleanup.”); id. 26 (discussing how “in-situ 
burning would also cause adverse impacts”); id. 28 (noting “[s]pill response and cleanup activities 
can also displace each species from important habitat areas” and that “cleanup efforts can lead to 
additional exposure as well as disturbance and displacement of polar bears”); id. 34 (recognizing 
“onshore spill response and cleanup activities . . . can alter site dynamics and increase resource deg-
radation, resulting in potential adverse effects on historic properties”). 
 77.  In fact, “[f]rom 1964 through 2010, there have been 33 spills ≥ 1,000 bbl from OCS plat-
forms and pipelines.” CHERYL MCMAHON ANDERSON ET AL., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
UPDATE OF OCCURRENCE RATES FOR OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/Update%20of%20Occurrence%20Rates%20for%20 
Offshore%20Oil%20Spills.pdf); see also id. at 10–11 (describing the incidents). In its 2008 Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Chukchi and Beaufort Planning Areas produced, the gov-
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other spills and near misses in the Gulf of Mexico further reinforce this 
point.78 
In addition to creating the risk of a catastrophic spill, exploration 
and production activities also chronically release smaller amounts of oil, 
toxic muds, and other fluids into the ocean. Drilling muds, in particular, 
can have toxic effects in the water column.79 Moreover, discharges of oil 
are virtually guaranteed to result from routine activities.  As one Shell 
executive made clear, “There’s no sugar-coating this, I imagine there 
would be spills, and no spill is OK.”80 In fact from 1964 to 2009, there 
were more than 2,700 reported spills from offshore oil and gas activi-
ties.81 
Exploration activities also contribute to air pollution and global 
warming by releasing greenhouse gases, black carbon, and other pollu-
tants. The activities that Shell proposed for 2012 in the Chukchi Sea 
were expected to release nearly 420 tons of NOx, a pollutant that can 
                                                                                                                                     
ernment estimated a 40% chance of a large spill in the Chukchi Sea and a 26% chance of a large spill 
in the Beaufort Sea. See MINERALS. MGMT. SERV., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 
BEAUFORT SEA AND CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREAS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES, 209, 212, 217, 
221, at 4-454, 4-461 (2008), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-
Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Alaska-Region/Alaska-Lease-Sales/Sales209-221/Vol4a.aspx. 
 78. In the first three years after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, there were more than 1,700 
major environmental and safety violations on offshore energy platforms in the Gulf. See COMM. ON 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEMOCRATS, DANGEROUS DRILLERS: OFFSHORE SAFETY LAPSES CONTINUE 
THREE YEARS AFTER BP SPILL 11 (2013), http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/documents/2013-05-10_BP_Spill_DangerousDrillers. 
pdf. In November 2012, the Black Elk rig exploded, killing three workers. Black Elk Energy Com-
pany itself has been cited for numerous safety and environmental violations, drawing strong rebukes 
from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of 
Safety & Envtl. Enforcement, BSEE Director’s Statement on Black Elk Report (Nov. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/Statements/statement11042013/ (“[T]hese 
deaths were caused by a number of decisions, actions[,] and failures by Black Elk and contractors 
retained by Black Elk while conducting construction operations. These failures reflect a disregard for 
the safety of workers on the platform and are the antithesis of the type of safety culture that should 
guide decision-making in all offshore oil and gas operations.”). On July 24, 2013, the Hercules Off-
shore jackup rig located off the Louisiana coast partially collapsed after catching fire due to a natural 
gas well rupture. Kristen Hays, Gulf Rig Partially Collapses in Fire off Louisiana: U.S. Government, 
REUTERS (July 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-usa-gulfofmexico-well-
idUSBRE96N0SU20130724. The incident indicates the continuing lack of safety in offshore energy 
activities and the dangers of offshore drilling even in shallow water conditions. 
 79. Offshore Energy Production: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (written statement of Dr. Jeffrey Short, Pac. Sci. Dir., Oceana), avail-
able at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=0d1cabb7-f29f-1b59-
9b61-e8055aef00e2 (written testimony to the Committee). 
 80. Philip Bump, Shell VP: Yeah, We’re Gonna Spill Some Oil in the Arctic, GRIST (Nov. 30, 
2012, 12:25 PM), http://grist.org/news/shell-vp-yeah-were-gonna-spill-oil-in-the-arctic/ (quoting 
Shell’s Alaska vice president Pete Slaiby discussing the likelihood that smaller spills would occur). 
 81. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 77, at 10 tbl.10. 
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have substantial health effects.82 In addition, the proposed activities were 
expected to result in the emission of more than 60,000 tons of carbon 
dioxide and a substantial amount of black carbon.83 The problems associ-
ated with the emissions of black carbon are particularly acute in the Arc-
tic. When they land on white snow and sea ice, particles of black carbon 
accelerate melting, which in turn accelerates warming in the region. 
Seismic testing, exploration and production drilling, and associated 
activities dramatically increase noise levels in the ocean, and this noise 
can have significant effects on marine mammals and other wildlife. “Ma-
rine mammals use hearing and sound transmission to perform vital life 
functions. Sound (hearing and vocalization/echolocation) serves four 
primary functions for marine mammals: (1) providing information about 
their environment; (2) communication; (3) prey detection; and (4) preda-
tor detection.”84 Additional noise can disrupt these functions by displac-
ing animals from breeding and feeding habitats, causing temporary or 
permanent hearing loss, causing stress and other physiological responses, 
making it more difficult for animals to hear other relevant sounds and, in 
extreme situations, causing stranding or death.85 
Finally, conducting offshore oil and gas activities is a massive in-
dustrial undertaking. For example, to support its efforts to drill explora-
tion wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, Shell brought two 
drill rigs, a drilling vessel, ice breakers, tugs, barges, other support ves-
sels, aircraft, helicopters, and other industrial machinery.86 In addition to 
the direct impacts to the ecosystem discussed above, this large-scale in-
dustrialization brings an influx of people and industry from outside the 
communities along the coast. These changes have economic, social, and 
cultural impacts to Arctic communities.87 
                                                            
 82. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., SHELL 2012 EXPLORATION PLAN—CHUKCHI SEA: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 66–69 (2011), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/2011_1214_ 
FINAL_2012ChukchiSeaEA.PDF. 
 83. Id. 
 84. NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at 4-92. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE 
EXPLORATION PLAN CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA, at section 13 (2011), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Chukchi_EP/CS-EP-Public.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., JOHN B. KENRIKSEN, OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS IN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LANDS 
AND TERRITORIES IN THE ARCTIC: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, AT 28–29, 39–40 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.galdu.org/govat/doc/oilengelsk2.pdf. 
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b. Shipping 
The Aleutian Islands are already a major shipping thoroughfare, 
and shipping related to oil and gas activities, freight transport, and tour-
ism are predicted to rapidly expand into the Arctic Ocean.88 In 2009, the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment reported that “[t]here were approxi-
mately 6,000 individual vessels, many making multiple voyages, in the 
Arctic region during the AMSA survey year; half of these were operating 
on the Great Circle Route in the North Pacific that passes through Alas-
ka’s Aleutian Islands.”89 As sea ice continues to retreat and the demand 
for goods increases around the world, the number of vessels transiting 
the Arctic Ocean is predicted to increase.90 
Substantial risks to the marine environment will result from this in-
crease in shipping. As with oil and gas activities, the most apparent risk 
is a significant accident in the sensitive and remote Arctic environment. 
Remoteness, lack of infrastructure and basic information, and difficult 
conditions increase the likelihood of such an accident and make response 
very difficult: 
There is a general lack of marine infrastructure in the Arc-
tic . . . compared with other marine regions of the world with high 
concentrations of ship traffic. Gaps in hydrographic data exist for 
significant portions of primary shipping routes important to support 
safe navigation. In addition, for safe operations in the Arctic there is 
a need for the same suite of meteorological and oceanographic data, 
products and services as in other oceans, plus comprehensive in-
formation on sea ice and icebergs. Except in limited areas of the 
Arctic, there is a lack of emergency response capacity for saving 
lives and for pollution mitigation. There are serious limitations to 
                                                            
 88. This section focuses on increases in commercial shipping. Other forms of vessel transit are 
likely to increase as well. As discussed above, vessel traffic is associated with oil and gas activities. 
In addition, vessel-based tourism is likely to increase. “Tourists now represent the single largest 
human presence in the Arctic and the overwhelming majority of these visitors travel aboard ships.” 
ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 Report, at 99 (2009), available at 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [hereinafter 
AMSA REPORT]. Though relatively little of this traffic occurred in the U.S. Arctic Ocean, a cruise 
did make an unexpected stop in Barrow in August 2011. See Jerry Beilinson, What If a Cruise Ship 
Wrecked in Alaska?, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/extreme-machines/what-if-a-cruise-ship-
wrecked-in-alaska-6645471. “The future of Arctic marine tourism represents serious challenges to 
public authorities and businesses seeking to address the issues of safe passage and resource man-
agement.” AMSA REPORT, supra, at 99. 
 89. AMSA REPORT, supra note 88, at 4. Of the 6,000 vessels reported, approximately 1,600 
were fishing vessels. Id. 
 90. See id. at 4–5. 
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radio and satellite communications and few systems to monitor and 
control the movement of ships in ice covered waters.91 
The report went on to conclude that “[t]he current lack of marine infra-
structure in all but a limited number of areas, coupled with the vastness 
and harshness of the environment, makes conduct of emergency response 
significantly more difficult in the Arctic.”92 
The Exxon Valdez and Selendang Ayu accidents and response ef-
forts provide examples of these problems in less difficult Alaskan waters. 
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled more than eleven mil-
lion gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, creating a disaster that 
brought the risks of oil development and transportation to American 
shores and people.93 In December 2004, the Selendang Ayu was on its 
way to China from Seattle, Washington, with a crew of twenty-six and 
60,200 metric tons of soybeans. As the ship transited Unimak Pass in the 
Aleutian Islands, it ran into heavy weather and eventually ran aground, 
breaking into pieces, and spilling its soybean cargo and more than 
300,000 gallons of fuel.94 While the Coast Guard was able to rescue 
much of the crew, tragically six crew members and Coast Guard rescuers 
perished when a rogue wave hit the vessel and downed the rescue heli-
copter.95 
Similarly Shell’s drill rig, the Kulluk, separated from its tow vessel 
and grounded in harsh but not unusual conditions in the Gulf of Alaska 
in December 2012.96 While the situation was quite dangerous, thankfully 
there was no loss of life related to the loss of control and eventual 
grounding of the Kulluk.97 
None of the Exxon Valdez, Selendang Ayu, or Kulluk incidents hap-
pened in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas. Rather, each took in waters that, 
while subject to extreme weather conditions and seas, do not have ice, 
and generally are closer to onshore support assets. In the more remote 
                                                            
 91. Id. at 5. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/ 
emergency-response/exxon-valdez-spill-profile (last updated May 23, 2014). 
 94. See Mike Schuler, M/V Selendang Ayu Oil Spill and Sinking, GCAPTAIN MAR. & 
OFFSHORE NEWS (Apr. 29, 2009), http://gcaptain.com/mv-selendang-ayu-oil-spill-sinking/. 
 95. Marine Accident Brief, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD (Dec. 8, 2004), 
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/MAB0601.htm. 
 96. See infra Part V.C.3.f (discussing Shell’s problems in 2012). 
 97. Suzanna Caldwell, Kulluk Grounding: Shell Oil Testimony Opens Coast Guard Hearing in 
Anchorage, ALASKA DISPATCH (May 20, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130520/ 
kulluk-grounding-shell-oil-testimony-opens-coast-guard-hearing-anchorage. 
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and icy Arctic waters, the risk of an incident with catastrophic conse-
quences is even greater. 
In addition—and parallel to oil and gas activities—ship traffic in 
the Arctic Ocean will result in increased noise, air, and water pollution. 
Increased shipping also raises the likelihood of introducing invasive spe-
cies from ballast water discharge or other sources. Additionally, the main 
shipping routes in the Arctic overlap with migration corridors used by 
many marine mammals and birds, including the endangered bowhead 
whale. As a result, expanded commercial shipping will increase the like-
lihood of animal disturbances and ship strikes. 
c. Commercial Fishing 
Large-scale commercial fishing has been an important force in the 
southern Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska for several decades. Some of the 
world’s largest fisheries operate there, and more than four billion pounds 
of fish is harvested from the region each year. These fisheries have con-
tributed to changes in the marine ecosystem; stocks of pollock, cod, and 
other species, for example, are currently managed to maintain 40% of 
their historic biomass.98 These species, therefore, are managed so that 
there are 60% fewer fish, by weight, than were there historically.99 In 
some cases, these fisheries can compete with marine mammals, such as 
endangered Steller sea lions, for prey.100 In addition to biomass removals, 
some forms of fishing, such as bottom trawling, threaten important sea-
floor habitat and have a disproportionate effect on the marine environ-
ment. 
There is currently no large-scale commercial fishing in the Chukchi 
or Beaufort seas. It has been thought, however, that “[c]limate warming 
is likely to bring extensive fishing activity to the Arctic, particularly in 
the Barents Sea and Beaufort–Chukchi region where commercial opera-
tions have been minimal in the past.”101 More recent information sug-
                                                            
 98. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—SECTION 7 
CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR AUTHORIZATION OF FISHERIES UNDER THE FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN ISLANDS MANAGEMENT 
AREA 103 (2010). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 345, 348. 
 101. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
SCENARIO FOR THE US NAVY (2002), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/other/arctic_ 
and_climate_change.pdf. 
1292 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
gests that it may be a long time before there is sufficient biomass of tar-
get species to support commercial fisheries.102 
If commercial fishing were to occur, it would require careful man-
agement to avoid disproportionate or unexpected impacts. Though the 
Arctic Ocean supports a complex system of marine life, it has lower spe-
cies diversity and lower levels of production than temperate marine eco-
systems. The loss or depletion of a single forage species, such as Arctic 
cod, could seriously disrupt the Arctic marine food web.103 
Recognizing these unique challenges, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) and North Pacific Fishery Management Council have 
taken a proactive management approach to the Arctic. The Arctic Fishery 
Management Plan (Arctic FMP) was adopted unanimously by the Coun-
cil and implemented with broad support by NMFS.104 It closes the Chuk-
chi and Beaufort seas to commercial fishing until there is adequate in-
formation to manage fisheries in an ecologically sustainable manner. 
Similarly, the Council recommended and NMFS created the Northern 
Bering Sea Research Plan, which closes a portion of the Bering Sea to 
bottom trawling to allow for an evaluation of the potential impacts of that 
gear on benthic species and habitat, before bottom trawling expands into 
this region.105 In both cases, the goal has been to ensure that fishing ac-
tivities do not harm the health of the ecosystem. That shared goal has 
established common ground between industry, local communities, and 
conservation entities.106 
III. CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 
There are multiple challenges to effective management of human 
activities in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. The lack of baseline scientific infor-
mation prevents good predictions and measurement of the impacts of 
potential activities, undercuts efforts that could eliminate or at least min-
                                                            
 102. See, e.g., Hannah Heimbuch, As Globe Warms, Is an Arctic Fisheries Boom on the Way?, 
ALASKA DISPATCH (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130407/globe-warms-
arctic-fisheries-boom-way. 
 103. See, e.g., ARCTIC FMP EA, supra note 25, at 205 tbl.8-3 (“A fishery, if one turned to be 
economically viable, that harvested Arctic cod or that took large amounts as incidental catch could 
have an adverse and may have a significantly adverse impact on species that prey on it.”). 
 104. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16; see also Fisheries of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone off Alaska, 50 C.F.R. § 679 et. seq. (2013). 
 105. See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska, supra note 104; Groundfish 
Fisheries of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area, 73 Fed. Reg. 43362 (July 25, 
2008); Mary Pemberton, Commerce Secretary Approves Arctic Fisheries Plan, USA TODAY, (Aug. 
23, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2009-08-21-alaska-fish_N.htm. 
 106. See Pemberton, supra note 105 (quoting federal government, industry, and conservation 
organization representatives). 
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imize or mitigate likely impacts, hinders response efforts, and creates 
substantial uncertainty. The fact that the U.S. Arctic is remote from exist-
ing development and does not have even basic infrastructure makes man-
agement and oversight very difficult. The weather can also be extreme at 
all times of the year, and emergency response is hindered, for example, 
by a lack of adequate and proven oil spill prevention and response tech-
nology. The lack of a comprehensive legal regime to guide decisions 
about such development also forces decision makers to operate without 
overarching direction. 
A. Research Needs 
The lack of baseline information outlined above107 creates a signifi-
cant impediment to effective planning and preparedness. The U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy stated as a principle tenet, “Ocean managers 
and policy makers need comprehensive scientific information about the 
ocean and its environment to make wise decisions.”108 And as the USGS 
explained, there are “major constraints to a defensible science framework 
for critical Arctic decision making.”109 Similarly, an inter-agency gov-
ernment report addressing the need for integrated management in the 
Arctic noted that “scientific information and data relevant to U.S. Arctic 
decisions can be difficult to access[,] and it is not clear that the scientific 
agenda for the U.S. Arctic adequately serves the informational needs of 
decision-makers.”110 The final recommendations of the Interagency 
Ocean Policy Task Force (OPTF) call for science-based decision making 
and a better understanding of our ocean ecosystems, including a special 
emphasis on the Arctic.111 
                                                            
 107. See supra Part II.B (discussing missing scientific information) 
 108. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 374 
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/ 
welcome.html. 
 109. USGS REPORT, supra note 17, at 151. 
 110. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 5. 
 111. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 6, 39–40 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf (noting that one of the priority 
needs for addressing environmental stewardship of the rapidly changing Arctic Ocean is 
“[i]mprovement of the scientific understanding of the Arctic system and how it is changing in re-
sponse to climate-induced and other changes”). The Obama Administration formalized the final 
OPTF recommendations through an Executive Order in 2010 and has released an implementation 
plan.  See Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43023 (July 19, 2010); NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2013), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/national_ocean_policy_implementation_plan 
.pdf. 
1294 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
Various other authorities have specifically recognized the need for 
additional science before more oil and gas activities occur in the Arctic. 
In March 2010, then-Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar cancelled 
scheduled Arctic Ocean leases in the Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering seas, 
explaining “that the country must take a cautious approach in the Arc-
tic . . . and gather additional scientific information about resources, risks, 
and environmental sensitivities before making decisions about potential 
future lease sales in frontier areas.”112 The National Commission, after 
convening to study the Deepwater Horizon spill and make recommenda-
tions about offshore drilling, identified the need for “an immediate, com-
prehensive federal research effort to provide a foundation of scientific 
information on the Arctic . . . in order to inform the decision-making 
process.”113 In the fisheries management context, U.S. regulators have 
determined that the U.S. Arctic should remain closed to commercial fish-
eries “until sufficient information is available to support the sustainable 
management of a commercial fishery.”114 
To the extent that information about environmental resources ex-
ists, it is often not sufficiently mapped or incorporated into planning and 
management. Indeed, response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was hin-
dered by response plans that were not appropriately targeted to important 
areas and the resulting questions about how to prioritize equipment.115 
B. Remoteness and Lack of Infrastructure 
Effective management and response requires proven equipment, 
trained personnel, and infrastructure. There is very limited capacity near 
the Arctic Ocean, and the sheer distance, difficult conditions, and limited 
transportation options would make it very difficult to bring equipment 
and personnel to the region. 
The North Slope Borough, the county-level political subdivision 
adjacent to the U.S. Arctic Ocean, spans 88,000 square miles—an area 
larger than the state of Utah. Approximately 9,500 people live in the 
Borough; Barrow, the largest town, has just over 4,000 residents, and 
other coastal villages have as few as 200 people.116 No roads connect the 
                                                            
 112. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: A COMPREHENSIVE, SCIENCE-BASED OFFSHORE 
ENERGY PLAN 1 (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule= 
security/getfile&PageID=33566. 
 113. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 303. 
 114. FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 16, at ES-1. 
 115. See U.S. COAST GUARD, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: INCIDENT SPECIFIC 
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) 16–17, 20–22 (2011) [hereinafter ISPR], available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/bpdwh.pdf. 
 116. North Slope Borough, Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
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towns on the North Slope to one another or to the rest of the state, and 
most communities rely on small airports or airstrips and small boat docks 
for traveling between villages and to the rest of the state. There is no 
deepwater port along the U.S. Arctic Coast capable of supporting off-
shore development.117 All existing docks are in shallow water, which 
severely limits boat access and the types of equipment that can be ac-
cessed from the coast. 
Very little response equipment is stored on the North Slope, and 
there are few vessels there that could assist in a response effort. Senator 
Mark Begich (D-AK) has pointed out that icebreakers are “sorely lack-
ing” as well as U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) “cutters, aircraft hangars, crew 
quarters, communication capabilities, deepwater ports and other infra-
structure . . . .”118 Characterizing the lack of infrastructure after testifying 
to a Senate Committee, USCG Commandant Robert Papp explained that 
“[t]here is nothing up there to operate from at present and we’re really 
starting from ground zero.”119 
In contrast, a substantial number of people and vessels were availa-
ble in, or easily transported to, the Gulf of Mexico to respond to the 
Deepwater Horizon accident. Eventually, a total of 48,200 people—more 
than four times the population of the entire North Slope Borough—
participated in the response efforts.120 Similarly, 345 response vessels 
and over 3,000 vessels of opportunity (i.e., vessels not designed for oil 
spill response but enlisted in the effort) took part in the Gulf response.121 
Getting resources of that magnitude to the Arctic Ocean would be 
nearly impossible. There are no hotels or other housing capable of ac-
commodating thousands of responders.122 Nor is there an easy way to 
                                                                                                                                     
states/02/02185.html (last revised Mar. 27, 2014). 
 117. In 2013, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Alaska State Department of Transpor-
tation and Public Facilities released a report on the first year (2012) of their co-sponsored three-year 
study to examine the possible development of a deep water port north of the Aleutian Islands. See 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ALASKA DEEP DRAFT ARCTIC PORTS STUDY (2013), available at 
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKports/1ADDAPSReportweb.pdf. 
 118. Experts Say U.S. Needs to Improve Arctic Infrastructure, ARCTIC SOUNDER (July 27, 
2012), http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1130experts_say_us_needs_to_improve_arctic 
(quoting Senator Mark Begich). 
 119. Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Oil Spill Would Challenge Coast Guard, REUTERS (June 20, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-arctic-oil-idUSTRE75J6O620110620 (quoting 
U.S. Coast Guard Adm. Robert Papp Jr.). 
 120. ISPR, supra note 115, at 156; DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 133 (not-
ing that “[a]t the peak of the response, more than 45,000 people participated”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., GENERAL PURPOSES COMM., A JOINT VENTURE, FINAL REPORT, OPERATION 
ARCTIC SHIELD BARROW/PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 6 (2012) [hereinafter ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL 
REPORT]. 
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move equipment or personnel from one location to another. The nearest 
Coast Guard station is in Kodiak, AK, roughly 1,000 miles from the like-
ly locations of oil and gas exploration, and the nearest large deepwater 
port is more than 1,000 nautical miles from Barrow, in Dutch Harbor.123 
Even in Dutch Harbor, the ability of the port to service drilling vessels 
and house people is limited.124 
C. Weather 
As might be expected in a polar region, weather and other environ-
mental conditions can be severe in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is cov-
ered with sea ice from approximately October through May, and the air 
temperature drops below freezing on nearly every day of the year.125 
Throughout the summer and fall, the Arctic experiences extended periods 
of fog.126 Long hours of darkness also limit visibility in the late fall and 
winter, and strong winds are prevalent during the fall, when the daily 
maximum winds average forty miles per hour.127 
These conditions can complicate every stage of offshore oil and gas 
activities—from transporting equipment to and from a drill site, to drill-
ing, maintenance, and emergency response. For example, rough water 
and weather can affect transportation of drill rigs and their stability dur-
ing drilling operations. Ice and fog also impede drilling operations, and 
Arctic weather conditions can affect support vessels and aircraft. Routine 
issues, such as re-fueling, offloading wastewater, and transferring per-
                                                            
 123.  123. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Coast Guard Blames Shell Risk-Taking in Kulluk Rig 
Accident, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 4, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/ 
2014/04/140404-coast-guard-blames-shell-in-kulluk-rig-accident/; see also Welcome to Kodiak, AK, 
MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/ports/southcentral/kodiak/kodiak.htm (last 
visited June 1, 2014) (describing Kodiak port). Smaller ports are available in the Pribilof Islands. 
See, e.g., Welcome to St. Paul, AK, MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/ports/ 
northern_west/st_paul/st_paul.html (last visited June 1, 2014).  
 124. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Lawmaker: Did Shell Move Rig for Financial Reasons?, FUEL FIX 
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/01/11/lawmaker-did-shell-move-rig-for-financial-
reasons/ (noting lack of hotel rooms and space for the workers and that the shipyard was not well-
suited for the maintenance work). 
 125. Barrow, CLIMATE ZONE, http://www.climate-zone.com/climate/united-
states/alaska/barrow/ (last visited June 2, 2014) (tables showing average monthly temperature in 
Barrow). 
 126. PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL., OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC 
OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 94 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts 
.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/Oil20Spill20Preventionpdf.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL.] (noting that 49% of days in the summer and 57% of days in the fall are 
foggy).  
 127. Id. at 11 (noting that the maximum daily average wind speed for Barrow in October is 
forty-four mph, forty mph in November, and thirty-five mph in December). 
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sonnel, are risky in Arctic weather conditions.128 In addition, bad weather 
can be difficult to predict, which can make routine operations problemat-
ic, increase the risk of an accident, and make emergency response diffi-
cult or impossible. 
D. Emergency Response 
The Deepwater Horizon blowout and the inability to stop or clean 
up the resulting spill has increased attention on and controversy about 
spill response in the Arctic. There are three primary oil spill response 
methods currently available: mechanical containment and recovery; in 
situ burning; and dispersants.  The successful use of any of these meth-
ods in the U.S. Arctic Ocean is limited both by their own efficacy and by 
Arctic conditions.129 These limits are so significant that Representative 
Henry Waxman (D-CA) described spill response planning as follows: 
“On paper these plans . . . might seem reassuring. . . . But when you look 
at the details, it becomes evident these plans are just paper exer-
cise[s].”130 Lloyd’s of London concluded that “cleaning up any oil spill 
in the Arctic, particularly in ice-covered areas, would present multiple 
obstacles which together constitute a unique and hard-to-manage risk.”131 
1. Limits on Recovery and Removal Techniques 
Traditionally, marine spill response has focused on mechanical con-
tainment and recovery techniques, such as boom and skimmers. The effi-
cacy of mechanical response is limited, especially for large spills. After 
the Exxon Valdez spill, for example, an estimated 8% of the spilled oil 
was recovered using mechanical recovery,132 and only 3% of the spilled 
                                                            
 128. For examples of these problems, see infra Part V.C.3.f (detailing problems Shell had in 
2012). 
 129. See generally WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, NOT SO FAST: SOME PROGRESS IN SPILL 
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 132. Energy Development on the Continental Shelf and the Future of Our Oceans: Hearing 
Before the Joint Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. and Subcomm. on Insular Affairs, Oceans 
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oil was recovered using these techniques after the Deepwater Horizon 
spill.133 The relative ineffectiveness of these mechanical recovery meth-
ods results from the difficulty in finding oil in sufficiently dense concen-
trations, deploying and maintaining booms, and overcoming limits on 
storage and the ability to separate spilled oil from water.134 
The inability to effectively respond to the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout using traditional techniques resulted in the development of new 
methods, including a capping stack and containment dome.135 These 
methods of recovery show some promise, but they have never been test-
ed in Arctic conditions, and there is substantial concern about their 
use.136 
In-situ burning means that spilled oil is ignited and burned in the 
ocean. The efficacy of in-situ burning is limited by the need to collect 
and contain a large amount of the oil to burn and by the emulsification of 
oil caused by waves, which makes the oil more difficult to ignite.137 In-
                                                                                                                                     
and Wildlife of the H. Comm. Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (written testimony of Dr. 
Jeffrey Short, Pac. Sci. Dir., Oceana), available at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/o/ 
fileadmin/oceana/uploads/Climate_Change/Toxic_Legacy/Written_Statement_of_Dr__Jeffrey_ 
Short_3_24_Joint_Subcommittee_Hearing.pdf.  
 133. JANE LUBCHENCO, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
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3% recovery through skimming). 
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nResponse.pdf (last visited June 2, 2014). 
 135. See SHELL, CHUKCHI SEA REGIONAL EXPLORATION PROGRAM OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN 
N-13, app. N (2011), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/OSRP/ 
Chukchi%20OSRP%20-%20February%202012.pdf (describing capping stack and dome). 
 136. See, e.g., John Ryan, Sea Trial Leaves Shell’s Arctic Oil-Spill Gear “Crushed Like a Beer 
Can”, KUOW (Nov. 30, 2012), http://kuow.org/post/sea-trial-leaves-shells-arctic-oil-spill-gear-
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Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) but testing took place only in Puget Sound, Washington. See 
Tim Bradner, Arctic Drill Rule Advance; Shell Spill Dome OK’d, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE (Aug. 
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notes 149–54 and accompanying text. A court in Alaska has determined that these response tech-
niques are not actually part of the required spill response plan. See infra Part V.C.3.c (discussing the 
challenge to BSEE’s approvals of Shell’s Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Oil Spill Response Plans). 
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F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-72891). 
 137. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILLS AND OIL SPILL RESPONSE: 
ALTERNATIVE COUNTERMEASURES FOR OIL SPILLS 14 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oem/content/learning/pdfbook.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2014) (click on link for Chapter 3).  
2014] Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean 1299 
situ burning also creates both air pollution and a residue that sinks to the 
ocean floor, causing a risk of suffocation and contamination to benthic 
organisms.138 
Dispersants are chemical agents that enhance dispersion of oil by 
generating larger numbers of microdroplets of oil that become suspended 
in the water column “where they are much more susceptible to microbial 
degradation.”139 To work effectively, dispersants must be applied in calm 
conditions with moderate to mild mixing energy,140 and the oil must not 
be weathered (i.e., condensed) due to time in the ocean. There is limited 
proof that dispersants were effective after the Deepwater Horizon spill, 
and tests on commonly used dispersants show that they may be even less 
effective in the Arctic than in the warmer, more saline waters of the Gulf 
of Mexico.141 
There are also questions about the acute and sublethal toxicity of 
dispersants.142 A recent study shows that dispersants, when combined 
with oil, can be over fifty times more toxic than oil alone for some or-
ganisms.143 During the Gulf of Mexico blowout, dispersants were re-
sponsible for the death of coral, mutated seafood, and high mortality 
rates for dolphins, whales, and turtles.144 Dispersants contain known car-
cinogens and appear to have caused a variety of human health ailments 
during and after the Gulf of Mexico blowout.145 
Even in the best of conditions, these response methods can recover 
only a small amount of the total oil spilled.146 Arctic conditions are likely 
to limit this efficacy even further. For example, low visibility or turbu-
lent conditions can ground airplanes needed to spot or ignite oil and ap-
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 144. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, DEADLY GULF DISPERSANTS IN THE GULF 53–56 
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 146. See supra notes 132–34; see also generally US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC 
OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 129; PEW ENV’T GRP. ET AL., supra note 126. 
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ply dispersants.147 Wind and waves can limit deployment of boom and 
the use of skimmers. Similarly, ice can tear boom and clog skimmers.148 
The same problems with boom can occur during in-situ burning because 
boom is often required to corral the oil into pools that are thick enough to 
ignite. 
Response exercises in Alaskan waters have demonstrated the weak-
nesses of response techniques. Prior to 2012, the most recent tests of re-
sponse equipment in the Arctic Ocean were held in 1999 and 2000 in the 
Beaufort Sea. In those tests, skimmers, boom, and vessels were deployed 
to test mechanical recovery systems. These tests were characterized as a 
“failure,” despite the calm weather.149 They revealed that even though 
mechanical recovery is typically assumed to work in up to 30% ice cov-
erage, the system only actually worked in up to 10% ice coverage.150 
The next known tests were held in August 2012 off Barrow, AK, 
when the Coast Guard deployed boom and tested a skimmer designed to 
recover oil in pockets of water trapped by ice.151 Although the trial fo-
cused on deployment, not actual spill recovery, the lessons learned from 
this exercise demonstrate how difficult it would be to respond to a real 
spill in the Arctic. As the Coast Guard noted in its report on the exercise, 
the lack of docking facilities or ports was a challenge.152 Over the course 
of nearly a week, the spill response equipment had to be trucked to Pru-
dhoe Bay, loaded onto a shallow draft barge, then transported to the 
Coast Guard boat offshore Barrow.153  The Coast Guard also encountered 
challenges in finding berthing facilities for training personnel–a problem 
that would be compounded by the much greater number of responders 
that would have to be housed if a spill occurred in Arctic waters and a 
                                                            
 147. RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: 
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 149. See Oceana, What If an Oil Spill Happened in the Arctic?, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dL3RGwpBaI (showing footage of testing oil spill response 
capacity conducted by the  Alaska Department of Environmental Conversation in 2000). 
 150. See ROBERTSON & DECOLA, supra note 134, at 47. 
 151. Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Completes Arctic Spilled Oil Recovery 
Systems Deployment (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1508115/ 
Imagery-Available-Coast-Guard-completes-Arctic-spilled-oil-recovery-systems-deployment. 
 152. ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL REPORT, supra note 122, at 1; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, PREP-
SORS 2012 (CGC SYCAMORE) AFTER ACTION REPORT (2012) (on file with author). 
 153. ARCTIC SHIELD FINAL REPORT, supra note 122, at 3–4. 
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meaningful response effort were underway. Finally, ice and fog inhibited 
the exercise.154 
Realities like these led the National Commission to find that “suc-
cessful oil spill response methods from the Gulf of Mexico, or anywhere 
else, cannot simply be transferred to the Arctic.”155 The National Acade-
my of Sciences similarly determined that “no current cleanup methods 
remove more than a small fraction of oil spilled in marine waters, espe-
cially in the presence of broken ice.”156 
Generally, oil spill response plans have not reflected the fact that 
basic response methods are limited. For example, before the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, BP assumed that the boats and skimmers it used could me-
chanically remove 492,000 barrels of oil per day.157 In reality, skimmers 
collected approximately 3% of the spilled oil.158 BP based its assump-
tions about skimmers on their Effective Daily Recovery Capacity 
(EDRC). EDRC is based on the “Name Plate Recovery Rate” of the 
skimmer, which is based on the amount of liquid that a skimmer’s pump 
can draw, discounted by 20% to account for the lack of efficiency caused 
by factors such as the percentage of water mixed with oil that is recov-
ered.159 However, this simple formula does not account for other limita-
tions, such as “moderate sea states, poor encounter rates, oil composi-
tions that were incompatible with offshore skimming systems, and an 
inability of skimmers to stay within the confines of the largest and thick-
est patches of fresh crude oil close to the site of the well.”160 Thus, 
“[c]urrent planning standards for offshore skimming systems relying on 
EDRC as the measure of skimmer effectiveness during a response proved 
to be highly inaccurate and unreliable as measures of potential perfor-
mance.”161 
Similarly, the spill response plans approved for Shell’s proposed 
activities in 2012 rely on the assumption that 90% of a worst-case dis-
charge will be contained at the source and another 5% recovered by 
skimmers or other mechanical recovery.162 Neither the plans nor the ap-
                                                            
 154. Id. at 6. 
 155. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 303–04. 
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provals recognize the limits on these technologies, the lack of testing, or 
the past failures. 
2. Response Gap 
The efficacy of oil spill recovery in water is limited under any con-
ditions, but at times, recovery actions are completely impossible due to 
environmental conditions. The time during which response is impossible 
is called the “response gap.”163  As the USGS explained, 
“[u]nderstanding what combination of countermeasures will likely be 
available under the temporal and spatial variability of the Arctic is essen-
tial to assess environmental risks from any potential spilled oil.”164 
A response gap assessment examines historical weather data and 
operational limits during various time periods for a particular location to 
assess when response is likely to be impossible. The Canadian govern-
ment conducted a response gap assessment for a few locations in Cana-
dian Arctic waters.165 The study found that, in the Beaufort Sea, visibility 
precluded any response 20% of the time in July. In November, darkness 
precluded response approximately 75% of the time, and visibility pre-
cluded response 80% of the time.166 The study did not, however, assess 
the limitations caused by ice cover, which can also be significant. Ice 
coverage between 30% and 70% is particularly challenging for any re-
sponse method.167 A study integrating ice coverage with the Canadian 
response gap study found that, in July, thresholds would not be exceeded 
for at least one response measure about 50% the time, meaning that some 
response could be mounted roughly half the days in July.168 By October, 
response was possible only 20% of the time, and no response at all was 
possible from November until May.169 
Thus, each response method is limited in Arctic conditions, and 
there are times when no response will be possible. As the experts who 
                                                            
 163. See S.L. ROSS ENVTL. RES. LTD., SPILL RESPONSE GAP STUDY FOR THE CANADIAN 
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conducted the Canadian response gap study observed, “there is a grow-
ing recognition” that the primary response method—mechanical re-
sponse—“has significant limitations when used for large spills in . . . 
Arctic locations.”170 The other existing methods—in-situ burning and 
dispersal—are limited by many of the same environmental conditions 
and have the additional disadvantage that they change at lease some of 
the pollution from one form to another.171 
E. Lack of Comprehensive Regulatory Regime 
The lack of overarching legal or policy direction compounds the 
challenges to rational decision-making outlined above. Management of 
Arctic resources has been described as “balkanized”: 
More than 20 federal agencies and bureaus have domestic Arctic-
related missions that include promoting safety, permitting commer-
cial activities, conducting scientific research, assuring clean air and 
water, and conserving fauna, flora, and ecosystems. The responsi-
bilities of each of those agencies are spelled out in U.S. law, but 
how they coordinate with each other can be unclear. State, munici-
pal, and tribal governments also have authorities and responsibili-
ties, further complicating the regulatory landscape.172 
Decisions about Arctic Ocean resources fall under the purview of 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 
(FWS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), among others. 
“These agencies are all separate entities, most of them located in differ-
ent Cabinet departments. . . .”173 
Different agencies are charged with making final management deci-
sions about industrial activities—oil and gas, shipping, climate, fisher-
ies—and these decisions by different agencies are not always consistent 
with each other or reflective of a coherent long-term plan or risk-benefit 
calculus. There is no single statute that governs Arctic resource man-
agement or planning; nor is there a single statute providing direction for 
ocean management. Instead, federal agencies must implement their spe-
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http://www.esrfunds.org/pdf/177.pdf. 
 171. US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 129, at 11–
12. 
 172. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 38. 
 173. Id. at 39. 
1304 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
cific directions, which are not always in harmony. “For example, some 
missions focus primarily on facilitating the extraction of minerals and 
energy resources, while others are charged primarily with understanding, 
moderating, and mitigating the potential impacts of human activities up-
on environmental or cultural values.”174 As mentioned above, NMFS has 
precluded commercial fisheries in the U.S. Arctic at this time due to lack 
of scientific information.175 The Department of the Interior, however, 
with the same information, has moved ahead to allow offshore oil and 
gas activities.176 
These problems are complicated by the lack of binding internation-
al direction. There is no treaty or agreement governing international wa-
ters in the Arctic. Rather, the Arctic Council exists as a policy-making 
body. Its goals are largely aspirational, and thus far, the work of the Arc-
tic Council has not resulted in significant policy change in the United 
States. 
The multiple agencies and directions can lead to inefficiency, con-
flict, and poor management. To address some of those concerns, Presi-
dent Obama created the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of 
Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska.177 The Work-
ing Group “facilitate[s] coordinated and efficient domestic energy devel-
opment and permitting in Alaska while ensuring that all applicable 
standards are fully met.”178 The Working Group is comprised of repre-
sentatives from the federal agencies that play roles in Arctic management 
and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior. 
The Working Group coordinates, but it does not have the authority to 
change regulations or force specific actions at the member agencies. 
F. Increasingly Politicization of Oil and Gas Issues 
Management decisions are further complicated by the elevation of 
offshore oil and gas issues in the national political debate. Exploration 
and development of offshore oil and gas resources rose to national prom-
inence in the early 1980s as a result of the Arab oil embargo and Reagan 
Administration push for development.179 The issue faded from the na-
tional political scene in the late 1980s, and public opinion swung against 
                                                            
 174. Id. at 38. The government prepares an Arctic Strategy, but the document provides general 
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increased offshore exploration and development in the wake of the Exxon 
Valdez spill in 1989. In fact, in the aftermath of that spill, President 
George H.W. Bush issued a presidential directive preventing leasing off-
shore most of the continental United States and in Bristol Bay, AK.180 
Congress similarly expanded an annual funding limitation that precluded 
funds from being used to lease in those places.181  
1. Increasing Attention 
That period of relative calm began to change in the early 2000s as 
the George W. Bush Administration began to make more offshore areas 
available to companies.182 In addition, the issue was a centerpiece of Re-
publican rhetoric in the campaign leading up to the 2008 election. Most 
famous of these rallying cries, of course, was Republican vice-
presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s infamous chant, “Drill, baby, drill” 
and Newt Gingrich’s call to “drill here, drill now.”183 The national atten-
tion and political gamesmanship had some substantive ramifications. 
President Bush removed the presidential moratorium implemented by his 
father, and Congress let lapse the annual funding moratoria.184 Together, 
these two actions removed barriers to leasing in much of the U.S. Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS). Late in his final term, President George W. 
Bush released a draft 2010–2015 Five-Year Leasing Program proposing 
to expand even further offshore leasing of U.S. waters.185 This draft plan, 
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which was off-schedule (the existing plan did not expire until 2012), in-
cluded thirty-one lease sales.186 This draft was never finalized.187 
Offshore drilling issues were once again thrust into the national 
spotlight by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident. Unlike the aftermath 
of the Exxon Valdez disaster, however, public concern about offshore 
drilling has not yet resulted in fundamental, substantive change in the 
governing statutes or government policy.188 High-level officials have re-
peatedly stated that offshore drilling—in the Arctic Ocean and other 
places—is an important component of the Obama Administration’s “all-
of-the-above” energy strategy.189 
2. The Department of the Interior Seeks to Quiet Its Experts 
The sensitive political environment appears to have had a direct ef-
fect on substantive work within the Department of the Interior (DOI). For 
example, during the review of Shell’s 2007–09 exploration plans, a num-
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ber of DOI’s scientists expressed concerns about the potential impacts of 
Shell’s drilling plans. The opinions of these scientists were not disclosed 
in the final Environmental Assessment, but petitioners otherwise had 
copies of these expert assessments and were successful in ensuring that 
they were before the court during the challenge to the approval based on 
that assessment.190 
Subsequently, a manager at MMS filed a complaint with the DOI 
Office of Inspector General (IG), asserting that one of the agency’s sci-
entists wrongfully released the documents to outside parties.191 He as-
serted that the expert’s documents were a critical part of the agency’s 
internal deliberative process and therefore not subject to public access 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In a parallel claim, the 
manager alleged that two of the agency scientists “intentionally omitted 
or used false data in their published manuscript” about observations of 
dead polar bears found floating in the Beaufort Sea.192 The manager also 
alleged that the scientists manipulated data in order to influence FWS to 
list the polar bear under the ESA.193 
The IG thereafter initiated a multi-year investigation of the allega-
tions. Without public explanation, the agency—by then renamed 
BOEM—suspended one of the scientists in connection with the IG inves-
tigation, but the scientist was restored six weeks later, again without pub-
lic explanation. The IG report was released in September 2012.194 At that 
time, BOEM informed the scientist that it was reprimanding him based 
on a series of improper disclosures of internal government documents to 
a non-governmental organization in 2007 and 2008.195 As BOEM explic-
itly noted, one of the disclosures listed in the letter of reprimand had 
been “cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in making 
decisions to vacate BOEM’s approval of the Shell exploration plan.”196 
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At some point thereafter, the IG re-opened the case, pursuing a new 
scientific misconduct investigation. In response, the BOEM Scientific 
Integrity Officer found no violations of the DOI Policy on Scientific and 
Scholarly Integrity and declared the case closed.197 
IV. OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
As discussed above, a variety of federal agencies are charged with 
making management decisions about Arctic Ocean resources under sev-
eral federal statutes. Decisions about offshore oil and gas activities are a 
microcosm of this issue. DOI, through BOEM and BSEE,198 is charged 
with planning and authorizing offshore oil and gas leasing, exploration, 
and development. BOEM and BSEE are subject to permitting and other 
authority that resides in a number of federal agencies. This next section 
provides a general overview of the central regulatory directives for deci-
sions about offshore oil and gas activities in federal waters.199 
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A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) governs federal 
offshore oil and gas activities.200 OCSLA calls for the “expeditious and 
orderly development” of offshore oil and gas resources, “subject to envi-
ronmental safeguards.”201 Congress left it to DOI to find the appropriate 
balance between those competing objectives, with some guidance pro-
vided by the statutory factors addressed below. 
Under the Act, decisions about offshore oil and gas activities occur 
in four main stages.202 First, the Secretary of the Interior develops a na-
tionwide leasing program, which sets forth a five-year schedule of pro-
posed lease sales.203 The plan is crafted by BOEM and must indicate, “as 
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity 
[that] . . . will best meet national energy needs.”204 A Five-Year Leasing 
Program must “obtain a proper balance between the potential for envi-
ronmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the 
potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”205 It must be “conduct-
ed in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental 
values of the renewable and nonrenewable resources contained in the 
[OCS], and the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other re-
source values of the [OCS] and the marine, coastal, and human environ-
ments.”206 The statute sets out a number of specific factors, including the 
relative environmental sensitivity and productivity of different ocean 
areas, that the agency must consider in crafting this balance.207 
Second, should it choose to proceed with a specific lease sale in-
cluded in a Five-Year Leasing Program, BOEM conducts a more specific 
analysis and decision-making process related to that specific lease sale 
and the area in which it is scheduled.208 The sale areas often cover tens of 
millions of acres, and the agency sells leases through a competitive bid-
                                                            
 200. See 43 U.S.C. §1331, et. seq. (2012) 
 201. Id. § 1332(3). 
 202. For a more detailed review of the statute and some of the difficulties in its implementa-
tion, see Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
269, 273 (2011). 
 203. Id. 
 204. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 205. Id. § 1344(a)(3); see also id. § 1344(a)(1). 
 206. Id. § 1344(a)(1). 
 207. Id. § 1344 (a)(2)(g). 
 208. Id. § 1336(a). 
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ding process.209 Successful bidders obtain a conditional right “to explore, 
develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease area.”210 
Third, BOEM evaluates exploration plans submitted by lessees.211 
Once an exploration plan is submitted and deemed complete, BOEM has 
thirty days to approve, request modification of, or deny the plan.212 If a 
company obtains all the necessary approvals from BOEM and the other 
permits described below, it may drill exploratory wells on lease tracts 
purchased during the second phase. BSEE is part of this approval pro-
cess, and the ultimate approvals to drill wells require safety and spill re-
sponse-planning approvals that are granted by BSEE.213  In addition to 
exploration drilling, companies may apply to conduct seismic and other 
activities, which are subject to approvals separate from the exploration 
plan process.214  
Fourth, BOEM evaluates proposals for development and produc-
tion.215 OCSLA establishes requirements governing the scope and con-
tent of development and production plans, and operators must carry out 
their activities in conformance with approved development and produc-
tion plans.216 BSEE is part of this approval process as well.217 
B. Other Statutory Direction 
OCSLA establishes the framework for management, but decisions 
made by BOEM and BSEE are subject to a series of other statutory obli-
gations, some of which are implemented by other federal agencies. 
OCSLA makes clear that the requirements of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) apply at all stages.218 As a result, BOEM 
prepares Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to accompany deci-
sions about Five-Year Leasing Programs, lease sales, and development 
plans.219 At the third stage—exploration—DOI has interpreted the thirty-
day limit on approvals in such a way that it effectively precludes prepara-
                                                            
 209. Id.; see also infra Part V.B.2 (explaining that the government offered tens of millions of 
acres in lease sales in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas). 
 210. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4) (2005). 
 211. Id. § 1340(c)(1). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. § 1340(a)(1); see also id. § 1348(b)(1)–(3). 
 214. See NOAA ARCTIC SDEIS, supra note 11, at ES-1 to ES-4. 
 215. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2014). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. §§ 1351(c)(1)–(6), 1351(b). 
 218. Id. § 1351(e)(1)–(2); see also id. § 1331(p). 
 219. See id. § 1351(f). 
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tion of an EIS.220 Instead, BOEM prepares less detailed Environmental 
Assessments to evaluate decisions about approval of exploration plans. 
When companies get to the third and fourth OCSLA stages—
exploration and development—they must prepare spill response plans to 
address potential discharges. Although OCSLA contains a statement of 
policy that offshore operations be conducted “in a safe manner by well-
trained personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques” to pre-
vent spills and other accidents, it contains no substantive requirement for 
spill prevention or preparation.221 The substantive obligations come from 
Clean Water Act, which requires operators of offshore facilities to have 
“a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst 
case discharge.”222 Such plans “identify, and ensure . . . the availability 
of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maxi-
mum extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge 
resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial 
threat of such a discharge.”223 By executive order and subsequent memo-
randum of agreement, the responsibility for implementing this provision 
with respect to offshore oil and gas drilling has been delegated to DOI, 
and DOI has in turn delegated this authority to BSEE.224 Accordingly, 
BSEE approves or denies oil spill response plans that have been provided 
by companies for proposed exploration and development projects.225 
BOEM and BSEE must also comply with the ESA in granting ap-
provals.226 The agencies have generally met this obligation by undertak-
                                                            
 220. See Brief of Respondents at 52 n.11, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar (9th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 09-73942); This interpretation is not mandated by the text of the regulation and, indeed, it 
would be possible for the agency to interpret the provision to permit a full EIS. See Comments Re-
garding Shell 2010 EP Submitted by Alaska Wilderness League et al. for Jeffrey Walker, Regional 
Supervisor, Minerals Management Service, at 17–18 (Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author). President 
Obama has blamed this limit for “leav[ing] no time for the appropriate environmental review.” 
Obama Blames 30-Day Legal Limit for Role in Oil Spill, POLITIFACT (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/jun/01/barack-obama/obama-blames-30-
day-limit-law-role-oil-spill/. 
 221. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2014). 
 222. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). 
 223. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii). Beyond that, the law does not establish specific spill plan re-
quirements or measures that must be met as a condition of executive approval. 
 224. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54757 (Oct. 18, 1991); see also MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT—U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD—U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (2012), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/Newsroom/ 
Publications_Library/2012%20Coast%20Guard%20MOU.pdf. 
 225. There is a current controversy about whether considerations of spill response plans them-
selves require compliance with NEPA and other statutes. See infra Parts V.B.3 and V.C.3.c (discuss-
ing challenges to spill response plans). 
 226. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
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ing formal consultations at the lease sale, exploration, and development 
phases of the OCSLA process.227 At the exploration stage, the consulta-
tion has resulted in programmatic Biological Opinions, which evaluate 
the potential impacts of a series of potential activities rather than indi-
vidual exploration proposals.228 
A variety of other statutes apply to decisions at the third and fourth 
stages of OCSLA. In order to drill exploration or development wells, 
companies must obtain permits or approvals for air, water, noise, and 
other pollution that the proposed activities may cause. NMFS and FWS, 
for example, decide whether to grant approvals for harassment of marine 
mammals pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act and ESA.229 Companies must also comply with Clean 
Water Act discharge requirements administered by EPA.230 In the Arctic, 
EPA has promulgated general permits pursuant to the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for exploration activities.231 As 
long as proposed discharges are within the scope of those contemplated 
by these general NPDES permits, companies can simply  apply for cov-
erage. 
Prior to 2010, companies seeking to operate in the Arctic also had 
to comply with Clean Air Act protections administered by EPA.232 Drill 
rigs and associated vessels were treated like emitting facilities subject to 
the Clean Air Act’s restrictions on emissions and directive to protect 
pristine airsheds. A legislative rider attached to the 2011 Omnibus Ap-
propriations Act removed these requirements, and the authority to regu-
late air emissions from offshore activities in the Arctic Ocean was trans-
                                                            
 227. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2009). 
 228. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) SECTION 7(A)(2) 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION (2013), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_ 
BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/NMFS_Arctic%20R
egional%20Biological%20Opinion_4-2-13.pdf; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION 
AND CONFERENCE OPINION FOR OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE BEAUFORT AND CHUKCHI SEA 
PLANNING AREAS ON POLAR BEARS (URSUS MARITIMUS), POLAR BEAR CRITICAL HABITAT, 
SPECTACLED EIDERS (SOMATERIA FISCHERI), SPECTACLED EIDER CRITICAL HABITAT, STELLER’S 
EIDERS (POLYSTICTA STELLERI), KITTLITZ’S MURRELETS (BRACHYRAMPHUS BREVIROSTRIS), AND 
YELLOW-BILLED LOONS (GAVIA ADAMSII) (2012), available at http://www.boem.gov/About-
BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Environment/Environmental-Analysis/Biological-Opinions-
EPA.aspx. 
 229. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012); see also id. § 1532(15). 
 230. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). 
 231. See e.g., Arctic Oil and Gas Exploration General Permits, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/water.nsf/npdes+permits/arctic-gp (last updated June 13, 2013) (discuss-
ing Permit No. AKG-28-4300). 
 232. The law includes an exception for offshore activities in the Gulf of Mexico; these re-
quirements applied elsewhere. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a), (b) (2012). 
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ferred to DOI.233 Consequently, future offshore activities in the Arctic 
will not have to comply with the Clean Air Act. 
Until 2011, Alaska’s Coastal Management Program applied to oil 
and gas activities in federal waters. That program included standards de-
signed to limit the impact of oil and gas activities on the state’s coastal 
zone, formalize local involvement in agency decision making, and pro-
vide a measure of local control over those activities even though they 
occur seaward of the state’s borders.234 Over the years, however, Alaska 
diminished those standards, and it ultimately allowed the program to ex-
pire in 2011.235 In doing so, Alaska gave up its authority to ensure that 
federally authorized activities are consistent with state coastal policy and 
lost funds that previously had been used to help local communities man-
age activities in their coastal zones.236 
V. OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN 
Oil was first produced in Alaska in the early 1900s from a small 
onshore field adjacent to the Gulf of Alaska called Katalla.237 That pro-
duction ended in 1933, and starting in the late 1950s, oil was produced 
from fields on the shores of Cook Inlet.238 Oil was discovered at Prudhoe 
Bay in the 1960s, and the first oil made it to market from the North Slope 
field in the 1970s.239 The intervening years have seen consistent produc-
tion of oil produced onshore in the state and offshore in Cook Inlet.240 
                                                            
 233. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 432, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ74/html/PLAW-112publ74.htm. 
 234. Tim Bradner, State’s Coastal Zone Management Authority to Expire This Month, ALASKA 
J. OF COMMERCE (June 3, 2011), http://classic.alaskajournal.com/stories/060311/loc_sczm.shtml. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Richard Mauer, Loss of Coast Zone Program Hurts State’s Beluga Whale Case, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/10/30/2146856/coast-zone-
loss-hurts-states-beluga.html. 
 237. Tricia Brown, Katalla: Alaska’s First Oil Well, LITSITE ALASKA, 
http://www.litsite.org/index.cfm?section=Digital-Archives&page=Industry&cat=Oil-and-
Gas&viewpost=2&ContentId=2747 (last visited June 4, 2014). 
 238. Federal Oil and Gas in Alaska, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
http://www.blm.gov/ak/st/en/prog/energy/oil_gas.html (last updated May 21, 2014). 
 239. Production began in earnest. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, 
MONEY & POWER 553, 648 (2009) (“By 1978 over a million barrels per day were flowing through” 
the Trans Alaska Pipeline. It would double “[w]ithin a few years . . . [to] a quarter of America’s total 
crude oil production.”). 
 240. Production from Prudhoe Bay peaked in 1987 at 1.5 million barrels per day. See BRITISH 
PETROLEUM, PRUDHOE BAY FACT SHEET (2006), available at https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/ 
response/sum_fy06/060302301/factsheets/060302301_factsheet_PB.pdf. It has been declining stead-
ily since, though there are sufficient resources to keep the Trans-Alaska Pipeline operating for at 
least five more decades. See Alan Bailey, A TAPS Bottom Line, PETROLEUM NEWS (Jan. 15, 2012), 
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/225019711.shtml. 
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The same is not true for the Chukchi and Beaufort sea resources. In 
fact, the history of Arctic offshore development is one of great expecta-
tions and failed realities. The next section below details those efforts, and 
the controversy they generated. It is broken into three periods: 1980 to 
2000, 2000 to 2011, and 2012 to the present. These time periods corre-
spond generally to the development efforts. 
A. 1970–2000 
The first big push to develop Arctic Ocean oil and gas resources 
began in the late 1970s and lasted through the early 1990s. In light of the 
1973 Arab oil embargo and corresponding increase in oil prices, Presi-
dent Nixon directed that ten million acres of the OCS be leased in 
1975.241 “This announcement was significant not only because it pro-
posed leasing an amount of territory in one year almost equal to that 
which had been leased since the OCS program began in the early 1950’s 
but also because it envisioned moving into previously undeveloped or 
frontier areas off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and off Alaska.”242 Con-
gress responded by amending OCSLA to create the current regulatory 
structure.243  
Within this new framework, companies purchased large swaths of 
leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas and explored for oil. With one 
exception, those efforts failed, and companies relinquished almost all of 
the leases they purchased. Here, we describe those leasing and explora-
tion efforts and the controversy they engendered. 
                                                            
 241. See G. Kevin Jones, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the 
Reagan Administration—Part I, 12 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 6 & 11 n.44 (1990). 
 242. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted) 
[hereinafter Watt I]. 
 243. Nixon’s announcement led to the 1978 amendments to OCSLA.  
It crystallized growing concern over the impact of OCS activities and the ade-
quacy of the 1953 Act. Although the need to develop national energy inde-
pendence was clear, state and local governments feared damaging impacts to 
their coastlines from oil spills and the onshore development that accompanies 
offshore drilling. Commercial and recreational fishing interests expressed 
concern over the possible effects on their livelihoods and leisure activities, 
while environmental and citizens groups raised questions about the effect of 
OCS activities on the ecology. These interests accordingly sought a role in the 
offshore leasing policy decisions, which had previously been committed to the 
virtually unlimited discretion of the Secretary.  
Id. at 1295–96 (internal citations omitted). 
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1. Five-Year Leasing Programs 
Against a backdrop of new congressional direction and increasing 
pressure to expand exploration and development offshore, President 
Jimmy Carter and Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus began develop-
ing the first Five-Year Leasing Program in 1978.244 A draft proposed 
program was prepared, and in 1979, President Carter used “his second 
Energy Message to the nation” to “direct[] the Secretary to increase the 
amount of proposed acreage over that contained in the first Draft Pro-
posed Program.”245 Ultimately, Secretary Andrus selected a Proposed 
Final Program, which “scheduled 36 proposed lease sales for the period 
from June 1980 through May 1985, covering virtually the entire Outer 
Continental Shelf . . . .”246 The program scheduled “11 proposed sales in 
the Gulf of Mexico, 6 in the Atlantic, 4 off California, 10 off Alaska, and 
5 reoffering sales [in the Gulf of Mexico].”247 
The final program was greeted by four separate court challenges. 
Petitions for review were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit by the states of Alaska and California, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the North Slope Borough.248 
In this case, known as Watt I, the petitioners alleged violations of 
OCSLA, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in addi-
tion to a special trust responsibility owed to Inupiat Eskimos.249 The 
court found that the Secretary violated OCSLA by failing ti: identify the 
location of two proposed lease sales with greater specificity; consider 
certain factors required in the balancing that underlies creation of the 
plan and base the timing and location of leases on consideration of those 
factors; consider the benefits and environmental risks shared among OCS 
regions; consider the relative environmental sensitivity and marine 
productivity among the OCS regions; balance environmental and coastal 
zone factors and not just economic factors of oil potential; quantify envi-
                                                            
 244. Id. at 1299. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1300. The “Florida Straits, the Southern Aleutian Shelf in Alaska, and the area 
seaward of the Washington and Oregon coasts” were excluded; “[a]ll these excluded areas possessed 
a very low industry rating for hydrocarbon potential.” Id. 
 247. Id. The sales in Alaska included the following: Gulf of Alaska in 1980; Cook Inlet in 
1981; Norton Basin in 1982; Beaufort Sea, Kodiak, and North Aleutian Basin in 1983; Navarin 
Basin in 1984; and Chukchi Sea and Hope Basin in 1985. Id. at 1300 n.53. 
 248. Id. at 1294 n.1. The court described the North Slope Borough as “a local governmental 
body in Alaska.” Id. 
 249. Id. at 1294. 
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ronmental costs; and adequately explain the determination of net eco-
nomic value.250 
The court rejected petitioners’ other arguments, finding that the 
Secretary met his trust obligations to Inupiat Eskimos through compli-
ance with other relevant environmental statutes, including the ESA and 
Marine Mammals Protection Act,251 and that section 19 of OCSLA (re-
quiring coordination and consultation with local communities) is inappli-
cable to preparation of a leasing program.252 The court found it unneces-
sary to reach plaintiff’s NEPA claims.253 
This case was pending when President Reagan took office. The new 
President was faced with “rising inflation, record interest rates, further 
turbulence in the oil market following the 1979 Iranian revolution, and a 
severe recession.”254 His response, at least in part, was to state support 
for moving aggressively to develop the country’s natural resources and to 
remove the regulatory hurdles and protections that might limit develop-
ment. Offshore drilling was one significant focus of this effort, and short-
ly after being confirmed, Reagan’s Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, 
promised to offer one billion acres of the OCS for lease to oil compa-
nies.255 
While the challenge to the 1980 Five-Year Program was proceed-
ing, Secretary Watt prepared to make good on his promise and “was in 
the process of revising and reapproving the program pursuant to section 
18(e)” when the court issued its order remanding the 1980 plan.256 In 
January 1982, “the court issued an order in which it adopted the Secre-
tary’s position that he could meet the court’s remand in the course of the 
                                                            
 250. Id. at 1325. 
 251. Id. at 1324. 
 252. Id. at 1325. 
 253. Id. 
 254. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 63. 
 255. Id. “If the press is here,” Secretary Watt declared during a National Ocean Industries 
Association meeting in April 1982, “I hope they will write this down. We will offer one billion acres 
for leasing in the next five years. We will not back away from our plans to have 42 lease sales.” Id. 
As part of this commitment, Secretary Watt created the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in 
January 1982. He was 
aiming from the outset to promote domestic energy supplies by dramatically expanding 
drilling on the outer continental shelf. He combined, in one entity, authority for regulato-
ry oversight with responsibility for collecting for the U.S. Treasury the billions of dollars 
of revenues obtained from lease sales and royalty payments from producing wells. From 
birth, MMS had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its 
mandate to ensure safe drilling and environmental protection. 
Id. at 56. 
 256. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir 1983) [hereinafter Watt II]. 
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revision and approved the Secretary’s proposed timetable for completing 
the revision.”257 
In July 1982, Secretary Watt issued a new Five-Year Leasing Pro-
gram that scheduled forty-one sales between August 1982 and June 
1987. Together, these sales would offer nearly one billion acres in eight-
een planning areas. The new sales would be “area-wide,” meaning that 
entire swaths of the ocean—ranging from 8 to 133 million acres—would 
be offered in the sales rather than only the areas in which oil companies 
had demonstrated interest.258 This revised plan also generated substantial 
opposition in court. The petitioners from Watt I challenged the revised 
plan on the grounds that the Secretary failed to specify the size and loca-
tion of lease areas with the precision required under OCSLA; failed to 
consider and base his decision on relevant environmental factors required 
by OCSLA § 18(a)(2); used an incorrect methodology to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of leasing; violated OCSLA by failing to insure receipt 
of fair market value under leases; violated OCSLA and NEPA by failing 
to consider certain environmental impacts of the program; and failed to 
indicate when consistency determinations under the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act would be made.259 The court rejected these arguments and 
upheld the 1982–1987 Five-Year Leasing Program.260 
Soon thereafter, DOI began preparing the 1987–1992 Five-Year 
Program. A Draft Proposed Program was released in 1985, and the pro-
gram was finalized in July 1987.261 The plan continued the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s commitment to area-wide leasing, and seventeen sales 
were held between 1987 and 1992, including five in the Alaskan OCS.262 
Environmental groups and Atlantic and Pacific coastal states challenged 
the leasing program on a variety of NEPA and OCSLA grounds. In par-
ticular, petitioners were concerned that migratory species might be sub-
ject to synergistic or cumulative effects from oil and gas activities while 
migrating through various regions, particularly in the Pacific Ocean and 
Alaska.263 The court found that the cumulative effects of the lease sale 
offerings were not properly evaluated in the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (FEIS): 
                                                            
 257. Id. 
 258. DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 65. 
 259. Watt II, 712 F.2d at 590. 
 260. Id. at 611. 
 261. Natural Res. Defense Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 262. See PATRICIA R. BRYARS, OFFICE OF LEASING & PLANS, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALE STATISTICS, ALL LEASE OFFERINGS 2–6 tbl.1 
(Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lease-Sale-Statistics/. 
 263. Natural Res. Defense Council, 865 F.2d at 298. 
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Although the FEIS contains sections headed ‘Cumulative Impacts,’ 
in truth, nothing in the FEIS provides the requisite analysis. The 
FEIS for the most part considers only the impact within each area 
of non-OCS actions plus OCS development and not the impact of 
simultaneous OCS development in different areas. The few times 
the FEIS does discuss the impact of simultaneous OCS development 
in different areas, it makes only conclusory remarks, statements that 
do not equip a decisionmaker to make an informed decision about 
alternative courses of action or a court to review the Secretary’s rea-
soning.264 
The court concluded that “[e]ven under the applicable deferential 
standard of review, we believe that allowing the Secretary’s ‘analysis’ to 
pass muster here would eviscerate NEPA” and remanded the matter back 
to the agency.265 
In the end, President Nixon’s directive resulted in lease sales in the 
Gulf of Alaska, Cook Inlet, and Beaufort Sea between 1976 and 1980.266 
Leasing pursuant to subsequent Five-Year Leasing Programs occurred 
but was limited by litigation and congressional intervention.267 
2. Leasing 
The first federal lease sale in the U.S. Arctic Ocean was held in the 
Beaufort Sea in 1979.268 During the 1980s and early 1990s, six more 
lease sales in the Beaufort Sea and two in the Chukchi Sea were held.269  
                                                            
 264. Id. (emphasis in original). The court went on to say, “The FEIS does devote a few more 
sentences here to the inter-regional effects on migrating species but these snippets do not constitute 
real analysis; they merely state (and restate) the obvious . . . .” Id. at 299. 
 265. Id. The court concluded that “[i]n each place in which the FEIS even mentions inter-
regional impacts of OCS development, it merely announces that migratory species may be exposed 
to risks of oil spills and other ‘impacts’ throughout their routes. These perfunctory references do not 
constitute analysis useful to a decisionmaker in deciding whether, or how, to alter the program to 
lessen cumulative environmental impacts.” Id. 
 266. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE SALES (2013), 
available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_ 
Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sales.pdf. 
 267. See HAGERTY, supra note 184, at 5–6 & n.23. Congressional moratoria, renewed annually 
for more than two decades, prevented offshore leasing in all OCS in the continental United States 
areas outside the Gulf of Mexico and in Bristol Bay, Alaska. These moratoria were let to expire in 
the lead up to the 2008 presidential election. See id. at 1. 
 268. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 
186, 195, AND 202—FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, at I-2 (2003) [hereinafter 
SALES 186, 195 AND 202 FEIS], available at http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/BOEM-
Regions/Alaska-Region/Environment/Environmental-Analysis/2003_001.aspx. 
 269.See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266. With one exception, these sales 
were area-wide. In 1998, as a result of controversy over leasing in the Arctic Ocean and out of a 
desire to protect the Arctic Refuge from offshore oil spills, the Secretary of Interior offered a much 
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These sales resulted in substantial corporate investment.  Lease Sale 
71, for example, was held in the Beaufort Sea in 1982 and resulted in 
more than $2 billion dollars of high bids and 121 leases being issued.270 
The 1984 and 1988 Beaufort Sea sales resulted in another 429 leases and 
nearly $1 billion in high bids.  The 1988 Chukchi Sea sale resulted in 
350 leases being issued and nearly $500 million of high bids.271  In total, 
the 1991, 1996, and 1998 Beaufort Sea sales resulted in 114 leases; the 
1991 Chukchi Sea lease sale resulted in twenty-eight leases being sold.272 
Several of these sales generated controversy and litigation. In Vil-
lage of False Pass v. Watt, Alaskan native, commercial fishing, and con-
servation entities challenged a lease sale scheduled for the St. George 
Basin in the Bering Sea.273 The plaintiffs asserted that the Secretary 
failed to comply with various duties under OCSLA and NEPA and vio-
lated the ESA by failing to adequately protect endangered whales in the 
lease area.274 The court found that the Secretary fully complied with 
OCSLA but violated NEPA by failing to consider the impact of prelimi-
nary seismic testing on whales. It also found that the Secretary violated 
                                                                                                                                     
more limited area for Lease Sale 170 in the Beaufort Sea. The available area covered only the federal 
waters offshore of state lands, from the Colville River to Canning River. See MINERALS MGMT. 
SERV., BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 170, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT II-5 fig.II.E.1 (1998) [hereinafter SALE 170 FEIS], available at 
http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Environment/Environmental-
Analysis/Sale170_1.aspx. Of the 203 blocks offered, twenty-eight leases were issued. See Alaska 
OCS Region, supra note 267. The next sale, Lease Sale 176, was cancelled. The Secretary found that 
the eighteen months remaining in the five-year planning period was not a sufficient time period in 
which to conduct an adequate environmental analysis. Press Release, Mineral Mgmt. Serv., Secre-
tary Babbitt Defers Alaska’s Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 176 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/boem-newsroom/press-releases/2001/beufort.aspx. In this same time frame 
the state of Alaska held oil and gas lease sales in its Beaufort Sea waters (zero to three nautical miles 
offshore). In challenges brought by environmental groups and a local government, the Alaska Su-
preme Court found that Alaska had not complied with its own laws in offering these lease sales. Trs. 
for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 795 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1990); Trs. for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural 
Res., 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993); Trs. for Alaska v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 865 P.2d 745 (Alaska 
1993). Despite these challenges, the lease sales had gone forward with some leasing, although the 
lessees later relinquished most of the leases. See DIV. OF OIL & GAS, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
BEAUFORT SEA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE AREA (1999), available at http://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/ 
Publications/BeaufortSea.htm. 
 270. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Vill. of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (D. Alaska 1983) [hereinafter Village 
of False Pass I]. The plaintiffs were the villages of False Pass and Nelson Lagoon; the Bering Sea 
Fishermen’s Association; the United Fishermen of Alaska; Jack U. Williams (a resident of 
Mekoryuk, Nunivak Island); the Aleutians East Coastal Resource Service Area Board; Trustees for 
Alaska, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society, 
and Alaska Center for the Environment. Id. at 1129. 
 274. Id. at 1131. 
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the ESA by failing to take action to carry out the “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives” identified in NFMS’s biological opinion to protect endan-
gered whales.275 The court enjoined the execution of the leases pending 
compliance.276 
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s partial denial of summary 
judgment alleging that the Secretary violated the ESA by issuing a Final 
Notice of Sale before receiving a final biological opinion from NMFS; 
failed to protect endangered whales from oil spills as well as seismic test-
ing; and violated NEPA by failing to provide a worst case analysis for a 
100,000 gallon oil spill. Intervenors—oil companies and the Secretary— 
cross-appealed the district court’s partial summary judgment in the plain-
tiffs’ favor and the injunction granted against them.277 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district’s court order in all respects.278 
DOI also offered leases in the Bristol Bay region of the Bering Sea 
in the 1980s (formally known as the North Aleutian Basin planning ar-
ea).279 Before industry could explore those leases, however, the Exxon 
Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, vividly illustrating the risk 
of spilled oil to the offshore environment. In response, Congress placed a 
moratorium on leasing in Bristol Bay, and in 1995 the United States 
bought back and retired the leases.280 
3. Exploration 
The leases that were sold during this first period led to limited ex-
ploration drilling in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. By 1997, thirty exploratory 
wells had been drilled in the Beaufort Sea. Five additional wells were 
drilled in the Chukchi Sea between 1989 and 1991.281 The exploration 
                                                            
 275. Id. at 1165. 
 276. Id. at 1166. 
 277. Vill. of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 278. Id. at 616–17 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 279. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., NORTH ALEUTIAN BASIN OCS PLANNING AREA: ASSESSMENT 
OF UNDISCOVERED TECHNICALLY-RECOVERABLE OIL AND GAS 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Resour
ce_Evaluation/North-Aleutian-Basin-Assessment-Report.pdf. 
 280. Id. These proposals did create controversy. Three tribal villages and several environmen-
tal organizations challenged the decision to hold a lease sale in Bristol Bay. In Tribal Village of 
Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ ar-
guments that the Secretary failed to comply with the ESA by rejecting some “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives” to protect endangered whales; that the Secretary’s EIS was flawed; and the Secretary 
violated the consultation and notice requirements under OCSLA by failing to adopt Governor of 
Alaska’s recommendations to delay and limit the sale area. Id. 
 281. Alaska Historical Data, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/ 
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activities caused a significant amount of controversy among Alaska Na-
tive and conservation groups, but there were no court challenges to these 
exploration drilling proposals.282 The exploration wells in this period in-
cluded Mukluk, which at the time was recognized as “the most expensive 
dry hole in history.”283 Oil prices, which had been rising consistently, 
peaked in 1980,284 and companies let almost all of their leases in the Arc-
tic Ocean expire. As of 2000, companies owned no leases in the Chukchi 
Sea and only five leases remained, encompassing less than 10,000 acres 
in the Beaufort Sea.285 
Only one development project—BP’s Northstar—resulted from that 
exploration. After an unsuccessful legal challenge regarding the adequa-
cy of the government’s approval of BP’s development and oil spill re-
sponse plans,286 BP began producing oil at Northstar in 2001. Northstar 
is located on a bottom-founded earthen structure created by raising the 
level of what was a tidally exposed island three miles off of the Alaskan 
coast. Through directional drilling Northstar accesses both federal and 
state leases.287 Because it is on a man-made island, Northstar does not 
share all of the characteristics of typical offshore development, which is 
more directly susceptible to ocean conditions. Nonetheless, these man-
made islands have had challenges dealing with Arctic conditions.288 
                                                                                                                                     
About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Historical-Data/Index.aspx (last visited June 4, 
2014); BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., BEAUFORT SEA EXPLORATION WELLS (2006), available 
at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/ 
Historical_Data/Exploration%20Wells%20Beaufort%20Sea.pdf. 
 282. David Whitney, Petition Seeks Halt to Oil Well, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 1997. 
 283. See YERGIN, supra note 239, at 715. 
 284. James L. Williams, Oil Price History and Analysis, WTRG ECON., http://www.wtrg.com/ 
prices.htm (last visited June 4, 2014). 
 285. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 266. 
 286. See Edwardson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 268 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 287. See AOGCC Pool Statistics, ALASKA OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N,  
http://doa.alaska.gov/ogc/annual/current/18_Oil_Pools/Northstar-%20Oil/1_Oil_1.htm (last visited 
June 4, 2014); see also SALE 170 FEIS, supra note 269, at I-1; SALES 186, 195 AND 202 FEIS, supra 
note 268, at I-2. 
 288. See Pushing Sea Ice 2009, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
Ume7Cj8bRM (showing ice pushing up the small drilling island Oooguruk on June 23, 2009). Fur-
ther, BP initially found another of its prospects, Liberty, to be an economically viable discovery and 
proposed to develop it from an onshore location six miles from the reservoir using directional drill-
ing. BP shelved this prospect after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in increased regulatory 
and industry scrutiny of such extended-reach drilling. See U.S.: BP to Delay Development Drilling 
at the Liberty Field in the Beaufort Sea, ENERGY-PEDIA NEWS (July 8, 2010), http://www.energy-
pedia.com/news/usa/bp-to-delay-development-drilling-at-the-liberty-field-in-the-beaufort-sea; Wes-
ley Loy, BP Announces It’s Backing off Liberty Development Plans, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS 
(June 29, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/06/29/2526216/bp-announces-its-backing-off-
liberty.html. 
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B. 2001–2011 
The second big push to develop Arctic Ocean oil and gas resources 
began when George W. Bush took office in 2001. As explained above, 
almost no leases were owned at the time, and the new administration 
moved aggressively to change that. These efforts resulted in more than 
three million acres of leases being sold between 2003 and 2008 and an 
outburst of controversy and litigation. The following section describes 
the expansion of activities and related controversy. 
1. Five-Year Leasing Programs 
a. 2002–2007 
Soon after taking office, the Bush administration began preparing 
the 2002–2007 Five-Year Leasing Program. The Program scheduled 
three lease sales in the Beaufort Sea and two in the Chukchi.289 As ex-
plained below, the three Beaufort Sea lease sales held pursuant to this 
plan—Lease Sales 186, 195, and 202—are responsible for almost all of 
the leases owned in the Beaufort Sea and, therefore, underlie the ongoing 
controversy surrounding Shell’s proposals to drill there. In the end, sales 
were not held in the Chukchi Sea or Bristol Bay under this Program. 
b. 2007–2012 
The Bush administration continued its aggressive push to sell leases 
in the Arctic with the 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program, which 
scheduled two sales in the Beaufort Sea and expanded leasing there from 
roughly 9.4 million acres that were offered in the 2002–2007 Leasing 
Program to nearly thirty million acres.290 The Leasing Program included 
three lease sales in the Chukchi Sea, which had no current oil develop-
ment or industry infrastructure and had not been the site of a lease sale 
since 1991.291 Each Chukchi sale would have offered roughly thirty mil-
                                                            
 289. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 
2002–2007: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, at i (2002), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/FEISVol1-
pdf.aspx. 
 290. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & 
GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2007–2012 (2007), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/MMSProposedFinalProgram2007-2012-pdf.aspx; see 
also MINERAL MGMT. SERV., FINAL NOTICE OF SALE PACKAGE CHUKCHI SEA OIL AND GAS LEASE 
SALE 193, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/ 
BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Lease_Sales/Sale_193/Info.pdf. 
 291. MINERAL MGMT. SERV., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 
2007–2012: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2007), available at 
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lion acres, including the rescheduled Lease Sale 193, which had been 
included in the 2002-07 Leasing Program but not held.292 The new pro-
gram also included a 5.6 million acre lease sale in Bristol Bay.293 
President Bush justified this expansion by saying that offshore drill-
ing bans were “outdated and counterproductive,”294 and therefore he 
would open up more areas where no such ban was in place.295 President 
Bush also asserted that new technology allowed offshore oil exploration 
to be executed so that it “is out of sight, protects coral reefs and habitats, 
and protects against oil spills.”296 
Conservation groups and an Alaska Native village challenged the 
decision to approve the 2007–2012 Leasing Program and the underlying 
environmental analysis in court.297 One petitioner, Center for Biological 
Diversity, argued among other things that DOI violated NEPA by failing 
to consider the climate change impacts of developing these offshore pe-
troleum resources and violated the ESA by failing to consult with expert 
agencies on the potential impact of the Program on listed species.298 In a 
separate petition, the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness 
League, and Pacific Environment claimed that the agency had violated 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/Intro.aspx [herein-
after OCS 2007–2012 FEIS]; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE 
SALES (2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/ 
BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sal
es.pdf (showing all leasing activity offshore Alaska). 
 292. See OCS 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 291, at II-2, available at 
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-
Program/Chapter2Alternatives.aspx; id. at fig.II-1, available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/Figures2-1thru2-6.aspx. 
 293. Id. at II-2, fig.II-4; see also Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Alaska OCS Region, North 
Aleutian Basin, Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sale 214, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,095 (Apr. 8, 2008), available 
at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/notice/73fr19095.pdf. 
 294. H. Josef Hebert, Bush Urges Congress to Lift Offshore Drilling Ban, SEATTLE TIMES 
(June 19, 2008), http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2008002744_apoffshoreoil.html. 
 295. See Bush Calls on Congress to Lift Oil Drilling Ban, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2008), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25674571/#.UWRrg6KKJdc (noting that increasing supply would “ease 
market tensions and boost supply”). See supra notes 184 and 280 for a discussion of the relevant 
“bans.” 
 296. Hebert, supra note 294. 
 297. Two challenges were filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia regard-
ing the approval of the plan and its underlying EIS. The Center for Biological Diversity filed a peti-
tion on the first day after approval, and several weeks later a coalition comprised of the Native Vil-
lage of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, and Pacific Environment filed a second petition. Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 07-1247 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2008); Native 
Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 07-1344 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2008). These two 
petitions were consolidated in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 298. Opening Brief for Petitioners, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 
F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1247). 
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NEPA by failing to account appropriately for the vast amount of missing 
baseline scientific information about America’s Arctic waters and violat-
ed OCSLA by irrationally equating the environmental sensitivity of the 
offshore environment to the environmental sensitivity of the Alaska 
coastline.299 
In 2009, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the petition-
ers that DOI inappropriately equated the environmental sensitivity of the 
offshore environment with the sensitivity of the Alaska coastal environ-
ment and that this irrational approach skewed the balancing that OCSLA 
requires DOI to undertake when deciding what areas to include in the 
Leasing Program.300 The court found against the petitioners on their other 
claims, including finding that their NEPA claim related to missing base-
line science was not ripe for judicial review.301 In making this latter rul-
ing, however, the court emphasized the importance of DOI having this 
information before the lease sale stage.302 
By the time the court issued its decision, President Obama had tak-
en office. Thus, new Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar revisited the 
2007–2012 Leasing Program on remand.303 In March 2010, Secretary 
Salazar announced that DOI would cancel the future Arctic leases sched-
uled in that Program—two each in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas and 
                                                            
 299. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 28–32, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interi-
or, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1344); Opening Brief for Petitioners, Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (No. 07-1247). Amicus briefs were submitted in the 
consolidated case by a coalition of conservation organizations, which supported the petitioners’ 
argument that there was insufficient scientific information to justify decisions about Arctic re-
sources. An amicus brief was also submitted by two Stanford economists supporting the argument 
that climate change impacts should be quantified and considered. Briefs of Amici Curaie, Native 
Vill. of Point Hope v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1344). 
 300. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 487–89. The government’s analysis of the rela-
tive environmental sensitivity had been based on a single study evaluating coastal areas. 
 301. Id. at 480. 
 302. Id. at 486–87 (“These gaps in information, however, must be considered in conjunction 
with the ‘pyramidic structure’ of a five-year leasing program. At this early stage of the Leasing 
Program, the existence of some gaps in the baseline data for these three seas is not fatal to the Leas-
ing Program.” (internal citations omitted)). As described below, DOI did not have this information 
before it held Lease Sale 193, and, thus, while this D.C. Circuit ruling came too late to directly influ-
ence that sale, the decision was relevant to the legal challenge that was brought against it. See infra 
Part V.C.2. 
 303. The new administration consolidated the remand with its review of the late term 2010–
2015 draft leasing program proposal. See supra note 185. As one of his first acts after being con-
firmed as Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar announced that the comment deadline on the draft 
2010–2015 Five-Year Leasing Program would be extended and that a series of public meetings 
would be held. These meetings were held, and before the agency reached a decision, the court inval-
idated the current 2007–2012 Leasing Program and remanded it to DOI. 
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one in Bristol Bay.304 Concurrently, President Obama issued an executive 
order withdrawing Bristol Bay from oil and gas leasing through at least 
2017.305 Consequently, only one Arctic lease sale from this Program was 
held—the aforementioned Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193. Notably, Secre-
tary Salazar did recommit to that sale in his March 2010 decision. 
In announcing its revision to the 2007–2012 Leasing Program, Sec-
retary Salazar publicly recognized that better science was needed to 
guide decisions about the Arctic Ocean and directed USGS to prepare a 
report laying out the state of science in U.S. Arctic waters.306 Thus, the 
government appeared to be taking concrete steps to respond to the lack of 
baseline information about the Arctic Ocean.307 
2. Leasing 
Other than a few thousand acres, lease sales held between 2003 and 
2008 are responsible for all of the leases owned by companies in the U.S. 
Arctic Ocean. Three lease sales were held in the Beaufort Sea pursuant to 
the 2002–2007 Five-Year Leasing Program, and one was held in the 
Chukchi Sea pursuant to the 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program. In 
total, these sales resulted in more than three million acres of leases being 
sold largely to multinational oil companies for roughly $3 billion. Neth-
erlands-based Royal Dutch Shell was the dominant bidder.308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 304. Elizabeth Bluemink, Obama Drilling Policy Excludes Bristol Bay, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.adn.com/2010/03/31/1206793/bristol-bay-off-limits-arctic.html. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies Initiative 
That Will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (Apr. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_releaseA.cfm. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Graphic prepared by Oceana from data included in JOHN TALBERTH & EVAN BRANOSKY, 
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY, NET PUBLIC BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2012). 
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a. Beaufort Sea 
In a deviation from DOI’s historical practice of preparing a new 
EIS for each sale, BOEM’s predecessor, the Minerals Management Ser-
vice, prepared one EIS to cover all three scheduled sales in the Beaufort 
Sea.309 It used this document to support the first lease sale and then pre-
pared less-detailed Environmental Assessments for the two subsequent 
sales, thus “tiering” the NEPA-required analyses of the latter lease sales 
to the first one.310 Substantial public opposition existed to all of the lease 
sales.311 The agency held Lease Sale 186 in 2003, and it resulted in the 
sale of thirty-four leases encompassing 181,810 acres.312 Lease Sale 195 
was held in 2005, and it resulted in the sale of 117 leases, encompassing 
                                                            
 309. SALES 186, 195, AND 202 FEIS, supra note 268, at I-21. 
 310. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED OIL AND GAS 
LEASE SALE 195 BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA (2004), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_Newsroom/Library/Publications/2004/EA195w
ithout%20linkver4.pdf; MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED OCS 
LEASE SALE 202 BEAUFORT SEA PLANNING AREA (2006), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_Newsroom/Library/Publications/2006/2006_E
A_202.pdf.  
 311. SALES 186, 195, AND 202 FEIS, supra note 268, AT VII-1 (noting that most of the 4,911 
comments supported the no action alternative). 
 312. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., TABLE 6: ALASKA OIL AND GAS LEASE OFFERINGS 
(2011), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/ 
Table_6.aspx. 
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more than 600,000 acres.313 Lease Sale 202 in 2007 resulted in the sale of 
90 leases encompassing more than 490,000 acres.314 
Among other things, these three sales are notable for the distinct 
lack of competitive bidding. Of the 247 tracts sold, DOI received only 
one bid on 241 of them—multiple bids were submitted on only six.315 In 
fact, in Lease Sale 195, there were no instances of competitive bidding—
each tract sold received only one bid.316 Shell was by far the dominant 
bidder in Lease Sales 195 and 202.317 The company purchased no leases 
during Lease Sale 186, but it since purchased leases that EnCana bought 
in that sale.318 
By the time DOI made its decisions regarding Lease Sale 202, the 
controversy over the leasing of U.S. Arctic waters had reached a boiling 
point. The North Slope Borough and Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commis-
sion filed a lawsuit challenging the agency’s assessment of the environ-
mental impacts of the sale.319 The plaintiffs claimed that during review of 
the lease sale, BOEM managers and decision makers changed the con-
clusions of the agency’s scientists about the significance of impacts in 
order to speed up the lease sale process and avoid having to do a new 
EIS.320  The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska ruled against 
the plaintiffs.321 An appeal to the Ninth Circuit also was unsuccessful.322 
                                                            
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See id. (compare data in table under columns “No. of Tracts Bid On” and “No. of Bids 
Rec’d”). 
 316. See id. 
 317. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SALE DAY STATISTICS: BEAUFORT SEA LEASE SALE 195 
(2005), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/ 
Regional_Leasing/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Lease_Sales/Sale_195/Analysis%20of%20Bids%20by 
%20Company2.pdf; MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SALE DAY STATISTICS: BEAUFORT SEA LEASE SALE 
202, at 2–3 (2007), http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/ 
Leasing/Regional_Leasing/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Lease_Sales/Sale_202/SALEDAYSTATS.PDF.   
 318. Kay Cashman, Shell, ConocoPhillips Buy EnCana’s Alaska Beaufort Sea OCS Leases, 
PETROLEUM NEWS (Oct. 23, 2005), http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/14850948.shtml. 
 319. See N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1502, at *1 (D. Alaska, Jan. 8, 2008). 
 320. Plaintiffs Opening Brief at *24–26, *29–31, N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., 
No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 64990 (D. Alaska, July 20, 2007); Press 
Release, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, Invasive Species Threat from Arctic Offshore Drill-
ing Ignored (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news-releases/2008/01/24/ 
invasive-species-threat-from-arctic-offshore-drilling-ignored/. 
 321. See N. Slope Borough, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1502, at *1 (order denying plaintiff’s mo-
tion for summary judgment and dismissing the action). 
 322. See N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., 343 F. App’x 272 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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b. Chukchi Sea 
As explained above, Lease Sale 193, held February 8, 2008, was 
the first sale held in the Chukchi Sea in nearly two decades. High energy 
prices and the coming change in presidential administration created 
strong incentives for DOI to offer, and industry to purchase, leases.  Pub-
lic attention was likewise acute given the importance of the Chukchi Sea 
to wildlife and communities, the national political attention focused on 
offshore drilling, and DOI’s delay in deciding to list the polar bear under 
the ESA, which eliminated a potential complication from the lease sale in 
the Chukchi Sea.323 
Lease Sale 193 resulted in approximately 2.1 million acres being 
leased at a total price of more than $2.6 billion.324 Again Shell was the 
dominant bidder, purchasing more than half of the acreage and spending 
more than $2 billion.325 Unlike in the Beaufort Sea, however, other large 
companies—notably ConocoPhillips and Statoil Hydro—made substan-
tial investments.326 The sale was one of the largest in terms of acreage 
and money ever held in the U.S.327 
A coalition of Alaska native and local and national conservation or-
ganizations challenged the sale.328 Among other claims, the plaintiffs 
asserted that DOI illegally failed to address missing scientific infor-
mation about baseline conditions in the Chukchi Sea, failed to account 
for the likely production of natural gas as well as oil, and failed to appro-
priately predict or evaluate the potential impacts of oil and gas activities 
                                                            
 323. By court order, DOI was supposed to make its polar bear listing decision in early January 
2008. Secretary Kempthorne acted contrary to this court order by delaying the listing of the polar 
bear until after Lease Sale 193 was held the next month. See Bryan Walsh, Polar Bears Wait-Listed 
As Endangered, TIME (Jan. 17, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599, 
1704808,00.html. 
 324. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., FINAL BID RECAP: LEASE SALE 193, at 9–24 (2008), 
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$10 million on several leases that did not receive bids from any other companies. Also, in several 
instances, Shell vastly outspent the competition, when it existed. Shell bid more than $6,000 per 
acre, for a total of more than $34,000,000 for lease block 6913. ConocoPhillips bid just more than 
$10 per acre, for a total bid of just more than $60,000. Id. at 15.  
 326. See generally id. (detailing all of the bids received on tracts offered in Lease Sale 193). 
 327. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 291. The second largest sale in the Arctic 
was in 1982 in the Beaufort Sea, resulting in more than $2 billion in high bids. Id. Only two sales in 
history—both in the Central Gulf of Mexico—have generated higher total bid amounts. Gulf of 
Mexico OCS Region, supra note 188 (showing total high bids, including sales in 2007 and 2008 in 
the Central Gulf of Mexico that exceeded Lease Sale 193). 
 328. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Alaska 2010). 
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on the Chukchi environment, including on the local people.329 The agen-
cy’s EIS concluded that “[b]ased on the paucity of information available 
on marine mammal ecology in the Chukchi Sea and on specific locations 
of future developments, we are unable to determine at this time if signifi-
cant impacts will or will not occur.”330 
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska ruled for 
the plaintiffs, finding that DOI had violated 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22, which 
guides an agency’s NEPA review when there is incomplete or unavaila-
ble information.331 Specifically, the court found that the agency had iden-
tified substantial missing scientific information but had not complied 
with the obligation to determine whether that information was essential 
to the decision at issue and whether it could be obtained.332 The court 
                                                            
 329. Id. at 1012–13. During the administrative process leading up to that lease sale, NMFS had 
expressed concern about the absence of adequate data to assess the individual and cumulative effects 
of the proposed oil and gas activities on marine resources, and the agency cautioned that the data did 
not support the impact assessments in the draft EIS. See Letter from Robert D. Mecum, Acting 
Adm’r, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to John Goll, Reg’l Dir., Minerals Mgmt. Serv., MMS Draft 
EIS for Chukchi Planning Area (Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with author). 
 330. CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at app. A, A7. 
 331. See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Alaska 2010). 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.22 reads as follows: 
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the 
human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or un-
available information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lack-
ing. 
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and 
the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the 
information in the environmental impact statement. 
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse 
impacts cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exor-
bitant or the means to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within 
the environmental impact statement: 
(1) A statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a 
statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to 
evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the hu-
man environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence 
which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant ad-
verse impacts on the human environment, and (4) the agency’s evaluation 
of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods 
generally accepted in the scientific community. . . . 
Id. 
 332. See Native Vill. of Point Hope, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1018. Moreover, the agency had decid-
ed to proceed with Lease Sale 193 while determining that missing information prevented designation 
of critical habitat for newly ESA listed polar bears. Five months after the polar bear decision was 
due and just three months after the Chukchi Sea lease sale, DOI stated in the May 15, 2008 polar 
bear ESA listing, “A careful assessment of the designation of marine areas as critical habitat will 
require additional time to fully evaluate the physical and biological features essential to the conser-
vation of the polar bear. . . . [and that] critical habitat is not determinable at this time.” Endangered 
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also found that DOI had violated NEPA by failing to consider the possi-
bility of natural gas development in the Chukchi Sea despite incentives 
to pursue it.333 The court remanded the EIS to DOI.334 
In response to the remand, DOI initially released a draft supple-
mental EIS that concluded that none of the missing information was es-
sential to the decision to hold the sale.335 DOI retracted that draft and, 
after the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, issued a 
new supplemental EIS that also addressed the potential impacts of a very 
large oil spill, again concluding that none of the missing information was 
essential to its decision.336 Specifically, for each of the hundreds of ac-
knowledgments made in the EIS regarding incomplete information, the 
agency made one of five findings, none relying on new information: 1) 
though incomplete, there was sufficient information on which to base a 
sound judgment; 2) the analysis included the assumption that adverse 
effects would occur (e.g., in event of oil spill); 3) the impacts would be 
same under all alternatives; 4) the existence of other laws and regulations 
would preclude significant effects; or 5) that more information would be 
known at a later stage of development.337 
The district court ultimately sanctioned this approach.338 In Febru-
ary 2013, plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, argu-
ing that the rationales on which BOEM based its conclusions that miss-
ing scientific information is not essential to its decisions at the lease sale 
stage were arbitrary and that the agency based its analysis of impacts on 
a development scenario that was arbitrarily small.339 As explained below, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of petitioners in January 2014. 
                                                                                                                                     
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,298 (May 15, 2008). Thus, the govern-
ment apparently determined that information was sufficient to sell leases but not to designate critical 
habitat for endangered polar bears. 
 333. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (“The Court agrees with Plaintiff that 
the inclusion of incentives for natural gas production, without addressing the impact of natural gas 
exploration, is arbitrary . . . .”). 
 334. Initially, the court enjoined all activity under Lease Sale 193 pending the remand. Id. at 
1019. There were subsequent proceedings on relief, and eventually, the court allowed certain activi-
ties—including large-scale seismic surveying, pre-drilling studies, and administrative transactions—
to proceed during the pendency of the remand. It would not, however, allow exploration drilling. Id. 
at 1018; see also Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 1:08-cv-0004-RRB, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78306 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2010). 
 335. CHUKCHI LEASE SALE 193 FINAL SEIS, supra note 29, at 2.  
 336. See id. 
 337. Id. app. A at 10–11. 
 338. See Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 
No. 1:08-CV-0004-RRB (D. Alaska Feb. 13, 2013) (No. 269). 
 339. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 12-35287 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2012). 
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3. Exploration 
Having purchased leases in the Beaufort Sea in 2005, Shell began 
the process of seeking approvals to drill exploration wells. The compa-
ny’s push to drill these wells touched off a lengthy public controversy 
about the company and the manner in which the government makes deci-
sions to authorize activities like those proposed by Shell. This ongoing 
controversy can be divided into three temporal categories based on the 
company’s efforts: 2007–2009; 2010–2011; and 2012–present. The first 
two are discussed here, and the last is addressed in the succeeding sec-
tion. Each section is organized around the approvals that spurred litiga-
tion—approvals of exploration plans, the granting of permits under the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, and approval of oil spill response 
plans, etc. 
There are some commonalities among Shell’s successive efforts to 
drill exploration wells. First, Shell repeatedly sought to use the Kulluk 
drill rig and the Noble Discoverer (the Discoverer) drilling vessel.340 The 
Kulluk was a conical drill barge built in 1983 for use in the Arctic.341 It 
was dormant from 1993 to 2005 when Shell bought it and began prepar-
ing it for the uses described below.342 The Discoverer was built in 1966 
and was not specifically designed for the Arctic.343 It was owned by the 
Noble Corporation and contracted to Shell.344 The vessel suffered signifi-
cant damage while conducting exploration drilling off Australia.345 In 
addition, Shell leased, constructed, or retrofitted a variety of other sup-
port and response vessels to complement the Kulluk and Discoverer.346 
                                                            
 340. Kulluk, MARINE EXCH. OF ALASKA, http://www.mxak.org/community/kulluk/kulluk.html 
(last visited June 5, 2014); see also Kulluk Conical Drilling Unit, MARINE EXCH. OF ALASKA, 
http://www.mxak.org/community/kulluk/kullukmore.html (last visited June 5, 2014). 
 341. Kulluk, supra note 340 (“After that the rig was stacked for fourteen years in McKinley 
Bay near Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories of Canada. The rig was purchased by Shell Off-
shore Incorporated of New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005 and spent the next year being refurbished 
where she had been stacked in Canada.”). 
 342. Noble Discoverer, MARINE TRAFFIC, http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/shipdetails. 
aspx?MMSI=636014934 (last updated May 24, 2014). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Rich Miller, Shell, Conoco Postpone Plans for Offshore Drilling in Arctic Alaska, 
PROFESSIONAL MARINER (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.professionalmariner.com/June-July-2013/Shell-
Conoco-postpone-plans-for-offshore-drilling-in-Arctic-Alaska/. 
 345. Rob Maetzig, Twinkle, Twinkle, Damaged Drillship, TARANAKI DAILY NEWS ONLINE 
(Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/4987045/Twinkle-twinkle-
damaged-drillship. 
 346. SHELL GULF OF MEXICO, INC., EXPLORATION PLAN 2010: EXPLORATION DRILLING 
PROGRAM POSEY BLOCKS 6713, 6714, 6763, 6764, AND 6912, KARO BLOCKS 6864 AND 7007 
BURGER, CRACKERJACK, AND SW SHOEBILL PROSPECTS OCS LEASE SALE 193, at 2 (2009), availa-
ble at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal%20Number/ 
555142AF66ACBEAC852577190066D55D/$File/Exhibit%206%20and%20Exhibit%207...3.06.pdf.  
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Each iteration of Shell’s proposals plans for some combination of these 
vessels. 
a. 2007–2009 Beaufort Sea Exploration 
For the 2007–2009 drilling seasons, Shell proposed to drill up to 
twelve exploration wells in the Beaufort Sea over three years using the 
Kulluk and Discoverer operating simultaneously, each accompanied by 
icebreakers and numerous other support vessels.347 In February 2007, 
BOEM approved Shell’s exploration plan, accompanied by an Environ-
mental Assessment.348 There was no official opportunity for the public to 
review or provide comment on the exploration plan or the Environmental 
Assessment before the permit was issued.349 
In its proposal, Shell identified the general location of the four 
wells it planned to drill in 2007 but said that the location of the wells 
drilled in subsequent years was unknown.350 The drilling in 2007 was to 
take place in Camden Bay,351 which is roughly twelve miles offshore 
from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. At the time, the available in-
formation suggested that Camden Bay was a particularly important loca-
tion for bowhead whales as they transited to and from the Canadian 
Beaufort Sea.352 Several exploration wells had been drilled near Camden 
Bay in the 1980s and one in the 1990s.353 
In addition to the exploration plan, Shell submitted applications for 
various other permits and approvals required to begin drilling operations, 
including an oil spill response plan, Clean Air Act permits, letters of au-
thorization and incidental harassments authorizations under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, and a consistency determination under the 
Coastal Zone Management Act.354 
                                                            
 347. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL OFFSHORE INC. 
BEAUFORT SEA EXPLORATION PLAN 2 (2007) [hereinafter SHELL 2007 EA], available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Enviro
nment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-009.pdf. 
 348. Id. (Finding of No Significant Impact). 
 349. See Letter from McDonnell on Shell’s Proposed Drilling in the Beaufort Sea to Goll (Feb. 
15, 2007). 
 350. SHELL 2007 EA, supra note 347, at 1–2. Shell did identify several lease blocks on which it 
sought to drill. Id. These leases were purchased in Lease Sale 195 held in 2005. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 818–21 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 353. SHELL 2007 EA, supra note 347, at 1; see also Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 
Conservation Order No. 407, ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN. (Oct. 23, 1997), 
http://www.doa.alaska.gov/ogc/orders/co/co400_499/co407.htm (granting ARCO Alaska, Inc. an 
exception to allow it to drill an oil pool in Camden Bay). 
 354. See infra Part V.C.3. 
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As described here, conservation and Alaska native groups chal-
lenged a number of these government approvals once they were awarded. 
i. Challenge to the DOI’s Approval of Shell’s Exploration Plan 
The North Slope Borough, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commision, 
and a number of conservation and Alaska Native groups challenged 
DOI’s approval of the exploration plan.355 Per OCSLA’s jurisdictional 
requirements, these challenges proceeded directly in the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.356 
Petitioners immediately sought a stay of the government approval 
of Shell’s exploration plan due to concerns about the effect that ice-
breakers traveling through the Chukchi Sea and in the Beaufort Sea 
would have on bowhead and beluga whales and on subsistence hunt-
ing.357 Petitioners asserted that DOI’s approval of the exploration plan 
violated both OCSLA and NEPA. They petitioners argued that the agen-
cy could not adequately evaluate Shell’s plan under these laws because 
Shell had not identified the location of the wells it planned to drill in 
2008 and 2009.358 Petitioners also argued that the Environmental As-
sessment prepared by MMS did not fully evaluate impacts to a number of 
wildlife species, such as young bowhead whale calves susceptible to sep-
aration from their mothers.359 Agency scientists predicted “the proposed 
action has the potential to cause significant impacts to a variety of pro-
tected wildlife resources,”360 and were concerned about the consequences 
                                                            
 355. See Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 819. 
 356. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(2) (2012) (“Any action of the Secretary to approve, require modifica-
tion of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any development and production plan under this sub-
chapter shall be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of appeals for a circuit in 
which an affected State is located.”). The law was not clear whether a challenge to the exploration 
plan approval by environmental and Alaska Native groups should be filed directly in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, or whether they were required to first file an administrative appeal in the Interior Board of Land 
Appeals (IBLA). Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 819. Thus, some groups first filed appeals 
in the IBLA, while others filed their challenge to the exploration plan approval in the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Id. After the IBLA issued an order suspending any further proceedings pending 
the outcome of the case filed in the Ninth Circuit, groups that were before the IBLA filed their peti-
tions with the Ninth Circuit Court as well. Id. Eventually, the three cases before the Ninth Circuit 
were consolidated and Shell intervened in the case. Id. 
 357. See Brief of Petitioners, Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d 815, 2007 U.S. 9th Cir. 
Briefs LEXIS 909, at *11–19. 
 358. See Petitioners’ Consolidated Brief, Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d 815, 2007 U.S. 
9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 908, at *23–32. 
 359. Alaska Wilderness League, 548 F.3d at 825–27. 
 360. MMS Analyst Review of EA for Exploration (on file with author); See also Juliet 
Eilperin, Warnings Ignored by Agency, HERALD-TRIBUNE (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20100525/ARTICLE/5251048?p=3&tc=pg.  
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of a large oil spill, especially to subsistence users and polar bears.361 In 
addition, the petitioners argued that the Environmental Assessment was 
deficient because it avoided consideration of a large spill on the grounds 
that such an impact, though large, was too unlikely to warrant considera-
tion and that the DOI had violated NEPA by improperly “tiering” to ear-
lier analyses.362 
The court delayed making a decision on the motion for stay until 
August 1 based on declarations filed by Shell that gave the court the 
“understanding that there will be no icebreaking, drilling, or other ves-
sels, or other drilling related activity, in either the Chukchi or Beaufort 
Seas until after August 1, 2007.”363 However, in July the North Slope 
Borough informed the court that Shell’s icebreakers had begun transiting 
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.364 The court then issued an order requir-
ing Shell to “report to the court on the status of any of its icebreaking 
vessels, supply ships or other water craft whose activities are potentially 
related to drilling activities and are currently present in or headed toward 
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas . . . .”365 This order allowed the court to 
monitor what was happening on the water as it considered the merits of 
the lawsuit. 
In August 2007, the court granted a stay, finding that the environ-
mental and Alaska Native groups had shown there was a probability that 
they would succeed on the merits of the case and that they faced the pos-
sibility of irreparable harm if the court did not grant the stay.366 The stay 
remained in effect until the court ruled on the merits of the case in No-
vember 2008 and, therefore precluded Shell from drilling in both 2007 
and in 2008.367 
                                                            
 361. Alaska Wilderness League, 2007 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 908, at *19–21. 
 362. Id. at *39–40. The government’s own experts shared the concern about tiering. For exam-
ple, in a review of Shell’s proposed 2007 drilling plans, a BOEM analyst noted that “[t]he tiered 
concept assumes that subsequent environmental documents will be required to focus the analysis on 
site-specific, project-level issues, impacts, and appropriate mitigation measures developed. In this 
instance, I definitely do not feel that this has been the case.” Id. at *39. Another analyst commented, 
“[W]e are always told not to worry about our lease sale analyses, because the specifics will be ad-
dressed later. Yet when specific projects do roll around, we are given neither the time nor the infor-
mation necessary to adequately analyze and mitigate the proposed activity.” Id. at *40. 
 363. Petitioners’ Joint Response to Shell Offshore, Inc.’s Notice to the Court at 2, Alaska Wil-
derness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. July 18, 2007) (Nos. 07-71457, 07-71989, 
07-72183). 
 364. Id. 
 365. Order at 1, Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. July 18, 
2007) (Nos. 07-71457, 07-71989, 07-72183). 
 366. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting a stay 
of drilling pending adjudication of the case). 
 367. Id. at 820, 835. 
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In its opinion on the merits of the case, the court noted that “a num-
ber of agency experts expressed concern about the potentially significant 
impacts the drilling would have on bowhead whales, polar bears, and the 
Inupiat subsistence harvest.”368 Due to the agency’s acknowledgement of 
the gaps in data and the potential for serious consequences, followed by 
its unsubstantiated conclusions that any impacts would be insignificant, 
the court determined that the agency had not taken the requisite hard look 
at Shell’s plans.369 The court found that there remained “substantial ques-
tions as to whether Shell’s plan may cause significant harm to the people 
and wildlife of the Beaufort Sea region.”370 The court also found that the 
agency’s approval of the project violated OCSLA, because the permit 
application did not identify the location of each proposed well.371 
In March of the following year, the court, without stating a reason, 
vacated and withdrew its November opinion, noting that it would issue a 
new opinion.372 Shortly after, Shell withdrew its exploration plan, the 
agency rescinded its prior approval of that plan, and the court dismissed 
the case as moot without issuing a new opinion.373 
ii. Administrative Appeals of 2007 Clean Air Act Permits 
In addition to the exploration plan approval, Shell also needed per-
mits from EPA under the Clean Air Act for its proposed 2007–2009 ac-
tivities. EPA issued two minor source permits—one for the Kulluk and 
one for the Discoverer.374 The North Slope Borough, conservation 
groups, and Alaska Native entities filed administrative appeals challeng-
ing both air permits at the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), an ad-
ministrative body within EPA set up to review the Agency’s decisions.375 
Once such an appeal is filed, the permits at issue are not considered final 
                                                            
 368. Id. at 819. 
 369. Id. at 831–32. 
 370. Id. at 825, 834–35. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacated and 
withdrawn). 
 373. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), dismissed as 
moot sub nom. Alaska Wilderness League v. Salazar, 571 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 374. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. 357, 359–60 (EAB 2007), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/OCS%20Permit%20Appeals%20(CAA)/5E8F19
CE776970DE8525735600525853/$File/Shell%20Oil.pdf. 
 375. Id. at 357. The conservation petitioners included Resisting Environmental Destruction on 
Indigenous Lands, a Project of the Indigenous Environmental Network; Northern Alaska Environ-
mental Center; Alaska Wilderness League; Center for Biological Diversity; and Natural Resources 
Defense Council. Air permits from EPA are subject to appeal to the EAB under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 
(2014). 
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until the appeal is decided.376 Therefore, pending the EAB’s decision, 
Shell did not have permits and could not proceed with exploration drill-
ing. 
Petitioners argued to the EAB that EPA erred in awarding minor 
source permits for the two vessels rather than requiring regulation under 
the strictures of the Clean Air Act “Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion” (PSD) program.377 Specifically, the petitioners argued that EPA 
erred by: (1) concluding that the drilling vessels were technically only 
“OCS sources” subject to regulation when they are attached to the ocean 
floor and (2) treating each drill site as a separate minor source, rather 
than aggregating the emissions from multiple wells over the entire sea-
son.378 The petitioners also challenged EPA’s conclusion that only wells 
drilled within 500 meters of each other would be considered part of the 
same source.379 
In September 2007, one month after the Ninth Circuit issued its or-
der staying Shell’s activities, the EAB affirmed EPA’s determination that 
each well could be counted a separate source, but it found that EPA did 
not provide adequate explanation to support its conclusion that sources 
would be considered the same if wells were drilled within 500 meters of 
each other.380 The EAB remanded the permits to EPA, thus continuing 
the automatic stay.381 In addition to the stay from the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, these EAB orders provided a second reason for which Shell 
was precluded from drilling in 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
b. 2010 Beaufort and Chukchi Exploration Plans 
Shortly after withdrawing its 2007–2009 exploration plan, Shell 
submitted two new single-year exploration plans for the 2010 drilling 
                                                            
 376. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(f)(1). 
 377. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. at 359. The most substantial import of the decision to 
grant minor source permits was that Shell was not required to apply “Best Available Control Tech-
nology” (BACT) to its vessels. Id. at 366. BACT is an emissions limitation, which is made on a 
case-by-case basis based on energy, environmental, and economic impacts. Guide to Environmental 
Issues: Glossary of Terms & Acronyms, EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE, http://ofmpub.epa.gov/sor_internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/glossariesand 
keywordlists/search.do?details=&glossaryName=Environmental%20Issues%20Glossary (last visited 
June 7, 2014). It can include additional control equipment or modification of the production process-
es or methods. Id. 
 378. In re Shell Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. at 369–70. 
 379. Id. NSB also challenged EPA’s calculation of the drill ships’ potential to emit (PTE) 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and the enforceability of the permits’ NOx limitations, the validity of Shell 
ambient air quality modeling, the adequacy of the opportunity for public participation, and the suffi-
ciency of EPA’s environmental justice analysis. Id. at 357. 
 380. Id. at 358. 
 381. Id. at 406. 
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season.382 Shell planned to use one drill ship (the Discoverer) to drill up 
to five wells in both the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.383 In the Beaufort 
Sea, Shell proposed to drill two exploratory wells near Camden Bay and 
north of Point Thompson, about thirty miles off the coast.384 In the Chuk-
chi Sea, Shell proposed to drill three wells on any of five potential sites 
spanning ninety miles, approximately seventy to 135 miles offshore.385 
Once again, federal agencies granted Shell most of the approvals 
necessary for the company to proceed with drilling operations.386 These 
approvals were granted despite the pending legal challenges to the 2007–
2012 Five-Year Leasing Program and Lease Sale 193. Again, local gov-
ernment, conservation, and Alaska Native groups filed various challeng-
es to the federal government’s approvals of Shell’s exploration plan and 
Clean Air Act permits.387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 382. See Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 16–17, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F. 
App’x 747 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-73942). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. Concurrent with these developments, and as explained above, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the 2007–2012 OCS Leasing program violated OCSLA. See supra notes 300–
02 and accompanying text. Shell’s Chukchi Sea leases were purchased in a lease sale held under that 
program, and thus while DOI was re-evaluating that program in 2009 and 2010, Shell could not 
conduct exploration activities on its leases. DOI, however, proceeded to evaluate Shell’s exploration 
proposals. This uncertainty was cleared away when Secretary Salazar let stand the Chukchi Sea lease 
sale in his final decision on remand, although as explained below by that time the Secretary had 
suspended consideration of the final approvals for Shell’s 2010 exploration activities due to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster.  
 387. Discussed more in-depth infra Part V.C.3.a. 
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i. Challenge to MMS’s Approval of Shell’s 2010 Exploration Plans 
MMS approved Shell’s Beaufort Sea Exploration Plan in October 
2009 and its Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan two months later.388 Alaska 
Native entities and conservation groups challenged the exploration plans 
in petitions for review filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.389 
                                                            
 388. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV. - ALASKA OCS REGION, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MGMT. FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (2009), available at http://www.boem.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental 
_Analysis/2009-061-fonsi.pdf. 
 389. Petitioners AEWC and Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope filed the Petition for Re-
view for of the Beaufort Sea approval, No. 09-73944, on December 15, 2009, and filed the Petition 
for Review for the Chukchi Sea approval, No. 10-70368, on February 4, 2010. Petitioners Native 
Village of Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of 
Wildlife, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Envi-
ronmental Center, Oceana, Ocean Conservancy, Pacific Environment, Resisting Environmental 
Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society filed their 
Petition for Review of the Beaufort Sea approval on December 15, 2009. Those same groups, as well 
as National Audubon Society, Ocean Conservancy, and The Wilderness Society filed their petition 
for review of the Chukchi Sea approvals on January 19, 2010. The court consolidated all of the peti-
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Among other claims, the petitioners argued that a blowout was a reason-
ably foreseeable event and that, therefore, MMS must analyze the poten-
tial environmental effects of a large spill from exploration drilling.390 
Petitioners also argued that, once again, MMS had failed to consider im-
pacts to bowhead whales and that MMS improperly analyzed the impacts 
of drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas separately and dismissed any 
potential for cumulative effects of drilling in both areas or in drilling 
over multiple years.391 The Ninth Circuit summarily denied the petitions 
in May 2010, stating without substantive explanation that MMS had met 
its obligations under NEPA and that the agency did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously.392 
A month before the opinion was issued, however, the Deepwater 
Horizon exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. As this disaster un-
folded over many months, it raised immediate public concern about the 
safety of offshore drilling and the ability to quickly and effectively re-
spond to any and all problems. 
The wholesale inability of industry and government to stop the 
blowout quickly or clean up spilled oil in the relatively calm and infra-
structure-rich waters of the Gulf of Mexico led the Obama Administra-
tion to suspend consideration of its final approvals for Shell’s planned 
drilling in the U.S. Arctic Ocean in 2010.393  
                                                                                                                                     
tions and allowed Shell to intervene on the side of the federal government. Order, Native Vill. of 
Point Hope v. Salazar (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2010) (No. 09-73942), available at   
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal%20Number/86A9966325
DA82A08525771B004FCCB3/$File/Exh.%20C...7.03.pdf. 
 390. Id. 
 391. See Consolidated Brief for Petitioners, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F. 
App’x 747 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010) (Nos. 09-73942, 09-73944, 10-70166, 10-70368); Opening Brief 
on the Merits for Petitioners Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and Inupiat Community of the 
Arctic Slope 41–47, Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F. App’x 747 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010) 
(Nos. 09-73942, 09-73944, 10-70166, 10-70368). In its 2008 Biological Opinion, NMFS concluded 
that “[b]ecause [of] the potential for noise disturbance to displace whales from important feeding 
areas, special scrutiny should be given to . . . drilling operations which may impact these areas.” 
MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON OIL AND GAS LEASING AND EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES IN THE 
U.S. BEAUFORT AND CHUKCHI SEAS, ALASKA 99 (2008), https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/ 
protectedresources/whales/bowhead/biop0708.pdf (emphasis added). NMFS had also warned that 
significant impacts could occur, especially to mothers and calves if important feeding habitat was 
disturbed. Id. at 87. A similar risk of disturbance existed for walrus because they feed at Hannah 
Shoal, about twenty-five miles from one of the proposed Chukchi Sea drilling sites. 
 392. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 378 F. App’x 747. 
 393. Memorandum Ken Zalazar, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Michael R. Bromwich, 
Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Decision Memorandum Regarding the Suspension of Certain 
Offshore Permitting and Drilling Activities on the Outer Continental Shelf 1 (July 12, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/upload/Salazar-Bromwich-July-12-Final.pdf. 
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ii. Administrative Appeals of 2010 Clean Air Act Permits 
Before the Gulf of Mexico blowout, Shell had applied for two per-
mits pursuant to the Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion (PSD) program for its Discoverer drill ship, one for drilling in the 
Beaufort and one for the Chukchi.394 EPA issued the permits in the 
spring of 2010.395 Again Alaska Native and environmental groups ap-
pealed the permits to the EAB.396 Among other things, Petitioners argued 
that Best Available Control Technology Standard (BACT) should be re-
quired on all vessels associated with Shell’s drilling operations, not just 
the drill ship.397 In its decision, the EAB ruled against the petitioners on 
this BACT claim.398 In addition, EPA had determined that a rig became 
an “OCS source” when a Shell representative declared it secure, stable, 
and ready to begin exploration. The EAB held that that the agency did 
not provide a “cogent, reasoned explanation” of its adoption of Shell’s 
approach to determining when the drill ship becomes a stationary source 
subject to regulation and that this determination inappropriately delegat-
ed to Shell EPA’s authority to regulate.399 Finally, the EAB found that 
EPA’s analysis of the potential for adverse health impacts to Inupiat 
communities along the Arctic coast did not comport with the agency’s 
own concurrent revision of standards for particular emissions.400 
Ultimately, Shell was unable to drill in 2010 and 2011 because (1) 
the analysis underlying Lease Sale 193 was illegal and on remand to the 
agency; (2) EPA did not comply with the law in awarding Clean Air Act 
permits; and (3) the government put its exploration decision-making on 
hold in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
                                                            
 394. In re Shelf Gulf of Mexico, OCS Appeal Nos. 10-01 to 10-04, slip op. at 13, 15 (EAB 
Dec. 30, 2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/OCS%20Permit 
%20Appeals%20(CAA)/41B37138DABA5A54852578090072B80A/$File/Denying%20and%20Re
manding....pdf. Unlike in its 2007 applications, Shell acknowledged here that the Discoverer was a 
major emitting facility subject to the Clean Air Act’s PSD program.  
 395. Id. at 15, 17. 
 396. Id. at 1. The groups were the Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Native Village of Point Hope, Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands 
(REDOIL), Alaska Wilderness League, Audubon Alaska, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, 
Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commis-
sion, and Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 2–3. 
 400. Id. at 3, 8. 
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C. 2012–Present 
Beginning with the revised 2007–2012 Five-Year Leasing Program, 
decisions about offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic were squarely 
under the control of the Obama Administration. As it moved forward, the 
administration completed a new 2012–2017 Five-Year Leasing Program, 
continued its commitment to Lease Sale 193, and once again granted ap-
provals and permits for exploration drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort 
seas. These decisions, again, led to controversy. 
1. 2012–2017 Five-Year Leasing Program 
The 2012–2017 Five-Year Program and accompanying program-
matic EIS were finalized in August 2012. The plan includes two lease 
sales in the Arctic Ocean: Lease Sale 237 scheduled in the Chukchi Sea 
in 2016 and Lease Sale 242 in the Beaufort Sea in 2017.401 The program 
document explains that the sales are scheduled late in the five-year plan-
ning horizon to allow for additional scientific information to be gathered 
and for improved “contingency planning and infrastructure develop-
ment.”402 In addition, BOEM committed to moving toward a revised sys-
tem of leasing for the Arctic Ocean that is “markedly different from the 
traditional area-wide leasing model applied in the GOM, in which all un-
leased acreage in the area is typically offered for sale.”403 The agency 
stated that it 
[i]s developing a process in which it will continue to use incoming 
scientific information and stakeholder feedback to proactively de-
termine, in advance of any potential sale, which specific areas offer 
the greatest resource potential while minimizing potential conflicts 
with environmental and subsistence considerations . . . . To facili-
tate this approach, BOEM will carefully consider specific subsets of 
the broader planning area that have the most promising oil and natu-
ral gas resource potential, based on analysis of geological and geo-
physical (G&G) data as well as information developed through any 
exploration under existing leases from previous sales. BOEM will 
                                                            
 401. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., PROPOSED FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012–2017, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter PFP 2012–2017], available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Pr
ogram/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%2012-17.pdf. On August 27, 2012, Secretary Ken 
Salazar gave final approval to the schedule of lease sales set out in the Proposed Final Program 
(PFP). 2012–2017 OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
http://www.boem.gov/Five-Year-Program-2012-2017/ (last visited June 8, 2014); see also PFP 
2012–2017, supra, at 4 tbl.B. 
 402. PFP 2012–2017, supra note 402, at 7–8. 
 403. Id. at 7. 
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further refine those areas in order to exclude or protect through mit-
igation environmentally sensitive habitats and subsistence uses 
based on ongoing scientific study and the incorporation of tradition-
al knowledge supplied by Alaskan Natives.404 
It is not clear how these changes will be implemented. A challenge was 
filed to the plan by Center for Sustainable Economy.405 Briefing in the 
case is ongoing.406 
2. Lease Sale 193 
In February 2013, the plaintiffs in the challenge to Lease Sale 193 
appealed the district court’s decision upholding the supplemental EIS as 
compliant with NEPA. In their appeal, the petitioners argued that DOI 
had violated NEPA in two regards. First, they argued that the supple-
mental EIS did not satisfy the agency’s obligations when acting in the 
presence of significant scientific uncertainty.407 Specifically, they argued 
that the reasons given by the DOI—that missing scientific information is 
not essential to decisions at the lease sale stage—are arbitrary.408 Second, 
the petitioners argued that the agency based its analysis of impacts on an 
arbitrarily limited development scenario.409 
On January 22, 2014, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the peti-
tioners.410 The court found that DOI had violated NEPA by relying on an 
arbitrarily small prediction of the amount of the development that might 
result from selling leases in the Chukchi Sea. All of the analysis of po-
tential impacts to the environment in the EIS supporting the decision to 
hold Lease Sale 193 was premised on a scenario in which one billion 
barrels of oil were developed from the leases sold. One billion barrels 
reflected the “lowest possible amount of oil that was economical to pro-
duce,” and DOI chose to use it even though estimates of hydrocarbon 
potential in the Chukchi Sea ranged up to twenty-nine billion barrels 
with a mean estimate of twelve billion barrels.411 The court rejected the 
                                                            
 404. Id. 
 405. Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, No. 12-1431 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2012). 
 406. Id. 
 407. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. at 499–502. 
 410. Id. at 502–05. 
 411. Id. at 501. 
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government’s justification for using this low estimate and remanded the 
case to the district court.412 
Several days after the court decision, Shell announced that it would 
not seek approval—as it had planned—to drill exploration wells in the 
Chukchi Sea beginning in 2014.413 
3. 2012–2013 Beaufort and Chukchi Sea Exploration 
Looking again to drill exploration wells, Shell submitted revised 
exploration plans in May and June 2011, respectively, seeking approval 
for 2012 to drill up to four wells in the Beaufort Sea, two wells each at 
its Sivulliq and Torpedo prospects, and six wells at its Burger prospect in 
the Chukchi Sea.414 In August 2011, BOEM conditionally approved the 
Beaufort Exploration Plan, and in December 2011 BOEM conditionally 
approved the Chukchi Exploration Plan.415 The conditional approvals 
allowed Shell to drill the wells proposed under its exploration plans as 
long as the company received the permits required by other agencies and 
met other particular conditions imposed by BOEM. 
The use of such conditional approvals has prompted concern be-
cause it allows for continued environmental and economic uncertainty 
beyond the exploration plan approval.416 Future agency decisions about 
the conditions can be improperly influenced by the massive industry in-
                                                            
 412. Id. at 504–05. The court found that the supplemental analysis satisfied the DOI’s obliga-
tions to address missing information and rejected the petitioners’ argument to the contrary. See id. at 
496. 
 413. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Shell Says It Won’t Drill in Alaska in 2014, Cites Court Chal-
lenge, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shell-says-
it-wont-drill-in-alaska-in-2014-cites-court-challenge/2014/01/30/72dd06f8-89ab-11e3-916e-
e01534b1e132_story.html. In October 2013, Shell had announced plans to return to the Chukchi Sea 
in 2014 and had been pursuing the necessary approvals. 
 414. SHELL OFFSHORE INC., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN 
CAMDEN BAY, BEAUFORT SEA, ALASKA 1–6 (2011), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Beaufort_EP/Shell%202012%20Camden%20Bay% 
20Exploration%20Plan%20Public%20Copy.pdf; SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC.,  REVISED OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA 1–5 (2011), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Plans/Regional_Plans/
Alaska_Exploration_Plans/2012_Shell_Chukchi_EP/CS-EP-Public.pdf.  
 415. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION PROGRAM 11–12 (2013) [hereinafter DOI 60-DAY REPORT], available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf. 
 416. See Letter from Cindy Shogan, Exec. Dir., Alaska Wilderness League et al., to Dr. James 
Kendall, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. 39 (July 25, 2011), available at 
https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90463/621169/737117/736922/A2F7W2_-
_AWL_Comment_Letter_on_Shell_Beaufort_Sea_Spill_Plan_and_Exploration_Plan_7-25-11.pdf. 
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vestment that follows conditional approvals, further tilting the decision-
making field toward approving risky activities. 
Shell also sought and received approvals for its oil spill prevention 
and response plan and air and water pollution permits. As detailed below, 
each of these authorizations spurred litigation. Despite this and other ac-
tive litigation as described above, Shell mobilized its drilling rigs into 
U.S. Arctic waters in the summer of 2012, though it did not manage to 
complete any exploration wells. 
a. Challenge to Exploration Plan Approvals 
For the third time, Alaska Native and environmental groups chal-
lenged the approval of Shell’s exploration plans in the Ninth Circuit.417 
As the first plans to be submitted in the Arctic since the Gulf of Mexico 
blowout, Shell’s revised plans were required to respond to two Notices to 
Lessees issued by the Secretary of the Interior as a result of the Gulf in-
cident. The revisions related to the calculation of a worst-case discharge 
and to Shell’s ability to deploy containment equipment in the event of a 
blowout.418 
In their challenge, the petitioners focused on BOEM’s compliance 
with the OCSLA regulations governing spill response capabilities. Peti-
tioners argued that the government had improperly approved Shell’s ex-
ploration plans before Shell had an approved oil spill response plan in 
place, and had violated the law by relying on a cursory explanation of 
Shell’s well capping and containment system, for which the design had 
not even been completed, much less was it built or tested.419 Petitioners 
also contended that Shell’s estimate of the time required to drill a relief 
well was overly optimistic and that if a relief well could not be drilled in 
                                                            
 417. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). Native Village of 
Point Hope, Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, 
National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental 
Center, Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Resisting Environmental Destruction On Indigenous Lands 
(REDOIL), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society filed their petition challenging the Beaufort 
approval (No. 11-72891) on September 29, 2011, and ICAS filed its petition on October 3, 2011 
(No. 11-72943). Id. The same groups filed petitions challenging the Chukchi Sea approval in Febru-
ary 2012. Again the cases were consolidated, and Shell and the state of Alaska joined as intervenors 
in the case. See id. 
 418. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL NOTICE 
TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
(OCS) (2010), http://www.boem.gov/Regulations/Notices-To-Lessees/2010/10-n06.aspx; BUREAU 
OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND 
OPERATORS (NTL) OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2010), 
available at http://www.ocsbbs.com/ntls/10-n10.pdf. 
 419. Native Vill. of Point Hope, 680 F.3d at 1129. 
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such a short time, the total amount of oil needing to be recovered could 
exceed the amount anticipated in Shell’s plans.420 
The Ninth Circuit assigned the case to the same panel from previ-
ous year, and the court again rejected the challenges.421 The court sanc-
tioned the agency’s reliance on the old spill response plans when it ap-
proved the drilling plans and determined that, because the agency had 
eventually approved the new spill response plans, the issue was moot.422 
The court also deferred to the agency’s own expertise in determining that 
the cursory description of Shell’s spill containment plans was sufficient 
and that the time estimate for drilling a relief well was realistic.423 
b. Continuing Controversy over Air Emissions424 
Shell again applied for Clean Air Act permits needed for its pro-
posed drilling. EPA issued two PSD permits for the Discoverer—one for 
the Chukchi Sea and the other for the Beaufort Sea.425 EPA issued a mi-
nor source permit for the Kulluk.426 
Alaska Native and environmental groups again challenged the per-
mits at the EAB. With respect to the Discoverer permits, the petitioners 
again argued that EPA erred by determining that the vessels are OCS 
sources subject to regulation only when attached to the seabed.427 In ad-
dition, the petitioners challenged EPA’s determinations in assessing 
compliance with the Clean Air Act that ambient air would be measured 
                                                            
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 1126. 
 422. Id. at 1131. 
 423. Id. at 1134. 
 424. In December 2012, Congress transferred the authority to regulate air emissions from OCS 
sources from EPA to the DOI. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 
§ 432, 125 Stat. 786, 797 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
112publ74/html/PLAW-112publ74.htm. These changes do not apply to permits already issued or 
under consideration, like those at issue for Shell. See id. § 432(d). BOEM has committed to revising 
its regulations to better enable the agency to address the new responsibilities. 
 425. In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, OCS Appeal Nos. 11-02, 11-03, 11–04, & 11–08, slip op. at 1 
(EAB Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/ 
OCS%20Permit%20Appeals%20(CAA)/FFB31450EBD172148525798300737184/$File/Denying%
20Review...51.pdf. 
 426. See In re Shell Offshore Inc., OCS Appeal Nos. 11-05, 11-06, & 11-07 (EAB Mar. 30, 
2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal 
%20Number/148252B4723F0450852579D100714934/$File/Shell%20Kulluk.pdf. 
 427. The groups challenging the Discoverer permits were the Native Village of Point Hope, 
Resisting Environmental Destruction of Indigenous Lands. Alaska Wilderness League, Center for 
Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, 
Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and the 
Iñupiat Community of the Arctic Slope. Id. at 1. In addition, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commis-
sion initially joined the challenge but later withdrew. 
1346 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
500 meters from the ship and that the emissions would not violate new 
increment standards for certain pollutants.428 Finally, the Alaska Native 
groups argued that EPA’s environmental justice analysis regarding dis-
proportionate impacts to the North Slope communities continued to be 
arbitrary.429 
The EAB dismissed the appeal, finding EPA’s determination that 
the rig became an OCS source when attached to the bottom was ade-
quately justified. The EAB affirmed EPA’s measurement of compliance 
at 500 meters from the ship, found that Shell’s estimated emissions 
would comply with the new standards, and concluded that the supple-
mental analysis adequately looked at the disproportionate health impacts 
on the North Slope as compared to the rest of Alaska.430 
With respect to the Kulluk permit, the petitioners argued that EPA 
erred in establishing limitations on the Kulluk’s potential to emit various 
pollutants and in declining to require a pre-construction increment analy-
sis.431 The groups also challenged the 500-meter exemption for measur-
ing ambient air quality and raised environmental justice concerns. On 
March 30, 2012, the EAB rejected those arguments and upheld the Shell 
Kulluk air permit.432 
Once the EAB appeals were complete, Alaska Native and environ-
mental groups filed two cases in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals chal-
lenging EPA’s approval of the permits.433 The court rejected the petition-
ers’ arguments and upheld the permit approvals. With respect to the Dis-
coverer, the Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Air Act was ambiguous as 
to whether best available control technology was required for vessels not 
attached to an Outer Continental Shelf source, and therefore, deferred to 
EPA’s determination that such technology was not required. 434 The court 
                                                            
 428. In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, supra note 426, at 2–3. Shell had explained to EPA that this 
distance was necessary for the ship to comply with the NAAQS. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. See In re Shell Offshore Inc., supra note 427, at 46. The groups challenging the Kulluk 
permit include: Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands, Alaska Wilderness 
League, Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern Alaska Envi-
ronmental Center, Oceana, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and Inupiat 
Community of the Arctic Slope. Id. at 1. “[I]ncrements are maximum allowable increases in pollu-
tion concentrations that may occur in particular areas.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 432. Id. at 100. 
 433. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands v. EPA, 716 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 
2012) (amended Apr. 23, 2013). 
 434. Id. at 1165. 
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also upheld EPA’s decision to allow measurement of ambient air to 
begin 500 meters from the ship.435 
In August 2013, the Ninth Circuit rejected the challenges to the 
Kulluk permit, thereby affirming EPA’s decision not to require a pre-
construction increment analysis for the Kulluk.436 
c. Spill Plan Approvals and Challenge 
As explained above, companies seeking to drill exploration wells 
must have approved oil spill response plans.437 Shell first had a Beaufort 
Sea response plan approved in 2006 to accompany its proposed 2007–
2009 drilling program. Renewed approvals were granted in 2010 for both 
the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea response plans. Drilling never occurred in 
those years, however, and DOI required Shell to resubmit plans for its 
proposed 2012 activities. 
In the new submissions, Shell’s emergency response plan is based 
on the assumption that “10 percent of the 25,000 [barrels of oil per day 
(bopd)] discharge escapes the primary offshore recovery efforts at the 
blowout.”438 Shell’s planning assumption means that Shell expects to 
contain, recover, and remove approximately 95% of any oil spill in the 
water and that only 5% would remain unrecovered and capable of affect-
ing shorelines. 
This response assumption is made despite the fact that, as explained 
above, less than 10% of the spilled oil that resulted from the Exxon Val-
dez and Deepwater Horizon accidents was recovered using mechanical 
means and that none of the equipment Shell proposed for use had been 
tested in Arctic conditions. As explained below, some of that equipment 
had not even been built. 
BSEE approved Shell’s oil spill response plans in February 2012.439 
In July 2012, a coalition of Alaska Native and conservation organizations 
filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Alaska challenging those ap-
                                                            
 435. Id. 
 436. See Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA, 727 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 437. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 438. SHELL, supra note 135, app. C at C-11. According to Shell, “the unrecovered 2,500 bopd 
is assumed to drift toward the mainland, driven by winds out of the [west-northwest].” Id. Shell 
assumed that “half of the oil reaching the near-shore environment would be recovered by the skim-
ming systems dispatched from the [Shell’s nearshore recovery task force].” Id. Shell further stated 
that “[t]he remaining 1,250 bopd are assumed to migrate toward the shoreline where [Shell’s spill 
response contractor] would mobilize personnel and equipment to intercept the oil and deploy boom 
for shoreline protection.” Id. 
 439. Dan Joling, Shell Spill Response Plan Wins Federal OK, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 
17, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/02/17/2322791/shell-wins-ok-for-arctic-spill.html. 
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provals.440 The plaintiffs argued that BSEE violated the law by approving 
a plan based on Shell’s assertion that it can remove 95% of a worst-case 
discharge and that the trajectory analyses on which the response plan is 
premised are faulty because they fail to encompass oil remaining under 
ice through the winter.441 The plaintiffs also argued that insufficient in-
formation was provided to BSEE for the agency to determine whether 
and how the worst-case discharge was modeled and that the spill re-
sponse plan did not contain information about Shell’s Arctic containment 
system, which BOEM and BSEE stated was an important component of 
response. In addition, several of the plaintiffs argued that BSEE violated 
NEPA by failing to prepare either an Environmental Assessment or EIS 
to evaluate the spill plan—or alternatives—and violated the ESA by fail-
ing to consult with expert agencies about potential impacts to endangered 
species.442 
This is case of first impression, and there is little case law interpret-
ing the statutory provisions at issue. It proceeded in district court in con-
junction with an action filed by Shell seeking declaratory judgment that 
the spill plans comply with the law.443 
In August 2013, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments 
wholesale,444 and they are pursuing an appeal.445 
d. Clean Water Act Permits 
To drill exploration wells, Shell must apply for and receive permits 
from EPA pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES) under the Clean Water Act. In lieu of individual permits 
for each activity, EPA can issue a “general permit” covering categories 
of similar activities. In May 2009, Shell asked EPA to provide coverage 
under its existing general permit for discharges from drilling activities in 
the Arctic Ocean.446 Shell’s proposed discharges dramatically exceeded 
                                                            
 440. Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Nos. 3:12-cv-00048-RRB, 
1:12-cv-00010-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/ 
files/159Order-denying-MSJ.pdf. 
 441. Id. at 13. 
 442. Id. at 24–36. 
 443. Id. at 1–2. 
 444. See generally id. 
 445. Shell Gulf of Mexico v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 13-35835 (9th Cir. argued Aug. 
13, 2014).  
 446. See Letter from David Dickson, Alaska Wilderness League et al., to Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency et al. (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/ 
permits/ocs/shell/alaska_wilderness_league_petition_shell_chukchi_noi_1-20-2010.pdf. 
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the amounts anticipated by the general permit.447 Concerned that approv-
al under a general permit would make it difficult to monitor impacts, en-
vironmental and Alaska Native organizations requested that EPA require 
individual permits for the proposed drilling.448 
Before EPA ruled on Shell’s request, the company repeated and 
broadened its application, seeking to operate under the general permit for 
the proposed 2012 activities and beyond.449 This time Shell was joined 
by ConocoPhillips and Statoil, who also sought coverage under the gen-
eral permit for drilling planned in 2012 and 2013.450 ConocoPhillips and 
Statoil also proposed to discharge volumes of pollutants including muds, 
cooling water, and sanitary and domestic waste that exceeded the 
amounts analyzed by EPA.451 Concerned again about the general permit 
approach, environmental groups requested that EPA permit the activities 
only under individual permits.452 
In summer 2011, EPA granted coverage to the three operators un-
der the expiring general permit.453 Subsequently, the Alaska Eskimo 
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NOI_CORRECTED_comments_1-28-2011.pdf. 
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Whaling Commission (AEWC) and Inupiat Communities of the Arctic 
Slope (ICAS) filed a lawsuit that resulted in a settlement whereby EPA 
agreed to issue a new general permit by a certain date.454 
EPA ultimately issued new separate general permits for the Beau-
fort and Chukchi seas in October 2012.455 Although the new general 
permits included an analysis of volumes of discharges that were more 
closely aligned with the proposals by Shell, ConocoPhillips, and Statoil, 
the permit itself placed no limits on the total volume of any discharge. 
Thus, even though EPA’s underlying analysis of impacts relied on an 
assumption that discharges would be limited to certain quantities over the 
five-year period, nothing in the permit actually limited the total amount 
of discharges permissible. The permit, therefore, left the door open for 
companies to continue discharges exceeding those analyzed by EPA.456 
Two lawsuits were filed—one by AEWC and the other by a coali-
tion of conservation organizations. The suits allege that EPA violated the 
Clean Water Act in setting the terms of the general permits and allowing 
for coverage of the proposed activities.457 The cases are currently pro-
ceeding in the Ninth Circuit. 
e. Shell Lawsuits Against Conservation Groups 
Between February and June 2012, Shell filed three lawsuits in fed-
eral district court in Alaska related to its proposed exploration drilling.458 
The suits named an Alaska Native and thirteen conservation organiza-
tions as defendants and sought declaratory judgments that approvals or 
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permits obtained by Shell complied with the law.459 None of these suits 
named the federal agency that issued the permits as a party, and the de-
fendants moved to dismiss two of them for lack of jurisdiction and a 
cognizable controversy.460 The district court denied those motions.461 
Ultimately, the district court dismissed two of the suits as moot, and the 
third was consolidated with the affirmative challenge to BSEE’s approv-
al of Shell’s spill plans.462 
Eventually, as part of its ruling rejecting the conservation groups’ 
challenge to BSEE’s approval of Shell’s oil spill response plans, the dis-
trict court granted Shell summary judgment and awarded declaratory re-
lief establishing its response plans as valid. Both of those rulings—the 
decision in the affirmative challenge to the spill response plans and the 
grant of declaratory judgment—are now on appeal in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.463 
f. Shell’s Operations in 2012 
Though litigation did not stop Shell from completing exploration 
wells in 2012, substantial problems and near-disaster did. These prob-
lems reflect the difficult conditions in Alaskan waters and the risks in-
herent in operating there. 
As an initial matter, Shell made public statements that were incon-
sistent with the commitments made in its Oil Spill Response Plans. As 
explained above, Shell’s spill response plans were premised at least in 
part on an assumption that the company could recover approximately 
95% of a major spill before spilled oil could contact the shoreline.464 In 
June 2012, however, a Shell spokesperson contradicted these clear 
statements in the plan by saying that “we expect to ‘encounter’ 90 per-
cent of any discharge on site—very close to the drilling rig . . . [and] to 
encounter 5 percent near-shore between the drilling rig and the coast. 
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And we expect to encounter another 5 percent on shore. We never make 
claims about the percent we could actually recover, because conditions 
vary, of course.”465 These statements directly contradict the clear lan-
guage of the plan.466 
Shortly before drilling was to start in 2012, Shell notified EPA that 
it would not be able to meet the emissions standards set in January for its 
Arctic fleet, asking EPA to modify its permit.467 EPA granted Shell’s 
request and issued a compliance order that allowed Shell to emit higher 
levels of pollutants than originally allowed.468 Notwithstanding EPA’s 
allowance of higher emissions levels, Shell’s operations in 2012 repeat-
edly violated the terms of its air permits. EPA cited both the Discoverer 
and Kulluk for violating “numerous” conditions of the air permits. The 
violations included failure to install required air pollution control equip-
ment, failure to properly calibrate air pollution monitoring equipment, 
operation of unpermitted propulsion engines, numerous violations of 
emission limits, and the failure to timely report such violations.469 Even-
tually, Shell was fined $1.1 million for these violations.470 
Shell also sought to lower the standards that would be required for 
its oil spill response barge. After the barge failed to receive U.S. Coast 
Guard certification, engineers from the company argued that it was no 
longer appropriate to require them to meet the rigorous weather standards 
originally proposed.471 Although Secretary Salazar initially characterized 
a trial deployment of Shell’s oil spill containment dome in the waters of 
Washington State as successful,472 DOI documents later revealed that the 
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dome had “breached like a whale” and was “crushed like a beer can” 
during the test.473 This failure led Secretary Salazar to prohibit Shell from 
drilling into hydrocarbon zones at any of its planned wells.474 
The company also had a series of significant problems moving ves-
sels and other equipment. Most famously, at the end of December, the 
icebreaker Aiviq—a brand-new, highly-touted purpose-built Arctic-class 
support vessel–was towing the Kulluk from Dutch Harbor for a 2,000 
mile trip to Seattle. The towrope disconnected, setting the Kulluk adrift 
in rough, but not unusual, seas.475 The Aiviq re-established the towline 
but then lost engine power, leaving both the Aiviq and Kulluk adrift.476 It 
has since come to light that Shell’s contractors made the decision to de-
part Dutch Harbor to avoid an estimated $6 million in state taxes that 
would have come due if it had remained in Dutch Harbor on January 1, 
2013.477 
A Coast Guard cutter joined the effort and established a tow with 
the Kulluk, but its towline soon parted and became entangled in the 
ship’s port propeller.478 Shell’s response vessel, the Nanuq, then arrived 
on scene and, along with the Aiviq, established towlines again, but again 
both lines separated from the Kulluk.479 The tug Alert then arrived from 
Prince William Sound to help, but it was forced to release its towline to 
the Kulluk after engine problems made towing too dangerous.480 The rig 
grounded shortly thereafter, losing among other things its small support 
boats, which spilled their fuel and washed further ashore.481 Despite mil-
lions of dollars of upgrades to prepare the Kulluk for drilling, its circular 
design had apparently made it an “ungainly structure” that was particu-
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larly challenging to tow in bad weather, spinning in circles and acting as 
“a sail” that hindered rescue efforts.482 
Shell lost control of its other drillship, the Discoverer, during the 
2012 open water season as well. On its way to the drill site, the ship was 
anchored in Dutch Harbor. The anchors were unable to hold the ship in 
place, and it drifted toward the coast.483 Tugs were called in to assist the 
rig, which was very close to shore.484 During the drilling operations, 
Shell was unexpectedly forced to use the Discoverer’s propulsion en-
gines to stay on site, as the anchor-handling icebreaker was not able to 
keep the vessel in position during unmooring due to rough weather.485 
This resulted in a violation of Shell’s air permit, which forbid the use of 
propulsion during the operational phase covered by the permits.486 After 
the drilling season, the Discoverer experienced propulsion problems and 
was not able to return to Seattle under its own power.487 
Ice in the Chukchi Sea delayed Shell’s plans to drill there by more 
than one month.488 Additionally, twenty-four hours after the company 
finally secured the Discoverer over its planned drill site, Shell had to 
weigh anchor and move because a massive ice floe covering approxi-
mately 360 square miles was drifting dangerously close to the site.489 
Throughout the 2012 drilling season, Shell also faced difficulties 
transporting people to the drill site because it did not have an easily ac-
cessible port on the U.S. Arctic coast from which to make personnel 
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transfers. “All too often, fog socked in the helicopters Shell used to rotate 
workers on and off its vessels,” and as a result, flights between the rig 
and land-based facilities were delayed for days at a time.490 In addition, 
the pilots operating Shell’s helicopters did not have Arctic experience,491 
and the lack of de-icing capability on the helicopters continued to chal-
lenge operations after drilling was complete because the crew could not 
be transported off the Kulluk rig.492 
In addition, the cold weather caused problems with desalination and 
treatment of water for use on the ship.493 Shell’s cranes froze in the cold 
conditions and could not be used to move heavy equipment aboard its 
ships.494 After the drilling season was over, weather also prevented Shell 
from conducting required maintenance on the Kulluk drill ship.495 As 
Deputy Interior Secretary David Hayes stated, “We’re no longer talking 
about these things in the abstract, where . . . the issues seem very man-
ageable. When they actually affect operations, it’s a reminder that this 
is . . . a particularly challenging environment.”496 
Many of Shell’s problems appeared to stem from the company’s 
lack of appreciation for the difficulty of operating in Arctic and northern 
water conditions as well as its high risk-tolerance.497 Shell’s problems led 
to a series of government investigations. The Department of the Interior 
undertook a sixty-day review of the drilling season that resulted in rec-
ommendations for improved regulations applicable to drilling in the Arc-
tic and additional requirements for Shell.498 Secretary of the Interior Sal-
azar concluded at the end of this review period that “Shell screwed 
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up.”499 As noted above, EPA’s investigation into Shell’s violations of its 
Clean Air Act permits resulted in a $1.1 million fine for the company.500 
In addition, the Coast Guard opened a marine casualty investigation re-
lated to the Kulluk grounding and asked the Department of Justice to 
open a criminal investigation of Shell’s drilling activities.501 The Coast 
Guard reportedly found sixteen safety and environmental violations by 
the Discoverer and almost as many by the Kulluk.502 
On April 3, 2014, the Coast Guard released the final results of its 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the grounding of the 
Kulluk. The report details mismanagement and poor risk assessment on 
the part of Shell and its contractors.503 It also describes violations of the 
law and regulations and recommended changes to improve safety and 
planning. On the very first page of the report, Assistant Commandant for 
the Coast Guard states that “the inadequate assessment and management 
of risks by the parties involved was the most significant causal factor in 
the mishap” and expresses trouble with the “significant number and na-
ture of the potential violations of law and regulations.”504 
Ultimately, Shell’s problem-plagued 2012 season is the in-the-
water result of the process, controversy, and management difficulties 
outlined above.  
4. Proposal for 2014 Chukchi Sea Exploration 
On October 31, 2013, Shell announced that, despite its continuing 
problems, the company was considering seeking approval to return to the 
Chukchi Sea in 2014.505 The announcement included a statement that 
exploration in the Beaufort was on hold for the immediate future and that 
the Kulluk drill rig might have been damaged beyond repair.506 Roughly 
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a week later, the company did indeed submit a “scaled down” explora-
tion plan.507 In that plan Shell sought approval to drill up to six wells in 
the Chukchi Sea, beginning with the one it started in 2012.508 Shell 
planned to use the Discoverer once again in the Chukchi Sea and to con-
tract with another vessel, the Polar Pioneer as a backup.509 The revisions 
also include reductions or relocations of spill response capacity and in-
creased noise estimates.510 
On November 29, 2013, BOEM sent Shell a letter requesting addi-
tional information needed to evaluate the plan.511 The review process 
resulted in correspondence back and forth between the agency and com-
pany. Also, in response to a requirement from the review of Shell’s 2012 
season, the company has submitted an Integrated Operations Proce-
dure.512 In the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the Lease 
Sale 193 EIS, Shell announced that it would forego exploration in 
2014.513 The company has since announced that it will pursue an expand-
ed exploration program using the Discoverer and Polar Pioneer to drill 
up to six wells over several years in the Chukchi Sea.514 The company 
hopes to begin operations in 2015, but the approval process is subject to 
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has not responded to other recommendations, and the Department of the Interior has not completed 
the Arctic safety standards called for in the report. See id. at 6–7. 
 513. Stanley Reed, After Weak Earnings, Shell Halts Plan to Drill in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/business/international/shell-to-step-up-asset-
sales.html?_r=0. 
 514. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REVISED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE 
EXPLORATION PLAN, CHUKCHI SEA, ALASKA (2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/EP-
PUBLIC-VERSION/.  
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ongoing remand resulting from the invalidation of the Lease Sale 193 
EIS. 
VI. WHAT’S NEXT 
With that history as background, we look next to the future. Rather 
than prognosticating, however, the Article offers steps that can and 
should be taken to help avoid mistakes like those that have plagued Shell 
and to provide protection for the health and resiliency of the U.S. Arctic 
Ocean. 
The United States is at a crossroads with regard to energy, the envi-
ronment, and human activities in the Arctic Ocean. Government approv-
als have led to millions of acres of leases controlled by oil companies, 
and those companies are seeking approvals to drill exploration wells.515 
As explained above, these decisions have led to controversy, litigation, 
and substantial risk to the marine environment. Despite consistent efforts 
over nearly ten years, companies have not been able to complete any ex-
ploration drilling, and newly available sources of unconventional fuels 
coupled with increasingly likely regulation of greenhouse gas emissions 
create significant uncertainty as to the market need and price to support 
industry investments in the U.S. Arctic Ocean.516 
The United States has been down this road before; approvals in the 
1980s led to some exploratory drilling but no development, and a decline 
in oil prices led companies to forego the leases they had purchased.517 In 
this section, we distill some of the reasons for this apparent boom-and-
bust cycle and the controversy it has generated. We then provide some 
steps that could be taken to improve the decision-making process and, 
hopefully, lead to a durable solution that maintains a healthy and diverse 
Arctic marine environment. 
A. Lessons Learned 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the United States has had a 
troubling history in its efforts to balance the exploitation of Arctic re-
sources while trying to respect and protect wildlife and local communi-
ties. Controversy and litigation have met almost every single government 
decision related to offshore activities, and there is the appearance that 
political considerations factor into decisions about public resources. 
                                                            
 515. See, e.g., supra Part V.B.1. 
 516. See, e.g., OCEANA ET AL., FROZEN FUTURE: SHELL’S ONGOING GAMBLE IN THE U.S. 
ARCTIC (2014), available at http://oceana.org/en/news-media/publications/reports/frozen-future-
shell-s-ongoing-gamble-in-the-us-arctic.  
 517. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80. 
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Fundamentally, these problems can be attributed to (1) the failure to en-
sure necessary preparedness to operate in a difficult and remote places; 
(2) the lack of community involvement; and (3) the need for more specif-
ic policy direction for making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
First, of course, it is clear that the Arctic is a challenging place in 
which to conduct industrial activities. As Shell’s experiences in 2012 
demonstrate, even one of the world’s largest companies did not appropri-
ately appreciate or manage these risks. Importantly, however, the prob-
lems are not solely attributable to Shell. The government granted the ap-
provals that allowed an unprepared company to operate in the Arctic 
Ocean. Moreover, the government took ill-advised planning steps—in 
the Five-Year Leasing Program, at the lease sale stage, and during court-
ordered remands of those decisions—that provided the leases and mo-
mentum for the company to seek those approvals. It is not clear that the 
government balanced risks and benefits appropriately or that sufficient 
forethought was given to the ramifications of decisions at the planning 
and lease sale stages. Allowing companies to purchase leases they are not 
prepared to explore safely creates a situation in which Shell’s poorly 
planned and executed 2012 efforts can occur. Once companies have in-
vested in leases and equipment, there is an overriding need to demon-
strate to shareholders a return on that investment. Proving the reserves by 
drilling successful exploration wells is one important way companies can 
achieve this goal. Thus, allowing companies to purchase leases creates a 
powerful incentive for those companies to explore, which in turn can 
create pressure on the government to approve those plans.  
Second, fundamental decisions about the expansion of oil and gas 
activities in Arctic waters have been made behind closed doors without 
meaningful opportunity for the public—and especially local community 
members—to participate. Regulations do not require public review of 
exploration plans, Environmental Assessments, or oil spill response 
plans. Even some of the public hearings that have been held were ineffi-
cient and problematic.518 Though improvements have been made, more 
remains to be done to fully incorporate the public and communities in the 
decision-making process. 
Third, it seems clear that the relevant government agencies do not 
have adequate, specific direction to address subsistence and environmen-
tal issues when conditions are uncertain. Decisions were made to allow 
oil and gas leasing and exploration despite widely recognized gaps in the 
                                                            
 518. Dan Joling, Drilling Advocates Dominate Federal Offshore Hearing, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/02/26/1723933/drilling-advocates-dominate-
offshore.html. 
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scientific understanding of the functioning of the marine environment 
and ways in which it might respond to disturbance.519 Similarly, oil spill 
response plans were approved even though the technology being used 
had never been tested in Arctic conditions, and the assumptions underly-
ing the plans were at odds with all of the historical evidence.520 Some of 
these decisions led to clear violations of the law.521 Others were based on 
new interpretations of the law that are still being challenged in court or 
on legal interpretations from other venues applied to the Arctic.522 There 
was no clear direction for precaution in the face of scientific or other un-
certainty. 
Together, these failures have had three overlapping effects that 
have led to the current state of controversy and failed operations in the 
Arctic. First, they have contributed to a substantial distrust of govern-
ment decision makers. DOI, in particular, has appeared to make deci-
sions that favor development rather than focus on science, holistic plan-
ning, or precaution.523 Second, these agency decisions have put marine 
resources at substantial risk. The grounding of the Kulluk with 150,000 
gallons of fuel on board is the most dramatic recent example. In addition, 
Shell exceeded its permitted air emissions and water pollution discharge 
requirements, putting workers at risk due to apparent safety violations. 
Finally, poor decisions have led to significant uncertainty and inef-
ficiency. By making the region available for leasing without proper eval-
uation of the potential impacts, the government has created a situation in 
which companies take financial risks and then advocate to government 
regulators to allow activities that could validate those risks. Analyses 
have shown that these risks to companies and the ocean are difficult to 
quantify and manage.524 Differing views about the appropriate way to 
balance risks to the environment against the purported benefits of allow-
ing companies to explore and develop has resulted in controversy. This 
                                                            
 519. See supra Part II.B. 
 520. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 521. See supra Parts V.B.1.b and V.B.3 (discussing 2007–12 Five-Year Leasing Program, 
Lease Sale 193, and 2007 Exploration Plan litigation). 
 522. See supra Parts V.C.3.a–b (discussing challenges to spill response plan approvals, the 
500-meter exclusion zone, and low-probability/high impact analysis for a major spill). 
 523. See DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT, supra note 33, at 77–79 (detailing “[a]gency integrity 
and pockets of corruption” and “[m]ismanagement and [m]isdirection”); see also supra notes 360–
62 and accompanying text (discussing failure to consider appropriately agency scientists’ concerns 
about the potential for significant effects from Shell’s proposed 2007–2009 exploration plan); see 
also note 331 and accompanying text (discussing the agency’s failure to fully address missing scien-
tific information in compliance with 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 in deciding to offer nearly thirty million 
acres of the Chukchi Sea in Lease Sale 193). 
 524. See LLOYD’S REPORT, supra note 131. 
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controversy has contributed to expense, inefficiency, and distrust. A 
more careful approach might have prevented it. 
B. Moving Forward 
Having identified several causes of the controversy and inefficiency 
related to decisions about offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic 
Ocean, we now turn to steps that can be taken to address these problems. 
Government officials—in congress and in the Executive Branch—can 
take steps to effect meaningful change. 
 
1. Congressional Action 
Though it appears to be unlikely in the short-term, congressional 
action would be the most comprehensive and effective way to address 
the problems identified above. Congress should act to reform the process 
by which decisions about Arctic oil and gas leasing, exploration, and de-
velopment are made. Many proposals of this nature were made in the 
wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill.525 Indeed, a series of deficiencies 
in OCSLA have been identified, and changes have been suggested to 
address them.526 Congress could take action that would ensure more ef-
fective compliance with NEPA, ensure that maintaining ocean health is 
given the highest priority, require more effective public involvement and 
interagency coordination, and improve spill response standards.527 
More generally, there is no statute that provides general guidance 
and philosophy for stewardship decisions about ocean resources in the 
Arctic or elsewhere. Nor is there a broader statute providing a specific 
mission for BOEM, BSEE, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue 
(ONRR). Rather, those three agencies are left to implement OCSLA 
without additional direction for ocean management. By contrast, for our 
terrestrial territory, the Bureau of Land Management (a sub-agency with-
in DOI), which oversees 245 million acres of federal land, is guided by 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act multiple use and sustained 
yield objective.528 The U.S. Forest Service (within the Department of 
Agriculture) manages roughly 190 million acres of land within the forest 
system pursuant to a similar standard in the National Forest Management 
                                                            
 525. See, e.g., Hartsig, supra note 202. 
 526. See generally id.; Michael LeVine & Andrew Hartsig, Management and Oversight of 
Offshore Oil and Gas—The Need for Change, 42 TRENDS 1 (2010). 
 527. See, e.g., Hartsig, supra note 202, at 306–15. 
 528. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2012) 
1362 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1271 
Act.529 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s manages over 150 million 
acres in the National Wildlife Refuge System and is guided by the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, which requires the 
conservation, management, and restoration of refuge lands for the benefit 
of present and future generations of Americans.530 Finally, the National 
Park Service management of eighty-four million acres of National Parks 
land is guided by the National Park Service Organic Act, which requires 
conservation-oriented management of our parks with a focus on provid-
ing for the enjoyment by current and future generations.531 
These statutes provide a basic structure within which the agencies 
make public land decisions, and BOEM and BSEE’s piecemeal approach 
to decisions reflects the absence of such guidance. OCSLA addresses 
only choices about offshore oil and gas activities, and it is not designed 
to provide stewardship for ocean ecosystems. The ideal federal law 
would recognize, as we generally do for our terrestrial territory, that the 
United States has an obligation to manage ocean resources not only for 
the current generation of Americans but also for future generations. It 
would ensure that the health and diversity of our marine waters is main-
tained and that development takes place only in a way that does not risk 
ecosystem health or other human uses of the ocean. Such a statute would 
complement OCSLA and provide broader direction to BOEM, BSEE, 
and other agencies that make decisions about Arctic Ocean resources. 
In the absence of such direction—and as explained above—the var-
ious federal agencies are left to implement different and often competing 
mandates related to Arctic Ocean resources in a piecemeal fashion. 
OCSLA addresses oil, gas, and mineral entry.532 The Magnuson–Stevens 
Fishery Management and Conservation Act addresses fisheries.533 The 
Marine Mammals Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act ad-
dress sensitive and at-risk fish and wildlife species.534 The disparate 
treatment of the Arctic under some of these laws highlights the need for 
such legislation. Out of concern for the continued health and diversity of 
fish and wildlife in Arctic waters, one agency—the National Marine 
Fisheries Service—looked at the state of the science in the Arctic and 
decided to close the federal waters to commercial fishing. Another agen-
cy—the Department of the Interior—looked at the same science and de-
                                                            
 529. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3) (2012). 
 530. Id. § 668dd(a)(2). 
 531. Id. § 1. 
 532. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2014). 
 533. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884 (2007). 
 534. Id.; Endangered Species Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1996), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2014). 
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cided to offer wide swaths of the ocean for lease to the oil and gas indus-
try and approves risky exploration proposals. Overarching legislation 
might provide a vehicle through which to harmonize the various needs 
related to the Arctic Ocean and help foster a productive future direction. 
Unfortunately, congressional action to provide additional direction 
that would alleviate the problem of piecemeal decision making does not 
appear likely. Despite continued warning signs, including a natural gas 
blowout and rig explosion at a shallow well in the Gulf of Mexico,535 the 
legislation introduced in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill has 
faded away. In its place, bills that would expand offshore leasing, re-
move important environmental safeguards, and prioritize oil and gas ac-
tivities above all other uses of ocean resources have moved through the 
House of Representatives.536 
2. Executive Action 
Within its existing statutory authority, the Executive Branch can 
take steps that would (1) ensure that decisions are based on good scien-
tific information and long-term planning; (2) improve transparency and 
opportunities for public engagement; and (3) ensure demonstrated spill 
response technologies. DOI has taken some steps to move in this direc-
tion, but more can and should be done. 
a. Steps to Improve Planning, Public Engagement, and Response 
The controversy and uncertainty outlined in this Article makes clear 
that decisions have been made in a piecemeal fashion and without a clear 
plan for the future of the Arctic region. Careful decisions require 
thoughtful planning, and the government should think holistically about 
how best to balance competing needs— including healthy oceans, af-
fordable energy, national security, and financial benefits to corporations 
and the American people—to create a vision for what it wants the Arctic 
region to look like in fifty or 100 years into the future. Concrete guide-
lines could be created to help ensure that today’s decisions about indus-
trial activities move us toward that vision. 
An understanding of the marine ecosystem sufficient to predict and 
mitigate potential impacts from industrial activities is integral to such a 
                                                            
 535. See Hays, supra note 78. 
 536. See Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, H.R. 2231, 113th Cong. (2013). On a related note, the 
mechanics of the federal budget process also inhibit informed agency decision making. The congres-
sional system of appropriations makes it difficult for agencies to coordinate their science effort be-
cause, for example, ocean-related budget discussions and priority setting are spread throughout 
multiple uncoordinated congressional committees. 
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planning effort. That understanding can best be achieved through long-
term baseline research and monitoring.  Since the 1980s, studies in the 
Arctic Ocean have not been guided by an overarching monitoring and 
research plan. Instead, research priorities over the past several decades 
have been guided by an assumption that enough was known about the 
basics. DOI, therefore, focused “on more topical studies in smaller areas 
to answer specific questions and fill identified information needs.”537 
These applied research questions are important and have led to a better 
understanding of specific issues, such as the bowhead whale migration 
route in the fall through the Chukchi Sea. However continued monitoring 
of key parameters is needed to understand whether the base of infor-
mation gathered remains valid. Climate change has altered the region 
dramatically over the last thirty years, and ecosystems have significant 
variability on yearly to decadal spans. 
The most efficient way to obtain the needed information is through 
a comprehensive research and monitoring program that would do the 
following: 
1. Integrate existing information to give a more holistic picture of 
what is known and conduct an analysis of the gaps in infor-
mation to determine the most pressing research and monitoring 
needs; 
2. Gain a more comprehensive catalogue of identified species, 
populations, and habitats, including seasonal migrations; 
3. Track the physical forcing factors that modulate biological 
productivity, habitat occupancy, and migration pathways; 
4. Secure a better understanding of trophic linkages, physical and 
biological processes affecting productivity and other facets of 
ecosystem structure and functioning, and effects of anthropo-
genic perturbations; 
5. Study potential ecological and sociological impacts; and 
6. Integrate these scientific data to identify Important Ecological 
Areas, as well as processes and habitats that are sensitive and 
vulnerable to perturbation, and furnish a basis for marine spatial 
planning. 
 
                                                            
 537. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, ALASKA OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGION, ALASKA ANNUAL STUDIES PLAN FINAL 
FY 2011 3 (2010), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Environmental 
_Stewardship/Environmental_Studies/Alaska_Region/Alaska_Studies_Plan/2011AlaskaStudiesPlan.
pdf. 
2014] Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean 1365 
Such a plan must also account for the climate change consequences of 
decisions to explore. Atmospheric levels of CO2 recently exceeded 
400ppm,538 and the disproportionate effects of the changes caused by 
those increases must be taken into account. 
As explained below, the government has started to take some of 
these steps to consider integrated Arctic management, and more can be 
done.539 
The planning proposed here can be undertaken without congres-
sional action. Moreover, in this planning process—and in other deci-
sions—it is vitally important to provide ample opportunity for public 
engagement and to make public the information needed to participate 
meaningfully. DOI could address these problems by allowing for public 
input in a timely manner on environmental assessments, spill plans, and 
other approvals. Moreover, government agencies can and should do more 
to engage those most affected by decisions. For example, several Alaska 
Native tribes in the U.S. Arctic are urging the federal government to take 
the following actions: 
1. Develop a “comprehensive and scientifically proven mitigation 
and monitoring plan . . . to provide oversight to Arctic industri-
al activities that could impact our food security, way of life, and 
the health of our peoples. . . .”540 
2. Commit to formal consultation with tribes in determining the 
deferral areas and other measures to protect “important cultural, 
biological, and subsistence use areas of the Arctic Ocean eco-
system to ensure . . .food security, cultural identity, and protect 
our way of life.”541 
3. Place on hold any new leasing in the U.S. Arctic until the com-
prehensive plan is created and implemented, deferral areas are 
imposed, and, importantly, when it is determined that “devel-
opment can be done without jeopardizing the safety of nearby 
villages, food security, and the migratory animals that [t]ribes 
depend upon.”542 
 
                                                            
 538. Geoffrey Mohan, Carbon Dioxide Levels in Atmosphere Pass 400 Milestone, Again, L.A. 
TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/20/science/la-sci-sn-carbon-dioxide-
400-20130520. 
 539. See infra VI.B.2.b. 
 540. 160 CONG. REC. E556 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2014). 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. 
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Providing meaningful opportunity for local people to influence decisions 
about the Arctic before they are made is critical to ensuring that the hu-
man rights of people in the Arctic are respected and honored by the Unit-
ed States. 
Moreover, participating effectively in the decision-making process 
requires access to information. President Obama has committed to create 
“an unprecedented level of openness in Government” and “a system of 
transparency, public participation, and collaboration.”543 Consistent with 
this directive, DOI can and should make available to the public data, 
studies, and other information relevant to decisions about oil and gas 
leasing and exploration in the Arctic Ocean. Relatively simple steps—
like publishing letters, approvals, and data on agency websites and com-
mitting to accepting public comments on exploration and spill response 
plans (as was the case for Shell’s Chukchi and Beaufort Sea plans)—are 
not routine and would go a long way toward building trust, improving 
public participation in the decision-making process, and fulfilling Presi-
dent Obama’s pledge to ensure openness in government. Similarly, 
BSEE should post its enforcement activities544 and make data from inci-
dents and near-misses, including causal information, available to the 
public. Last, any information BSEE has or learns about significant inter-
national offshore incidents—particularly those regarding operators in the 
United States like Shell—should be posted on its website. 
Oil spill prevention and response technology should also be devel-
oped and proven in Arctic conditions, and the necessary infrastructure 
should be put in place before more leasing or exploration occurs in U.S. 
Arctic waters. As explained above, there has been extensive and ongoing 
controversy surrounding the available response technologies, the lack of 
infrastructure, and the fact that none of the response equipment has been 
tested successfully in Arctic conditions. It is well within the administra-
tion’s authority to require such testing prior to approval of response plans 
or exploration plans. As explained above, the administration has relied 
on an overly restrictive interpretation of Clean Water Act regulations.545 
                                                            
 543. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dept’s & Agencies, 
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-12.pdf. 
 544. For a good example of posting enforcement activities, see Recent Enforcement Actions, 
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/public/enforcement (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (the posting of pipeline 
safety enforcement orders). 
 545. See supra notes 438–46 and accompanying text (discussing challenge to Shell’s oil spill 
response plans). 
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b. Mechanisms and Opportunities 
The changes outlined above would go a long way to ensuring that 
decisions affecting the Arctic Ocean are made in a holistic, inclusive 
manner that, in turn, would bolster informed decision making and also 
reduce controversy and risk. As explained below, the Obama administra-
tion, and DOI in particular, have taken some steps to move in this direc-
tion. Though there is more to be done, these changes evidence the admin-
istration’s authority to take meaningful action. 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon accident, DOI dissolved the 
Minerals Management Service and replaced it with BOEM, BSEE, and 
ONRR. These agencies then implemented some safety and oversight 
changes.546 None of these changes, however, went as far as the National 
Commission on the Deepwater Horizon and Offshore Drilling recom-
mended.547 Nor were they sufficient to prevent the accidents and near-
disaster caused by Shell in 2012. 
Recently, DOI committed to implementing Arctic-specific stand-
ards.548 This commitment came in part as a result of Shell’s 2012 drilling 
season,549 and it reflects the clear necessity to account for the unique dif-
ficulties of operating in the Arctic Ocean. While a step in the right direc-
tion, the new rules do not address planning or leasing. DOI can and 
should think more broadly about reforming its regulations to address 
shortcomings in the existing regulatory regime that generate ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and controversy. In addition to developing regulations con-
cerning containment systems, relief well capability, mutual assistance 
and resource sharing, and technical drilling issues, BOEM and BSEE 
should develop regulations to achieve the following: 
1. Implement additional Arctic-specific spill prevention and re-
sponse regulations, such as those detailed in the comments 
submitted on June 21, 2013, by the Pew Charitable Trusts; 
2. Provide specific direction for satisfying the agency’s balancing 
obligations under section 18 of OCSLA and codify the “target-
                                                            
 546. See supra Part III.F.2. 
 547. See The Offshore Energy and Jobs Act: Hearing on H.R. 2231 Before the H. Comm. on 
Natural Res., 113th Cong. 4–6 (2013) (written testimony of Donald F. Boesch, President of the 
Univ. of Maryland Ctr. for Envtl. Sci. to the Comm. on Energy and Natural Res.), available at 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/boeschtestimony06-10-13.pdf. 
 548. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Department of the Interior Releases Assessment 
of Shell’s 2012 Arctic Operation (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/department-of-the-interior-releases-assessment-of-shells-2012-arctic-operations.cfm. 
 549. See DOI 60-DAY REPORT, supra note 416, at 6–7. 
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ed leasing” approach to Arctic leasing described in the 2012–
2017 OCS leasing program; 
3. Clarify the roles and responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE and 
formalize the process and timing of various permit approvals 
(e.g., formalize mandatory public comment periods for oil spill 
response plans, environmental assessments, and associated 
analyses; clarify that BOEM will not approve a proposed explo-
ration plan until there is an accompanying approved oil spill re-
sponse plan, etc.); 
4. Explain how the agencies will comply with NEPA require-
ments at each stage of the OCS process in the Arctic (e.g., at 
the exploration plan stage, require completion of a full NEPA 
process before BOEM may deem an exploration plan com-
plete); 
5. Develop public disclosure requirements for information con-
cerning seismic exploration, drilling operations, inspections and 
compliance, and other activities;  
6. Ensure that BOEM properly accounts for externalities, includ-
ing climate change effects and other impacts associated with 
activities approved on the OCS.550 
 
More broadly, the Obama Administration has implemented changes 
that provide the opportunity for meaningful planning. President Obama 
created the National Ocean Council and implemented a National Ocean 
Policy.551 The Arctic is singled out as a priority area in this planning pro-
cess, and the National Ocean Council created an Arctic Strategic Plan 
and intends to implement it.552 These documents outline steps that can be 
taken to improve planning, decision making, and science for the Arctic 
Ocean. 
Similarly, President Obama created the Interagency Working Group 
on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in 
Alaska “[t]o formalize and promote ongoing interagency coordina-
                                                            
 550. See Letter from Ocean Conservancy, Oceana, & Audubon Alaska, to Tommy Beaudeau, 
Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Interior (June 21, 2013) (on file with author). 
 551. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-stewardship-ocean-our-coasts-and-
great-lakes. 
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tion . . . [and] facilitate coordinated and efficient domestic energy devel-
opment and permitting in Alaska while ensuring that all applicable 
standards are fully met.”553 That entity has begun “charting an ecosys-
tem-based management framework for the Alaska Arctic that would fo-
cus on particularly important ecological areas that support special wild-
life, land or water resources, as well as areas important for the subsist-
ence and culture of local communities.”554 As part of this effort, Inter-
agency Working Group produced a report explaining steps that could be 
taken to move toward integrated management for the Arctic.555 
At the end of the day, however, these steps have not ensured the 
forethought and planning needed to prevent controversy, litigation, and 
risk. In part that failure may be attributed to the Obama Administration’s 
repeated commitment to allowing exploration.556 Prior commitment to 
certain risky activities is, of course, antithetical to a thoughtful planning 
process. 
More fundamentally, however, these efforts provide some cause for 
optimism and underscore the Executive Branch’s authority to change the 
manner in which decisions are made. None of the actions laid out in this 
section require changes in existing laws or other congressional approv-
als—other than possible budget authorizations.557 A holistic look at these 
steps and an effort to incorporate them into one vision for the region and 
a set of principles to guide decisions into the future is well within the 
Executive Branch’s authority. 
Such an effort would improve certainty and clear and objective ac-
tion standards, which would go a long way ensuring protection of the 
marine environment, reducing risk and controversy, and improving deci-
sion making. At the end of the day, industry could benefit from that type 
of certainty. In its decision not to pursue Arctic drilling in 2014, Cono-
coPhillips emphasized this exact point and was backed up by Jack 
Gerard of the American Petroleum Institute who commented that the oil 
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companies “have to look at political risk [which is] high when there is 
regulatory uncertainty.”558 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As this history suggests, decisions about Arctic Ocean oil and gas 
leasing and exploration have been made in a piecemeal fashion, without 
the necessary scientific information, comprehensive planning, or appro-
priate guidance. These decisions appear to have been unduly influenced 
by national and international politics, resulting in substantial controversy. 
An examination of the historical context in which Arctic oil and gas ac-
tivities have been advanced in the United States reveals that the United 
States can find ways to make better, more informed, and more grounded 
decisions about development in the Arctic. The first steps in that process 
would be to improve planning, scientific understanding, preparedness, 
and public involvement in order to create a lasting vision for the Arctic 
Ocean. Implementing those changes is the best path toward management 
of the U.S. Arctic Ocean that protects all of its tangible and intangible 
values, ensures sustainability, and is respectful of local people, industry, 
and concerned members of the more general public. 
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